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Address to Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Festschrift of HEUNI 
 
 
Congratulations on the Silver Jubilee of the European Institute for 
Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI).  
Since 1981 – when HEUNI was established by an agreement 
between Finland and the United Nations – the Institute has worked 
closely with the UN, enriching its work on crime prevention and 
control.  
The Institute’s work on restorative justice, alternatives to 
imprisonment, juvenile justice, persons in custody as well as norms 
and standards is a big support to the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the work of the UN Member 
States.  
HEUNI has been a regular supporter and contributor to the work of 
the UN Congresses on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and 
sessions of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice.  
Its analysis of questionnaires and surveys contributes to an 
evidence based approach to crime prevention. This work is in 
increasing demand as the world tries to come to grips with the 
threat of trans-national organized crime.  
In 2003, for the first time, a global instrument came into force to 
counter the threat posed by organized crime: the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime. It, along with its three 
Protocols, is the first global attempt to deal with dangerous trans-
national threats posed by organized crime, for example trafficking 
in persons, smuggling of migrants and the illegal manufacturing 
and trafficking of firearms.  
In order to effectively implement this Convention, we need more 
information on “best practices”, more training of national experts, 
and more information on crime trends. HEUNI’s expertise and 
support in these areas are vital.  
I hope that in years to come there will be even closer co-operation 
between UNODC and HEUNI as well as other Institutes of the UN 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme Network. Your 
ideas and initiatives are vital for stimulating the inter-governmental 
process.  
 
Congratulations, and good luck for your next quarter century.  
 
 
Antonio Maria Costa 
Executive Director 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
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Introduction 
 
When something new gets established, it is not only the idea that 
counts but also the dedication and active contribution of the people 
involved. Over a quarter of a century ago, the European Institute for 
Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations 
(HEUNI), was created. The story began in 1972, on an airplane en 
route from Cairo to Geneva, when the Finnish professor of criminal 
law Inkeri Anttila and the Director of the (then) Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Branch (CPCJB) of the United Nations, Mr 
William Clifford, came up with the idea of establishing a European 
regional institute for the UN in Helsinki, Finland. At that time, the 
United Nations already had one interregional institute (UNICRI), 
established in 1968 on the basis of an ECOSOC resolution, and a 
regional institute for Asia and the Far East (UNAFEI), established in 
1962 on the basis of an agreement between the Government of 
Japan and the United Nations.  
It took some years before this plan finally started to become a 
reality. (In the meantime, another regional institute, ILANUD, was 
created in Costa Rica in 1975 for the Latin American and 
Caribbean region.) On 23 December 1981, an Agreement on the 
establishment of HEUNI was signed between the United Nations 
and the Government of Finland. The active promoters of the 
Agreement were, again, Professor Anttila, and Mr Clifford’s 
successor as Director of the CPCJB, Professor Gerhard O.W. 
Mueller.  
Why Helsinki, why the far northern edge of Europe? There were 
some good reasons for this. Almost thirty years ago, there was still 
a clear political divide between East and West Europe, and Finland 
had a recognized geopolitical status between the two. From the 
political and practical point of view, Helsinki was easily accessible 
from east and west. Indeed, one of the principal reasons for 
establishing the Institute in Helsinki was in order to build bridges 
between countries with different socio-economic systems. 
However, perhaps the main reason for choosing Helsinki was 
Professor Inkeri Anttila herself. She was a nationally and 
internationally recognized expert in crime policy matters, she had 
established useful contacts around the world among academics 
and decision-makers, and she was well known also within the 
United Nations: she had served as the President of the Fifth United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders (Geneva 1975) and she had just been elected a member 
of the UN Committee on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 
which was the predecessor of the present Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice. Moreover, she had previous 
experience in establishing and leading research institutions, such 
as the Finnish National Institute of Criminology, and the Finnish 
National Research Institute of Legal Policy. 
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HEUNI was established in December 1981 as an independent 
unit under the aegis of the Finnish Ministry of Justice. The institute 
became operational in 1982. Professor Anttila became the self-
evident Director of HEUNI. The other staff members were a senior 
researcher, two programme officers and an administrative 
assistant. HEUNI had a separate budget provided by the Ministry of 
Justice and, as encouraged by the Agreement, other governments 
participated in the operations either through a standing annual 
contribution (as with the case of Sweden), or in the form of ad-hoc 
contributions. 
There was no clear model on the basis of which the new institute 
would operate. The Agreement solemnly stated that the objective of 
the Institute shall be to provide for the regular exchange of 
information and expertise in crime prevention and control among 
various countries of Europe with different socio-economic systems, 
to promote the training of experts in the field and to undertake 
studies and research on crime prevention and criminal justice 
policies. Consequently, this made it possible for HEUNI to 
exchange information and expertise in practically any question 
related to crime prevention and control – but somehow the template 
for HEUNI’s work, HEUNI’s raison d’etre had to be discovered. 
When HEUNI started its work, Europe was clearly divided into 
two, not only politically, but also in respect of crime prevention and 
criminal policy questions. At that time the Council of Europe 
brought within its framework the Western European countries, 
whereas the approach in the Eastern European countries to many 
questions was quite different from that taken in the West. 
Nevertheless, all the European countries had to find solutions for 
the same kind of problems, such as how to deal with juvenile 
delinquents, how to prevent burglaries, how the work of the police 
and courts could be made more effective and how the penal 
system should be developed. HEUNI found its role when the 
decision was made to concentrate on those problems which would 
most likely benefit from an exchange of information and 
experiences among all European countries. 
For the first time, large pan-European research projects and 
conferences were being planned in order to discuss topical matters 
in crime prevention and criminal justice on a high level. At that time 
many felt that such exercises were too bold: it would not be 
possible to get experts in many countries to answer questionnaires, 
it would not be possible to identify themes for discussion that would 
be interesting enough for all countries, and in no way was it 
obvious that busy experts and overburdened civil servants would 
sacrifice their time and come to distant Finland just in order to 
participate in meetings organized by some unknown institute. And 
yet, again thanks to Director Anttila’s reputation and many contacts, 
it turned out in fact to be easy to find experts for each theme. One 
weakness in large organizations and other bureaucratic 
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establishments is the obligation to form contacts primarily through 
official channels. The modus operandi of little HEUNI was different: 
Director Anttila just sent a letter to her good friends, be they 
university professors, Presidents of a Supreme Court or Ministers. 
It was in keeping with this that the first International Advisory Board 
of HEUNI counted among its members three Supreme Court 
judges and a director of the international relations department of 
the Ministry of Justice of one country. In addition, the very first 
HEUNI seminar was attended by, among others, the Director of the 
Legal Division of the Council of Europe and a high representative of 
the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. With this proof, any 
lingering doubts about HEUNI’s ability to arrange high-level 
discussions evaporated, and HEUNI could properly start it 
operations.  
What then were the activities and functions of HEUNI? 
According to the Agreement, these were to organize seminars (for 
policy-makers, administrators, experts and researchers); to collect 
information and to provide interested Governments with relevant 
information and to publish and disseminate such materials and 
information; to conduct research and to hold conferences and 
meetings serving the objectives of the institute.  
The topics of the seminars, meetings of experts and the 
research projects are selected on the basis of two primary criteria. 
They should be based on the UN crime prevention and criminal 
justice programme as defined by the Crime Commission, and they 
should deal with issues of priority for the European region. Special 
emphasis has always been given to the need of the countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The topics have ranged from victim 
policy to prison health, from computerization to crime prevention 
strategies, from the analysis of crime trends to trafficking in 
persons, and many other topics in between.  
Throughout the years, HEUNI has fulfilled its mandated 
functions, with slight changes in priority, depending on the person 
of the Director at different times. HEUNI has had three directors, 
and the forms of activities have been a reflection of each of them in 
turn: establishing HEUNI and laying its groundwork, policy-making, 
and research.  
During Professor Anttila’s tenure (1981-1987), the focus was on 
the broad picture, on holding major European conferences, on 
creating visibility, credibility and stability, and on finding common 
ground between the different political systems. Dr Matti Joutsen’s 
term as Director (1987-2000) saw the period of perestroika and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. That was the time of smaller expert 
meetings, leading to large seminars and conferences with many 
European countries. It was also a period of rapid growth in 
international technical assistance and the provision of expertise 
upon request to the newly emerging democracies. At that time 
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HEUNI also took an active part in the development of the United 
Nations Crime and Criminal Justice Programme. Indeed, it has 
been said that the first draft of the new UN Programme was 
sketched out on the HEUNI kitchen table at a meeting which 
brought together senior officials from, among other countries, 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United 
States, as well as the United Nations. Thanks to the efforts of many 
dedicated “friends of the UN crime programme” from various 
member states, the Programme was renewed and strengthened at 
the Ministerial Conference held in Versailles in 1991. The reform 
resulted, among other things, in the replacement of the Crime 
Committee with the politically strong Commission. HEUNI was also 
active in providing the secretariat with various background 
documentation, both for sessions of the Commission and for the 
Crime Congresses. –The cooperation between the various UN 
network institutes was extensive, and the stablilization of the 
network was strongly on HEUNI’s agenda.  
With Mr Kauko Aromaa as director (2000 -), research has come 
to play a greater role on the HEUNI agenda. HEUNI staff members 
themselves take active part in the research projects which are often 
carried out jointly with different partners from the European 
countries. Occasionally HEUNI acts as a silent partner, by 
identifying experts and facilitating access to various authorities and 
offices. The large projects cannot be paid on the basis of the 
regular budget and so, following the contemporary trend, more and 
more extra-budgetary funds are being sought – and received from 
various sources. The research themes are related to transnational 
organized crime issues, such as corruption and cross-border crime, 
but also to crime prevention, corrections and victimisation, 
especially violence against women, and statistical analyses of 
crime trends. Meetings organized by HEUNI are primarily small 
expert group meetings and workshops at various conferences and 
congresses regarding on-going research projects. They usually 
result in reports in the HEUNI publication series or in articles and 
papers elsewhere. HEUNI’s visibility in scientific professional 
organizations has grown remarkably. Also, HEUNI’s participation in 
promoting UN standards and norms has grown significantly as 
HEUNI has played an important role in re-designing the information 
gathering instruments for the application of various standards and 
the need for, and provision of possibilities of technical assistance to 
the UN member states. 
One of HEUNI’s activities is the granting of scholarships. This 
involves a fairly modest programme but it has enabled some 170 
post graduate students, junior academics and practitioners in the 
field of crime and crime control to come to HEUNI for a short period 
of time to do her or his own research, to become acquainted with 
the Finnish legal system, or to acquire knowledge of the UN 
programme. Especially during the first ten years of HEUNI’s 
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operations, this was rather attractive for young persons from 
Central and Eastern European, since there were not so many other 
possibilities available, and the modern Western literature at that 
time was rather inaccessible in those countries. Later, many of 
these “children“ of HEUNI have moved on to brilliant careers, 
serving as professors, high-level civil servants, advisors and 
members of parliament and even ministers. 
When speaking about HEUNI, mention has to be made of the 
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme 
network, an entity which has mostly developed during HEUNI’s 
time and to which HEUNI has been a keen contributor. (The 
network is also known by a number of other terms, such as the 
“institutes, “the PNI” and “the Network Institutes.”) The story of the 
Institutes began already during the late 1960s, with the creation of 
the United Nations Social Development Research Institute 
(UNSDRI; later called the United Nations Interregional Crime and 
Justice Research Institute, UNICRI). That was gradually followed 
by the establishment of regional institutes in Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean region, the Arab countries, Europe and Africa, 
the latest newcomers having joined in 2004. Today, the PNI 
consists of sixteen interregional and regional institutes as well as 
specialized centres around the world, including the UNODC. The 
network was developed in recognition of the importance of 
international cooperation and in response to various legislative 
mandates of the United Nations to assist the international 
community in strengthening international cooperation in crime 
prevention and criminal justice at the global, regional and 
subregional levels. Specific criteria have been approved for the 
creation and affiliation of new institutes to the network.  
The scope of HEUNI’s activities is broad. Today’s challenges are 
very different from those for twenty-five years ago. Nowadays 
Europe is practically united: the European Union covers half of the 
countries in the region, and most countries are members of the 
Council of Europe. Resources and possibilities are widely available, 
to a degree also for institutions like HEUNI. The present-day spirit 
is to look for extra-budgetary funding for research purposes and 
HEUNI is not behind this trend. The fact that HEUNI’s host country 
Finland is an EU member is not without significance to HEUNI 
either. More and more, HEUNI is servicing the European countries, 
and the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Programme, by providing timely information on various aspects of 
crime, both on traditional and emerging issues. Looking back, it can 
be said that HEUNI’s strength lies in its ability to respond to the 
demands of each time. This is also a good point to look ahead. 
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On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of 
HEUNI, the entire HEUNI staff wishes to express their heartfelt 
thanks and respects to everyone who have made our work so 
meaningful and rewarding. Two persons in particular stand out: 
Professor Gerhard Mueller, who passed away in April 2006, and 
Professor Inkeri Anttila, who celebrates her 90th birthday today. 
 
 
Helsinki, 29 November 2006 
 
Terhi Viljanen 
Senior Programme Officer 
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European Experiences in Preventing Organised Crime: 
Field studies of best practices by a Council of Europe 
expert group1 
 
 
Kauko Aromaa 
Director 
HEUNI 
Finland 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Europe and South America: dissimilar organised crime problems, 
similar control approaches 
 
From organised crime studies in Europe and South America, 
obvious differences between the two regions emerge. Organised 
crime, including its transnational dimension, has a different history, 
a different opportunity structure, and a different profile in both of 
these two regions. However, organised crime, in general terms, 
also seems to have many commonalities across the two regions. 
This becomes clear when Oliveira distinguishes five different types 
of organised crime in the MERCOSUL region (Oliveira 20052). The 
first type comprises groups with clear lines of authority, involved in 
all kinds of serious professional crime. The second type of groups 
have a weak organisational structure, and are busy with assaults, 
fuel adulteration, kidnappings and hijacking. The third group are 
those involved in a range of financial crimes which involves tax 
evasion and environmental crime. In the fourth group, organised 
crime is evident by criminal activity within the State. This suggests 
that some public officials are corrupt or dishonest, co-operating with 
organised crime. In the fifth group are the terrorist networks and 
organisations. 
The types of organised criminal groups as presented by 
professor Oliveira are strikingly familiar to the European observer. 
Many of the concrete actions of the groups are probably different in 
                                                     
1 The paper was presented in the First International Co-operation Forum for the 
Control of Organized Crime in the Relations of Productions and Investments of 
Mercosul, Foz de Iguaçu, 23-25 November 2005 
2 Edmundo Oliveira (2005). Co-operation and Law Enforcement to Counter 
Organised Crime in the Common Market Countries of South America 
(MERCOSUL). In Kauko Aromaa & Terhi Viljanen (eds.): Enhancing International 
Law Enforcement Co-operation, including Extradition Measures. Proceedings of 
the workshop held at the Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice, Bangkok, Thailand, 18-25 April 2005. European Institute for 
Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI), 
Publication Series No. 46, pp. 33-39. 
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South America, whereas this kind of generalised typology is easily 
recognised also in descriptions of the European situation. 
Consequently, it should not be a surprise when I maintain that 
many of the instruments found useful in preventing organised crime 
in Europe are likely to be useful in South America too, beginning 
from the universal United Nations Convention on Transnational 
Organised Crime and its three protocols3. Similarly, even if the 
practical, legal and scientific definitions of (transnational) organised 
crime have been difficult to reach, it has proven to be possible to 
develop pragmatic approaches to countering this elusive 
phenomenon. This is what the present paper intends to 
demonstrate. 
 
 
The Council of Europe expert group 1997-2003 
 
A Council of Europe expert group worked, among other tasks, on 
the issue of best practices in combating organised crime in the 
region from the late 1990s to the end of the year 20034. The work 
was done by making brief field visits to selected European 
countries to interview central experts and authority representatives 
on a number of organised crime prevention issues. 
The purpose of these "best practice surveys" (BPS) was fairly 
simple: as certain European countries had developed innovative 
solutions to the problem of organised crime, it seemed appropriate 
and important to ensure that these be shared with other countries. 
The aim of the surveys was thus to document such experience in a 
limited number of countries and to disseminate the results in order 
to encourage and motivate the relevant authorities throughout 
Europe. 
Each field survey comprised three European countries that were 
selected according to previous information about their particular 
experience in the relevant survey topic. A total of eight field surveys 
were carried out. The field survey topics were 
• 1 Witness protection 
                                                     
3 The Palermo Convention (The United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime) has three supplementary protocols: The Protocol the Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; The 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land; Sea and Air; the Protocol 
against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition. 
4 The outcome was published in 2004 as "Combating Organised Crime. Best 
practice surveys of the Council of Europe." Reports by the Committee of Experts 
on Criminal Law and Criminological Aspects of Organised Crime (PC-CO)(1997-
2000) and the Group of Specialists on Criminal Law and Criminological Aspects of 
Organised Crime (PC-S-CO)(2000-2003). Council of Europe, Octopus 
Programme. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing. 
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• 2 Reversing the burden of proof in confiscating the proceeds of 
crime 
• 3 Interception of communication and intrusive surveillance 
• 4 Crime analysis 
• 5 Cross-border co-operation 
• 6 Provisions on membership of criminal organisations 
• 7 Co-operation against trafficking in human beings 
• 8 Preventive legal measures 
 
These topics comprise approaches intended to facilitate the 
investigation of organised crime (1, 3, 5, 6), making it easier to 
sentence actors in organised crime or increasing the risk of 
punishment (2, 5, 6, 7), enhancing the prevention and investigation 
of organised crime (4, 5, 6, 7), or making the criminal activity more 
difficult (8). 
Whether additional best practice topics could have been studied, 
remains an open question, as the mandate of the group of experts 
ran out. However, the eight topics just listed do represent quite a 
broad range of instruments that can be contemplated when 
developing an anti-organised-crime strategy. The eight topics have 
a close connection to Recommendation Rec(2001)11 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member States concerning guiding 
principles on the fight against organised crime, adopted on 19 
September 2001. The Recommendation comprises 28 guiding 
principles ranging from general preventive measures (such as 
prevention of money laundering and corruption), issues related to 
the criminal justice system (including criminalising membership in 
organised crime groups, the confiscation of crime proceeds, 
witness protection, the interception of communications, and crime 
analysis), to international co-operation, data collection, research 
and training. 
The topics, as can be seen, deal with several different aspects 
and levels: there are a number of dimensions to countering 
organised crime, dealing with either the crime definitions and legal 
measures intended to prevent organised crime, including issues of 
proof/evidence; with the crime environment; with the criminal 
motivation (profit); with taking away obstacles to practical 
investigations, including cross-border co-operation of relevant 
authorities; with providing police with special powers required for 
improved organised crime prevention and control. 
In short, the measures/dimensions analysed in this case fall 
under several well-known categories acknowledged in crime 
prevention theory, including 
 - increasing the effort 
 - increasing the risks 
 - reducing the rewards 
 - reducing the provocations 
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 - removing excuses 
 
It should be noted that there are also other relevant 
developments on the European scene that have to do with 
enhancing international co-operation at authority-level. These 
would deserve a full treatment separately. They comprise 
developments such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Arrest 
Warrant, the Baltic Sea Task Force, all of them relevant innovations 
the potentials of which have not yet been tested very far but where 
useful lessons could likely be learned as well. 
 
 
The best practice surveys 
 
Witness protection 
 
Witnesses (and victims) to organised crime are often subject to 
intimidation and violence, and are thus often prevented from 
providing information or testifying in court. In a number of countries, 
procedural and non-procedural measures have therefore been 
introduced to protect such witnesses or "collaborators of justice". 
Studying the experiences of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands in 
late 1998, the BPS concludes that witness-protection programmes 
in these countries are highly effective in that witnesses who co-
operate fully with the programme have not become victims of 
violence, and in that their testimonies have contributed to the 
conviction of leaders and key figures of organised crime groups. 
Alternative ways to protect witnesses. The European 
countries selected for a closer look at their experiences ("good 
practices") proved to have found alternative ways to protect 
witnesses. Witness-protection programmes may go as far as 
changing the identity of the witness, or they may have other ways 
of protecting the witness. Both aim at avoiding to endanger the 
witness by making it impossible to recognise them or to trace them. 
In most cases this is done by granting partial or full anonymity to a 
witness. 
Why is witness protection needed? It may be possible to use 
statements of anonymous witnesses as evidence in court, although 
convictions may not be based on anonymous testimony alone. 
According to this approach, the justified interests of an endangered 
witness can lead to a reduction of the right of the defence to 
question the witness. This may be achieved by different technical 
solutions, including hearing a witness in the absence of the 
defendant, or making eye-contact between witness and accused 
impossible, or allowing the questioning of a witness through an 
audio-link with a voice transformer. Questions may also be put to 
the investigating judge who may act as an intermediary, also in 
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order to prevent questions/answers that might help to reveal the 
identity of the witness. 
The advantage of hearing a witness in the absence of the 
defendant is that it prevents both direct verbal or physical threats to 
the witness and more subtle intimidation by the defendant. In 
addition, the court may exclude the public from the hearing, or part 
thereof. This means that endangered witnesses may be heard at a 
court sitting not open to the public, for their protection against 
public disclosure of their existence and their appearance. 
Legal basis. The argument in support of such practices is that 
authorities who compel (or ask) an endangered witness to testify 
should take appropriate measures in order to protect the life of the 
witness. This does not mean that the state is obliged to rule out all 
possible violence to witnesses. However, it does mean that a state 
should organise their criminal proceedings in such a way that the 
interests of witnesses are not unjustifiably imperilled. 
In ethical terms, witness protection should not be seen as a kind 
of reward for co-operation by the witness with the law enforcement 
authorities. Instead, it should be viewed as a way of safeguarding 
the criminal trial and securing the life and limb of the witness (and 
their relatives). In practice, it is however not uncommon for a 
witness to be rewarded for co-operation with the law enforcement 
authorities, for instance by a reduction of their sentence or other 
benefits. 
Types of crime. Entering a witness protection programme 
usually leads to a total disruption of the normal life of the witness 
and their relatives. For that reason and for reasons of the high cost 
involved, it is advisable to restrict witness protection programmes to 
cases of (very) serious crime, in particular for combating organised 
criminal groups and terrorist groups. 
This can be explained by the closed character of the groups 
involved, which makes it very difficult to use traditional investigative 
methods successfully. Considerable significance is attached to the 
testimony of witnesses who, by virtue of their personal proximity to 
the planning and commission of crime, are in a position to make 
statements leading to the identification of the organisers and 
beneficiaries of the crimes in question. In such cases, material 
evidence if often insufficient, and therefore the protection of 
individuals who are prepared to testify takes on even greater 
importance. 
Another category of crime for which witness protection is 
frequently used is that of capital and other violent crimes, especially 
in cases where the suspect already knew the victims and the 
witnesses. If the risk of retaliatory measures against witnesses by 
the perpetrator or their "friends" is such that witnesses are not 
willing to testify in court, a witness protection programme can offer 
a solution. 
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Admission; who is eligible. Procedures by which witnesses 
may be admitted to a protection programme are variable. It is usual 
that the decision goes to a rather high level of authority, often 
acting as some kind of central assessment boards. 
The most common type of eligible witnesses is the co-defendant 
who has decided to co-operate with the justice authorities and who 
is prepared to give testimony in court against their former 
associates. In the second place, the programme is meant for 
witnesses who are not suspected of a crime. This category mainly 
comprises innocent bystanders who happened to be present when 
something happened that was relevant from a criminal investigative 
viewpoint. This may also include relatives (wives and girlfriends) of 
members of organised criminal groups who were murdered. 
Overall, it is only a small percentage of the participants in the 
witness protection programme who do not have a criminal 
background. 
Volume and costs. In the three example countries, the annual 
number of applications to witness protection programmes has 
fluctuated roughly around 2 and 7 per million inhabitants, reflecting 
the exceptional character of the measure. However, as this 
measure is of a rather permanent character - the average duration 
being several years - the number of people in the programme is 
constantly increasing, the volume of participants having 
accumulated over time from ten to ninety people per million 
inhabitants. 
Witness protection is expensive. Depending of the duration and 
the number of family members involved, the cost per witness may 
vary - very roughly - between 80,000 and 400,000 USD. The costs 
are mainly caused by the protection service (salaries), removals 
and temporary residences, economic subsistence, housing, 
medical costs, and legal assistance. 
Although witness protection is not cheap, the costs may be 
considered to be reasonable compared to labour-intensive 
investigative measures such as infiltration or long-term 
surveillance. The strong impression also is that witness-protection 
is more effective and efficient than those other methods, especially 
in the case of organised crime. 
International co-operation. International co-operation between 
countries will make witness protection for every single country more 
effective, because the more countries the protected witnesses can 
reside in, the more difficult it will be for offenders to trace them. 
Furthermore, if countries share a common method of protecting 
endangered witnesses, this will enhance the ease with which 
witnesses can be moved abroad. For this purpose, international 
agreements should be promoted. 
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Reversing the burden of proof in confiscating the proceeds of crime 
 
The difficulty of proving the criminal origin of wealth. The 
generation of substantial profits is at the heart of organised crime. 
Thus depriving criminals from these profits is a key element of any 
anti-organised-crime strategy. Financial investigations, and the 
search, seizure and confiscation of proceeds are hence considered 
to be among the most powerful tools against organised crime. 
Major problems in this connection include situations where 
suspects are inexplicably rich but where there is no conviction for a 
predicate offence to which this wealth can be attributed or 
situations where there is a conviction for an offence but it may be 
difficult to prove that the wealth in question does in fact stem from 
the proceeds of that particular crime. Similarly the level of proof 
required may be too high, namely criminal (beyond reasonable 
doubt) rather than civil (balance of probability). Under such 
circumstances the question arises whether the burden to prove that 
suspected crime proceeds are in fact of lawful origin could be 
placed on the defendant. The BPS assessed the experiences of 
Denmark, Ireland and Switzerland. In this context, it discusses a 
number of human rights concerns related to this question, and 
concludes that a "refutable reversal of the burden of proof in 
confiscation cases seems likely to be upheld as lawful" by the 
European Court of Human Rights. However, it also states that the 
effectiveness of this approach remains limited, at least as long as 
criminal proceeds are not systematically targeted in the first place 
through financial investigations. 
Profits and proceeds. It is essential to differentiate between 
profits and proceeds. Profit is the amount obtained, net of financial 
disbursements by the offender(s) including legal and laundering 
costs. Proceeds denote the gross amount obtained by criminals, 
which may have to be distributed among different levels of 
offenders and among third parties to pay for sometimes legitimate, 
innocent third-party costs such as transport, housing and financial 
services. If the confiscation measure is expected to provide 
significant funding for financial investigation, there is an obvious 
risk that, unless the targets are wealthy anyway, only the profits 
from crime can normally be recovered and even many of the profits 
from crime will have been spent on conspicuous consumption. In 
practice, often only offenders' gifts, investments, property and 
savings are available for confiscation, and even these typically 
provided that they are in the offender's own name rather than 
somebody else's. 
Particular difficulties have been experienced in proving, beyond 
reasonable doubt, the criminal origin of assets owned (or 
apparently owned) by legal persons (corporations, trusts etc.) that 
are domiciled in offshore finance centres, and conventional criminal 
procedures are unlikely to penetrate these major cases. 
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The "take". The financial "take" (let alone the profit to local or 
central government net of enforcement costs) from asset 
forfeiture/confiscation has been modest in every country except the 
United States, where a significant amount of the income from 
forfeiture comes from: 
- the liability (including corporate criminal liability) of third parties 
such as financial intermediaries, rather than from the "primary" 
offenders such as narcotics traders, and 
- the civil and criminal forfeiture provisions attached to the 
particular form of conspiracy law known as the Racketeer 
Influenced Corrupt Organization law of 1970 (which has later on, 
in 2000, again been watered down). 
 
What gets seized? One conclusion would be that the financial 
investigation picks up, at best, the layering and usually the 
placement stage. It is very rare for physical objects or current 
businesses to be seized. What gets seized - or frozen - is real 
property (land, houses, apartments, cars, businesses), followed by 
cash in accounts or investments in shares and bonds. 
Overall, confiscation has been confronted with serious problems. 
In financial terms, the successes have at best been only modest. 
Modest results. The final observation is that not only legal 
changes but also cultural and organisational changes are essential 
prerequisites of successful confiscation of the proceeds of crime. 
Unless appropriate resources and training to enhance the 
competence levels of key decision makers - investigators, 
prosecutors, defence lawyers and judges - are provided, legislative 
changes to the burden of proof will make only the most modest 
difference.  
Alternatives. Finally, it should be remarked that confiscation is 
not the only way of depriving offenders of their proceeds: taxation 
authorities too can become actively involved in that role with good 
results. This issue would probably deserve special attention, in 
particular when considering the modest successes recorded for the 
confiscation option. No separate study has been carried out on this 
option in the present context. 
 
 
Interception of communication and intrusive surveillance 
 
The possibility of penetrating the closed world of organised crime in 
order to gain information of criminal activities, to collect evidence 
for use in court and to prevent further crimes is considered to be of 
critical importance to law enforcement and criminal justice 
agencies. However, the interception of telephone and other 
communications, the audio- or video-recording of conversations 
and other covert, intrusive investigative means may be technically 
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feasible, but can also be seen as threats to human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. Analysing the experiences of 
Hungary, Turkey and the United Kingdom, the BPS concludes that 
the interception of communications and intrusive surveillance are 
effective tools against organised crime. However, at the time of the 
visits in 1999, there were still uncertainties and differing 
interpretations of the then relatively new legislation, which - 
together with financial and technical limitations - led to certain 
restrictions as to the use of these means. The BPS also underlines 
the need to maintain high standards of control and procedural 
checks, as well as the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity 
when applying covert methods. 
Highly relevant for organised crime. The topic is highly 
relevant in organised crime control for several reasons: 
1) The very nature of organised crime - the fact that criminal 
activities are planned and conducted within a closed group of 
actors, often taking various special precautions against detection of 
such activities - implies that traditional means of collecting evidence 
as used in cases of other criminal offences, such as witnesses, 
expert testimonies or material evidence, are very often of less or 
even no value. 
2) To penetrate this closed world, it is essential for the police - and 
other law enforcement agencies aiming to disrupt the activities of 
criminal groups and collect evidence that could lead to conviction in 
the courts - to obtain "insider knowledge" about the activities of 
such groups. This is often a very difficult task, which may be 
achieved only using special investigative techniques and 
equipment, making possible interception of telephone, fax or 
Internet messages (interception of communications), or the making 
of audio- or video-recordings of conversations or events in 
particular places or rooms, or tracing movements of persons, cars 
and the like (intrusive surveillance). 
3) Although modern technology seems to offer almost unlimited 
possibilities, it is not primarily the technical, but foremost the ethical 
and legal (including constitutional) barriers to such activities that 
are the subject of very intensive discussion, controversy and 
sometimes strong objections, in many contemporary democratic 
societies. 
 
Requirements: serious crime only. The admissibility of 
intercepting communications and of intrusive surveillance is often 
regulated by additional safeguards, for instance such measures 
can only be applied if it would be impossible to achieve tasks of the 
investigation by other means. Also, the police is typically not 
allowed to decide on such measures on its own but have to apply in 
such cases to some other authority and so have to substantiate 
their application with evidentiary grounds. 
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Regulated duration. The use of interception of communications 
and of intrusive surveillance are typically also regulated by time 
limits, for example with two-, three- or six-month maximum 
duration, and with certain possibilities for renewal. Normally, the 
use of such methods must cease immediately if the goals for which 
they were applied have been achieved. 
Only information related to identified target admissible. 
These methods allow the investigating officials to obtain information 
not only on the subject but a non-defined number of other persons 
from family members to random outsiders. The use of such 
information is usually regulated by restricting it to the target of the 
measure as identified beforehand. All other information must be 
deleted. 
Private vs. public space. The differentiation between public 
and private spheres is crucial. Restrictions thus usually apply to 
interceptions of communications and intrusive surveillance on 
private premises. This, of course, requires that private and public 
premises are legally clearly defined. 
Evidentiary value of the information. The evidentiary value of 
information gathered with methods discussed here is a highly 
important issue. The crucial difference is whether they must be 
treated only as intelligence, or may be used as evidence in court as 
well. A related question is whether such information can be 
accepted as the only evidence or whether also other evidence is 
required in support of this. A further related question is whether 
information gained in this fashion may be used for other purposes 
than for the one for which the permission was granted. In each of 
these issues, different solutions are found across countries. 
Related investigative methods. Since interception of 
communication and surveillance in private places are very intrusive 
methods of investigation, law enforcement officials consider the 
application of less intrusive methods first. The two related methods 
that are used frequently are the gathering of information on 
communications traffic in which the target person (telephone 
number, e-mail address) is involved, and systematic "round-the-
clock" surveillance of public places. These methods are particularly 
useful in getting a comprehensive insight into the movements, 
lifestyle and personal network of a target person who is suspected 
of involvement in organised crime. 
A further frequently applied method is the use of informers. 
Sometimes intelligence or evidence is gathered by police officers 
who are working undercover, either "wired up" with a recording or 
transmitting device or filmed during conversations with a suspect. 
Another investigative method to be discussed in this regard is the 
use of "front" organisations by law enforcement. Such firms can 
offer facilities for criminal groups, such as assistance in the 
laundering of criminal proceeds, the fencing of stolen goods or the 
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transport or storage of illicit drugs. The difference between this 
method and the ones discussed before is that front businesses 
need not be set up in the course of a specific investigation but can 
offer facilities to the criminal fraternity in general. 
International harmonisation. The legal framework is very 
variable across countries. This is a clear indication that 
international harmonisation of the regulation of the methods 
discussed here would be called for, in particular as organised crime 
investigations often may be targeted at operations that reach 
across national borders. In such cases, different legislation and 
application of unusual investigation methods lose potential if 
regulations differ greatly. This is relevant not only in regards of 
gathering intelligence but also where the acceptability of the 
gathered evidence in court is concerned. Countries sharing 
organised criminals would fare better if they also shared common 
principles concerning the interception of communication, intrusive 
surveillance, and related investigative methods. 
 
 
Crime analysis 
 
Studying crime patterns and trends. Crime analysis is about the 
study of crime patterns and trends in an attempt to solve crimes or 
prevent their recurrence. It involves the collection, collation, 
analysis and dissemination of data related to crime. Debates from 
the mid-1990s onwards centring on strategies against crime 
underlined the need to develop capacities not only for operational 
and strategic analyses, but also for the use of intelligence for 
proactive policing. Such methods may lead to conflicts with data 
protection and human rights provisions and thus require controls 
and safeguards. The BPS traces the development and the different 
cultures of crime analysis in Belgium, the Russian Federation and 
the United Kingdom. It shows how crime analysis can be developed 
to become an autonomous discipline, and points to the strengths 
and weaknesses of the various possible approaches. It concludes, 
among other things, that crime analysis can be a powerful tool in 
preventing and fighting organised crime, and in handling the 
absence of the unity of time, place, perpetrator and activity which is 
a characteristic of organised crime. The prediction is that crime 
analysis will gain in significance and that the demand for its 
products will increase. 
Organised crimes are not random, isolated and unique 
events. Crime analysis rests on the assumption that crimes are not 
totally random, isolated and unique events, but can be combined 
into sets sharing common features and showing distinct patterns. 
Basically, crime analysis represents a system utilising regularly 
collected information on criminal incidents and individuals involved, 
in order to prevent and suppress crime and to apprehend criminal 
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perpetrators. The information obtained by systematically analysing 
the data can be used to support management and operations. 
Operational/strategic analysis. According to standard 
definitions, a distinction is made between operational (tactical) 
analysis and strategic analysis. Operational analysis is directed 
towards a short-term law enforcement goal with an immediate 
impact in mind, such as arrest, seizure and forfeiture/confiscation. 
The goal of strategic crime analysis is to develop, implement or 
evaluate a policy, based on insights into the nature of a particular 
type of crime or criminal, and the scope and projections of growth 
in types of criminal activities. 
Gain insight into complex relationships. Crime analysis is 
applied as a means to combat organised crime more effectively. It 
is a powerful instrument in the fight against organised criminal 
groups, because it provides a number of methods and techniques 
to gain insight into complex relationships between suspects, 
criminal activities and associated factors. Crime analysis can also 
be used (and is so used in practice) for the prevention and 
repression of other types of crime, both complex ones (such as 
fraud) and mass crime. 
Integration. There is no single best way to organise crime 
analysis, but integration of operational analysis into the 
investigative process and of strategic analysis into the policy-
making cycle is very important. Especially for operational analysis, 
it is highly relevant that crime analysts are involved in an (complex) 
investigation from the very start or as soon as its complexity 
becomes apparent. For strategic analysis it is vital that the purpose 
of the analysis is clear. When is what reported, by whom, how is it 
done and why? - these are some of the important issues to be 
addressed in order to enhance the quality of a strategic analysis 
report. 
Example. In the following, a concrete British example of 
successful crime analysis is presented in order to illustrate the 
potential of the approach. 
During a 21-month period, a series of daytime sneak-in 
burglaries took place on commercial premises, where company 
cheque books were stolen and individual cheques from these 
books were cashed for small amounts before the victims noticed 
their absence. When the separate offences were linked together, a 
pattern emerged which indicated that a substantial organised crime 
operation was involved. It was at this point that the matter was 
passed to a crime analyst. 
The starting point for the analyst was to examine the information 
available about the basic crime pattern. The victims were 
commercial organisations who generally had multiple company 
cheque books and bank accounts, together with complex account 
checking procedures. Their premises were also very accessible 
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during business hours, with comparatively low security for office 
areas. 
The analyst reasoned that, for the offenders, targeting these 
victims had the advantages that they were relatively vulnerable in 
two key areas - firstly in identifying intruders, and secondly in 
noticing missing cheques or monies in the short term. The plot also 
had certain disadvantages: monies had to be transferred quickly 
after the cheques were obtained, and the transfer of funds into 
bank accounts gave a potential link to the offenders. 
Such reasoning encouraged theorising about how the offenders 
had approached the operation as a whole, including planning, 
preparation and resourcing: 1) a system for quickly diverting funds 
to accounts needed to be established before the thefts took place, 
and 2) they needed a system which masked their identities as well 
as the link between their funds and the stolen funds. 
Using analytical computer software, the initial review of the data 
identified monies obtained using stolen company cheque books 
and tracked them moving between some 206 separate accounts, 
belonging to 85 different people, using 32 addresses. The analysis 
focused on the criminals' need to break the link between the stolen 
funds and the offenders. This could be achieved by two ways: 1) by 
"bouncing" funds around several accounts, and 2) by concealing 
the offenders' real identities behind false identities or aliases. 
A computer analysis showed that of the 85 individuals whose 
accounts were known to have received stolen funds, four were in 
fact using other names as aliases. These four between them 
controlled 23 names (a quarter of those known); they were also 
linked to 13 addresses (over a third of the total). These four also 
had control of 55 accounts (over half of those known). 
The next step was to identify transactional links between the 
accounts themselves, looking at how money was moved between 
all the accounts that had received stolen funds. The analysis 
eventually illustrated how the monies were accumulated to the 
accounts of the four key players and could be used in the police 
investigation and in court. 
 
 
Cross-border co-operation 
 
Law enforcement is trailing far behind organised crime. Almost 
any study on organised crime, whether European or South-
American, will point to the fact that the level of cross-border co-
operation between law enforcement authorities is trailing far behind 
the efficiency by which organised crime groups operate 
transnationally. A BPS was therefore launched to study problems 
and solutions, in particular at local levels, in Finland, France and 
Slovenia. Bottlenecks included the absence of legal frameworks or 
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diverging legislation, but also the lack of knowledge as to what is 
possible under existing regulations. At the same time the BPS 
identifies "good practice" and a number of opportunities which may 
complement the informal network of personal relationships across 
borders. The channels of communication have been multiplied. In 
addition to Interpol and the Schengen Information System an 
extended network of liaison officers is available. E-mail and in 
some cases direct communication links can be used, and multi-
level frameworks of co-operation have been created. The French-
German centre in Offenburg, comprising police and customs 
officers, may also serve as an example for combining cross-border 
and interagency co-operation. 
European co-operation is increasing. Back in the 1980s, a 
debate opened up in the European Communities about facilitating 
the free movement of persons across national borders. Since it was 
not possible at that time to reach general consensus, five member 
states decided in 1985 to create a territory without internal borders, 
the so-called Schengen area. Little by little, the Schengen area has 
been extended to include a growing number of the EU countries. 
According to present provisions, this comprises, i.a., common 
action in the field of police co-operation including operational co-
operation between police, customs and border control authorities in 
relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal 
offences. It also includes co-operation and joint initiatives in 
training, the exchange of liaison officers, secondments, the use of 
equipment and forensic research. 
The Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
between the member states of the European Union lays down the 
conditions under which mutual assistance is granted. As a general 
rule, requests for mutual assistance and communications are made 
directly between judicial authorities with territorial competence. But 
spontaneous exchange of information may also take place between 
member states regarding criminal offences, as long as the handling 
falls within the competence of the receiving authority. The 
convention also offers options for two or more member states to set 
up joint investigation teams, and to carry out controlled deliveries 
and covert investigations on the territory of another member state. -
For non-EU member states, the Council of Europe's 1959 
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters - 
and its additional protocols - are the most important multilateral 
instruments for cross-border co-operation. 
Problems. Although mutual legal assistance in criminal matters 
has a long tradition, there is still a lack of legal instruments in the 
area of cross-border co-operation. Until recently, formal 
international co-operation was heavily focused on judicial co-
operation, including extradition, transfer of proceedings, or transfer 
of the execution of sentence. 
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The growth of cross-border traffic of both persons and goods 
over the years has had a significant impact on transnational crime. 
Therefore, the need for cross-border police co-operation has 
increased very much. 
The majority of member states of the European Union participate 
in the Schengen Agreement, which offers opportunities for co-
operation between law enforcement agencies of neighbouring 
countries. For other European countries, it is much more difficult to 
reach a satisfactory level of cross-border co-operation. Countries 
should therefore urgently ratify those international instruments 
facilitating direct police and judicial co-operation across borders 
and supplement them with bilateral agreements. 
The internationalisation of investigations can lead to situations in 
which detectives or other law enforcement officers carry out 
investigative actions in the sovereign territory of a neighbouring 
country. At the moment, it is not always clear how far they can go in 
the use of their authority. 
The basic principle is that foreign officers can never exercise 
powers exceeding those of the national investigating officers in the 
country in question. But they are also bound by the legislation of 
their own country. This means that the strictest rules apply, 
resulting in a minimal arsenal of authorised actions. 
In practice, failure to properly respect national sovereignty in the 
course of cross-border investigations may be caused by a lack of 
time - as when immediate action is called for in cases of hot pursuit 
- or by lack of knowledge. The latter is the more important factor. 
Officers may not know the rules of the neighbouring country that 
apply in a particular situation and/or the correct channels for 
requesting necessary authorisations for specific actions 
A third factor is the lack of trust. At the very least, if any laurels 
are to be awarded for clear and visible successes in the fight 
against crime, law enforcement officers do not want to see them 
stolen by the authorities of a neighbouring country. Furthermore, 
and perhaps more important, in some cases there is the risk of 
leaks and corruption. 
For this reason, information is not shared with counterparts 
across the border or it is shared at the last possible moment and 
only if it cannot be avoided. Moreover, necessary notifications of 
competent authorities sometimes take place only at the last 
possible moment. 
In some cases local investigating officers of the neighbouring 
country are informed, but not the judicial authorities. It is quite clear 
that this behaviour does not help build up trust or establish a co-
operative attitude between parties either side of the border. 
Diverging legislation in the countries concerned are understood 
as a major obstacle to improved cross-border co-operation. For 
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instance, some European countries have very strict rules on the 
application of special investigative means, whereas others are 
much more flexible and tolerant in this respect. 
Another area in which there are important differences between 
countries is criminal procedural law. What is generally regarded as 
acceptable evidence in a criminal trial in one country is not 
necessarily accepted by the judge in a neighbouring country. It is 
obvious that these differences have an obstructive effect on cross-
border co-operation. 
Recommendations. In cross-border co-operation, the study 
recommends improvements on five separate dimensions: 
1) more systematic, efficient and reliable channels for cross-
border information exchange need to be developed; 
2) formal agreements and informal personal networks should 
both be improved; 
3) multi-level co-operation should be enhanced; 
4) cross-border and interagency co-operation needs to be 
combined; 
5) the competencies of liaison officers should be extended.  
 
Each dimension deserves like attention, as each addresses 
partly different problems of enhancing cross-border co-operation of 
law enforcement authorities. 
 
 
Provisions on membership of criminal organisations 
 
Organised crime is a complex target. Traditional "one man - one 
crime" approaches do not correspond to the realities of organised 
crime where different persons, possible based in different 
countries, organise themselves to commit crimes, but where only 
the person caught in the execution of an offence is brought to 
justice. The criminalisation of membership of an organised crime 
group as such is therefore a potentially powerful tool. The BPS 
studies the experiences of Germany, Italy and Poland. While this 
tool has become an international standard, the BPS pinpoints 
certain limitations which are mainly due to the problem of clearly 
identifying an organised crime group as a firm structure, and 
determining the point at which a form of participation becomes 
punishable. While this may be possible with regard to "classical", 
hierarchical mafia-type organisations, difficulties exist with regard to 
fluid, network-type [or marketing chain-type] enterprises. 
Nevertheless, suspicion of participation in an organised crime 
group constitutes a "golden key" [or universal key] for law 
enforcement and prosecutorial bodies as it may permit the use of 
covert and intrusive investigative techniques. Thus, the provisions 
on criminalising membership of organised crime groups may 
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complement witness protection and other anti-organised-crime 
tools. 
Membership suspicion opens the door to other evidence. 
The study of European practices concluded that it was rare for the 
offence of membership to be the sole offence for which organised 
criminals were prosecuted and sentenced. Instead, it turned out 
that provisions criminalising the membership in criminal groups or 
organisations often offer investigative advantages, which makes 
them a powerful tool: the investigation of this particular offence 
opens the door to such evidence which eventually may be used in 
court proceedings concerning the crimes committed by such 
groups. It thus appears that the concept of membership of criminal 
organisations fulfils a very practical function: it eases the 
applicability of special investigative means, the use of which is 
normally limited to the most serious offences for reasons of 
proportionality. The suspicion that the investigation is facing an 
organised crime group or targeting a person suspected of being a 
member of a criminal organisation facilitates the use of the most 
powerful and intrusive investigative techniques. These, in turn, 
allow the crime investigation to come closer to the concealed 
criminal activities that otherwise risk to remain beyond the reach of 
law enforcement authorities. 
At the same time, judicial bodies called upon to authorise the 
application of such techniques may require a reasonably high (or 
low) level of suspicion. If weak evidence is gathered as to 
membership, the prosecutorial authorities may then swap to other 
substantive, underlying offences as a basis for the criminal 
proceedings. 
It is remarkable that a substantive criminal-law provision could 
mainly serve for investigative purposes rather than for obtaining 
conviction. Normally, this function is devoted to procedural penal 
law. 
 
 
Co-operation against trafficking in human beings 
 
An issue of both human rights and organised crime. As 
trafficking in human beings is an issue of both human rights and 
organised crime, it is only natural that combating it has become a 
high priority for the Council of Europe and in the realm of the United 
Nations and the European Union. Measures against trafficking 
need to address the strong role of organised crime and the 
requirement of protecting and assisting victims of trafficking. If the 
conviction of criminals is to be achieved, the co-operation of victims 
as witnesses in the criminal justice process is essential. At the 
same time, the needs of victims can often best be served by 
involving non-governmental anti-trafficking organisations. The BPS 
studies the experiences gained in Austria, Belgium and Bulgaria, 
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where "co-operative approaches" have been developed between 
law enforcement and anti-trafficking organisations. These 
approaches are aimed at the dual objective of assisting and 
protecting victims on the one hand, and at facilitating their co-
operation as witnesses in the criminal justice system on the other. 
The concept of trafficking in human beings implies a strong role 
of organised crime groups, in that it includes the threat or use of 
force, coercion, fraud, deception or other means, in that trafficking 
involves several distinct but interrelated acts, and in that 
exploitation is not a one-off event but is carried out over a certain 
period of time. These features imply that effective measures 
against trafficking in human beings require co-operation at all 
levels. 
Co-operation of victims as witnesses essential for 
conviction. The subject of co-operation in itself is rather broad and 
covers a large range of issues. However, keeping in mind the need 
to assist and protect victims of trafficking on the one hand, and the 
crucial role of victims as witnesses in the criminal justice process 
on the other, the co-operation between non-governmental 
organisations providing services to victims of trafficking and police 
and criminal justice institutions would seem to be of particular 
importance. 
It was found that 
•  Measures against trafficking in human beings require co-
operation not only among criminal justice bodies, but also with 
other public institutions and in particular NGOs. 
• Such a co-operative approach can provide a sufficient level of 
assistance and protection to victims, subject of course to an 
appropriate legal framework and adequate funding. 
• In contrast, the usual police witness-protection programmes do 
not seem of much relevance. Such programmes do not appear 
to be equipped to address the specific needs of victims of 
trafficking. However, procedural witness protection measures 
also benefit victim-witnesses of trafficking. 
• The co-operation of victims as witnesses is said to be crucial for 
the criminal justice process. Police, prosecutors and judges 
suggest that if victims co-operate as witnesses they can obtain 
convictions; otherwise, prosecutions are unlikely to succeed. 
The co-operative approach described here seems to be 
successful in ensuring such co-operation by victims. A major 
precondition in this context appears to be clear regulations 
regarding the residence status of co-operating foreign victim-
witnesses (in the case of transnational organised crime -related 
trafficking, the key victim-witness is typically a foreigner). 
• From the perspective of police officers, trafficking in human 
beings is closely related to organised crime. At the same time, 
there are few investigations and prosecutions in connection with 
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trafficking aimed at criminal organisations. Some argue that the 
evidence provided by the police and the testimony of victim-
witnesses are insufficient. Others suggest that it is rather a 
question of the “economics” of the criminal justice procedure. 
Whatever the reasons, it would seem that, while the co-
operative approach is successful in protecting victims and 
ensuring their co-operation against individual traffickers, either 
the opportunities it offers have not been fully exploited or other 
strategies would have to be pursued in order to dismantle 
transnational trafficking networks and organisations. 
 
 
Preventive legal measures 
 
Crime groups infiltrate legal markets. With organised crime 
groups functioning more and more like criminal enterprises, it is a 
real and substantial risk that they participate in legal markets to 
invest criminal proceeds, to diversify business interests, to build up 
legal cover or to control markets. In some countries, legal 
measures have therefore been taken to exclude criminals from 
public procurement and construction contracts or from obtaining 
permits and licences. Such preventive measures are now also 
reflected in international standards The BPS assesses the 
measures taken in Estonia, the Netherlands and Sweden. The 
experience of the three countries underlines that prevention is as 
important as law enforcement. While all three countries make use 
of their existing legislation to prevent the infiltration of legal markets 
by organised crime, the example of the Netherlands shows that 
very comprehensive approaches can be developed in this respect. 
Bureaucratisation may encourage corruption. A problem with 
this approach is, for instance, that bureaucratisation in the 
prevention of economic and/or organised crime may, in some 
societies, lead to over-inhibition of precisely the small- and 
medium-sized local private enterprise most needed for the 
development of a flourishing indigenous private sector. As an 
understandable side-effect, multi-layered stages of controls can 
also be used as an instrument to extort bribes from large and small 
businesses for permits and licences, in other words create new 
potentials for corruption. 
Privacy and data protection issues, and the EU requirement to 
ensure a level playing-field and open competition for business, do 
inhibit the development of preventive approaches. Although crime 
prevention is a valid legal reason for data sharing, policy 
differences between enterprise ministries and crime-control 
ministries can inhibit preventive action. 
In the example of the Netherlands, prevention has become 
embedded in a systematic, considered analytical framework, whose 
preconditions are administrative integrity, good data protection, and 
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the willingness of all parties to include information in databases and 
act co-operatively. 
The basis of this scheme is that the two most important tasks 
attributed to the public administration in this context were as 
follows: 
- Firstly, every possible means should be devoted to ensuring 
the integrity of the civil service apparatus as a prerequisite for 
effectively combating organised crime. Integrity means greater 
awareness, transparent allocation of tasks, tighter procedures for 
the award of grants, enhanced controllability of action, and 
prevention of conflicts of interest. 
- Secondly, the public administration must be more aware of the 
fact that criminal networks increasingly use legal enterprises which, 
at certain points, are dependent on the government, in particular to 
obtain and exploit permits, in the outsourcing of work and the 
awarding of projects. 
 
Set up special agency. A central recommendation in the 
problem analysis in the Netherlands was that it would be desirable 
to set up a special agency, with legal status and powers to vet 
applications for permits, tender proposals and suchlike, utilising all 
types of database, and with the power to require companies to co-
operate with the agency's investigations. 
Despite the complexity of the issue, including problems of data 
protection and the requirement that suspicions of involvement in 
(organised) crime must be substantiated or backed up with reliable 
evidence, the approaches discussed here do offer greater potential 
than criminal justice measures for crime prevention, by reducing 
the situational opportunities for organised crime groups and serious 
offenders. Although there has been no long-term evaluation as yet 
on the effects of these strategies on either levels of crime or the 
organisation of crime, these illustrations can be recommended to 
member states as food for thought beyond largely tactical, 
repressive criminal justice measures. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Organised crime is hard to define in statistical or other accurate 
terms. This dilemma is reflected in much of the scientific and policy-
related work with the objective of gaining increased insight into the 
phenomenon and enhancing its control, prevention and repression. 
Sometimes, or even quite often, effective countermeasures seem 
to be seriously hampered by the lack of unanimity concerning the 
definition of the target. Similarly, scientific research of the topic also 
suffers from this dilemma, sometimes becoming diverted for 
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instance to esoteric considerations of a constructivist or post-
modern nature. 
Pragmatically speaking, the experiences presented here have 
illustrated that this real dilemma need not paralyse constructive 
action. The best practice surveys of the Council of Europe group of 
experts show a possible solution of finding a way beyond - or 
around - the apparent definitional cul-de-sac. The exercise could be 
continued indefinitely, refining, updating and complementing the 
present findings. Furthermore, the scope of possible anti-organised 
crime measures and approaches could be enlarged and widened 
indefinitely, since the group of experts only analysed eight 
innovative approaches, the main objectives of which are 
summarised below: 
 
 
1 Witness protection 
 
2 Reversing the burden of proof 
in confiscating the proceeds of 
crime 
3 Interception of communication 
and intrusive surveillance 
4 Crime analysis 
 
5 Cross-border co-operation 
 
6 Provisions on membership of 
criminal organisations 
7 Co-operation against trafficking 
in human beings 
 
8 Preventive legal measures 
(administrative prevention) 
 
 
 
- break into organised crime through 
witnesses 
- depriving criminals from the profits 
 
 
- to penetrate the closed world of  
organised crime to gain information 
- to understand the patterns and  
trends: investigation and prevention 
- enhance cross-border and inter-agency  
co-operation to improve investigations 
- to enhance investigations, increase the risk 
of apprehension 
- help victims, break into organised  
crime through victim-witnesses 
 
- make organised crime operations more 
difficult by exclusion 
 
 
 
However, any country contemplating its anti-organised-crime 
policy could benefit already from these initial considerations and 
investigations on how some European countries have developed 
their policies in this regard. The field is vast and the challenges are 
many, and furthermore, the characteristics of the target 
phenomenon are elusive, as well as constantly changing and 
developing. Consequently, whichever approach is selected to be 
promoted, it must also involve a central dynamic element: an anti-
organised-crime policy programme can by definition never be final 
but must be regularly reconsidered and revised as the surrounding 
realities change. 
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Developments in the European Union (EU) clearly indicate a trend 
of national substantive criminal laws becoming more and more 
uniform. As a result of conventions1 concluded within the EU, as 
well as of decisions of the European Council2, member states have 
adopted provisions similar in content making, for instance, 
corruption of EU or foreign officials, corruption in the private sector 
or money laundering a criminal offense, providing for liability of 
legal persons or for the confiscation of the proceeds of crime, etc. 
Also, the framework decision on the European arrest warrant, 
though addressing issues of international cooperation, is likely to 
contribute to bringing substantive criminal law provisions of 
member states closer to each other. For certain conduct defined as 
criminal offenses in the issuing state, the executing state may not 
refuse surrender of suspected offenders, claiming the lack of dual 
criminality. States will therefore certainly take steps, provided that 
they wish to maintain at least the appearance of their sovereignty, 
to make conduct enumerated in the framework decision a criminal 
offense under their national law as well.  
The trend towards bringing national substantive criminal laws 
closer to each other is not limited to the EU. Numerous 
international treaties concluded in the past have had a harmonizing 
impact on the member states’ criminal laws within the Council of 
                                                     
1 See Protocol [OJ 96/C 313/01 23.10.96] to the Convention on the Protection of 
the European Communities' Financial Interests [OJ 95/C 316/03 27.11.95] adopted 
on 27 September 1996 for criminalization of both active and passive corruption of 
national and Community officials; The Convention on the Fight against Corruption 
involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of 
the European Union [OJ 97/C 195/01 25.6.97]; The second protocol [OJ 97/C 
221/02 19.7.97] to the PIF Convention (OJ - C 316/1995/49), which has provisions 
for criminalisation of money laundering of proceeds generated by corruption.  
2 Framework decision criminalising corruption in the private sector [OJ L 192/54 
31.7.2003]; Framework decision on money laundering, dealing with the 
identification, tracing, freezing and confiscation of criminal assets and the proceeds 
of crime 2001/500/JHA; Framework Decision on combating the sexual exploitation 
of children and child pornography 2004/68/JHA; Framework Decision on 
combating trafficking in human beings 2002/629/JHA; Some are still at the stage of 
proposal such as the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision to strengthen the 
criminal law framework to combat intellectual property offences {SEC(2005)848} or 
Proposal for Council Framework decision on combating racism and xenophobia 
(COM/2001/0664 final - CNS 2001/0270). 
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Europe. While the primary aim of some of these treaties - such as 
the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour 
at Sports Events and in Particular at Football Matches3, European 
Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property4 and others5 - 
is to make international cooperation smoother, a direct effect of this 
has certainly been a degree of harmonization of national laws. 
Also, the soft instruments of the Council of Europe on the 
suppression of particular types of antisocial behaviour have 
contributed to bringing national criminal laws in Europe closer to 
each other.6 
Furthermore, on the global level, harmonization of national 
criminal laws has become a priority target over the last two 
decades. Clearly, the conventions on drug crime7, transnational 
organized crime8 or corruption9 are reflections of the trend.10 
Mention should also be made of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court adopted in 1998 which, though in a limited area, has 
made a substantial contribution to harmonizing and even unifying 
national laws. Due to the complementary jurisdiction of the 
permanent international criminal court, State Parties to the treaty 
have been prompted to define war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in a uniform manner by following the wording of the 
Statute.11  
                                                     
3 European Treaty Series, No. 120, 1985. 
4 European Treaty Series No. 119, 1985. 
5 Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of 
personal data (ETS No.108, 1981); Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure 
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime 
(ETS No.141, 1990). 
6 Recommendation on the prevention of racism, xenophobia and racial intolerance 
in sport (2001/6) 2001; Recommendation on guidelines to the Parties for the 
implementation to Article 5 of the Convention: identification and treatment of 
offenders (90/1) 1990; Recommendation on comprehensive report on measures to 
counter hooliganism (89/2) 1989; Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers 
to Member States on the Reduction of Spectator Violence at Sporting Events and 
in particular at Football Matches (84/8) 1984; Recommendation on the protection 
of the cultural heritage against unlawful acts (96/6) 1996. 
7 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic drugs; 1971 Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances; 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 
8 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its 
protocols (2000): Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Air and Sea, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition.  
9 United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003). 
10 It should be added that facilitating cooperation is also among the aims of these 
conventions. 
11 The definition of genocide in the Statute (see Article 6 and also Article 25 for 
incitement to commit genocide) in essence follows the wording of the definition of 
genocide (see Article 2) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (1948). 
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Whereas the tendency of harmonizing substantive criminal laws 
is clearly evident, much less has been achieved so far in the area 
of criminal procedure.12 Even within the EU differences in criminal 
procedural law are still considerable in areas of such significance 
as the legal preconditions for employing coercive measures, the 
rules of collecting and assessing evidence, the role of the 
preparatory stage of the process, the rights of suspects or whether 
prosecution is mandatory or can be made dependant on 
expediency considerations.13 The envisaged measures in the 
direction of harmonization within the Union are rather modest.14 
The explanation may lie in that the rules of the criminal process are 
dependant to a considerable extent on the organizational structure 
of the criminal justice system, the extent to which the court system 
is based on the so called hierarchical or the coordinate model15, the 
role of lay decision-makers, etc. This again is influenced by the 
cultural background, i.e. historical and political experience of a 
given people, the “Zeitgeist” in a particular society and socio-
psychological factors.16 The criminal process is not only a reflection 
of the cultural values; by giving them expression in the course of its 
operation it will further strengthen these values.17  
Thus it appears that harmonization is a difficult undertaking in 
the area of criminal procedure. One can of course ask if there is a 
need at all for harmonization. Do potential benefits of making 
national criminal justice systems resemble each other outweigh the 
value of diversity? And assuming that harmonization is given 
priority over heterogeneity then which model will the harmonized 
European criminal process follow? 
Let us put these dilemmas aside for the moment and simply 
acknowledge that in spite of the difficulties and the meager results, 
the international community does not consider harmonization or 
approximation a hopeless endeavor since steps have already been 
taken in the direction of harmonization on both the global and 
                                                     
12 This seems to be surprising in the light of the frequently voiced assumption that 
changes in substantive law will inevitably have their impact on the rules of the 
criminal process which, it is held, primarily serves the enforcement of substantive 
penal law. 
13 See: Robert Esser: Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Strafverfahrensrecht, 
De Gruyter Recht, Berlin 2002. p.5.  
14 Proposal of the Commission for a Council Framework Decision on certain 
procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union 
2004/0113 (CNS)  
15 Mirjan R. Damaska: The faces of justice and state authority: a comparative 
approach to the legal process, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. 
16 On the cultural factors explaining differences of systems of criminal procedure 
see Tatjana Hörnle: Unterschiede zwischen Verfahrensordnungen und ihre 
kulturellen Hintergründe, ZStW, Band 117. 2005/4, p.801-838.  
17 By this we assume that the goal of the criminal process is not limited to the 
enforcement of substantive law provisions. The autonomous function of the 
process is to express and demonstrate its link to the cultural background. See 
Hörnle op. cit p.834. 
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regional level. First, increased intensity in cooperation among 
states and international instruments on extradition and other forms 
of assistance, though not directly aimed at harmonization of 
national criminal procedures, have had an indirect harmonizing 
effect. Intensive cooperation, which leads to subsequent 
recognition of mutual dependence, will induce empathy for each 
other’s problems and to making concessions to national 
sovereignty considerations. This is clearly reflected in that states 
are more and more prepared to provide assistance according to the 
procedural provisions of their partners (requesting states), not 
insisting that letters rogatory be executed exclusively in line with 
their own law.18 It is hardly surprising that it is the EU Convention19 
that goes the furthest in this respect: the requested party, as per 
general rule, is under the obligation to comply with the formalities 
and procedures expressly indicated by the requesting State.20 
Executing letters rogatory according to foreign laws may also 
give ideas to legislators in the requested state when it comes to 
reforming their own law on criminal procedure. Certain forms of 
cooperation, such as the mutual recognition of foreign judgments or 
transfer of proceedings presuppose that there exist no fundamental 
dissimilarities in the cooperating states’ criminal procedures. 
Therefore states determined to cooperate will do their best to 
remove institutions unacceptable to their partners.21 It can therefore 
                                                     
18 According to the traditional doctrine which stressed respect for national 
sovereignty the collection of evidence and other procedural measures had to be 
performed in line with the law of the requested state. Thus the 1959 Council of 
Europe Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters in article 3 proclaims 
that “the requested Party shall execute in the manner provided for by its law any 
letters rogatory relating to a criminal matter and addressed to it by the judicial 
authorities of the requesting Party for the purpose of procuring evidence or 
transmitting articles to be produced in evidence, records or documents”. The 
Council of Europe Convention certainly set out from the then prevailing practice of 
Member States to permit the use of evidence collected abroad irrespective of 
whether the mode of collection was in line with their own law. As a general rule the 
only precondition of their use in domestic proceedings was the observance of the 
law of the requested state. It is primarily increased sensitiveness for equality 
concerns in the sense that also in cases with a “foreign component” defendants 
should enjoy the guarantees of the domestic criminal justice system that may 
explain the change in attitude.  
19 Convention established by the Council in accordance with Article 34 of the 
Treaty on European Union, on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the 
Member States of the European Union. Official Journal 197,12/07/2000 p.0003 – 
0023. 
20 According to article 4 “Where mutual assistance is afforded, the requested 
Member State shall comply with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated 
by the requesting Member State, unless otherwise provided in this Convention and 
provided that such formalities and procedures are not contrary to the fundamental 
principles of law in the requested Member State”. 
21 The fiasco of the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings 
in criminal matters in comparison to the European Convention on Extradition or the 
Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in criminal matters is probably 
due to the fact that the required harmonization of criminal proceedings in European 
states has not yet taken place. 
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be seen that institutions of international cooperation in criminal 
matters have the indirect effect of bringing criminal justice systems 
closer to each other.  
International human rights treaties aim directly at harmonization. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights22, for 
instance, enumerates the procedural guarantees that shall be 
observed in all states23. Also the “softer” instruments adopted 
within the framework of the United Nations focusing primarily on 
vulnerable groups of defendants, such as juveniles24 or pretrial 
detainees25, set standards to be observed by national laws. 
On the European level it is obviously the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Individual Freedoms (thereafter: Convention) 
which defines the basic standards all State Parties have to comply 
with. It is rightly claimed that whereas European community law 
has an impact rather on the substantive law of member states, the 
ECHR has made substantial contribution to shaping the criminal 
procedural law of members of the Council of Europe.26 The impact 
exerted by the ECHR on national criminal justice systems proves 
that the objective of the criminal process is, besides enforcing 
substantive criminal law, to arrive at accurate factual findings in a 
manner by which basic human rights are observed.27 In the 
remaining part of the paper I will explore the extent to which the 
Convention and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights (thereafter: ECtHR or Court) may contribute to further 
harmonizing criminal procedure in Europe.  
There is no doubt as to the legitimacy of the endeavor on the part 
of the Court to strive at harmonization of European legal systems. 
The Statute of the Council of Europe states that the aim of the 
Council is to achieve a greater unity between its members.28 The 
preamble of the Convention adds that one of the methods through 
which this aim is to be pursued “is the maintenance and further 
realization of human rights.” Thus it is clear that the Convention 
                                                     
22 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. 
23 However it is argued that the list contains only the minimum standards and since 
granting the right to individual application is still optional the case law of the UN 
Human Rights Committee gives little guidance to national decision-makers. See 
Esser op.cit p.31. 
24 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice (The Bejing Rules) (General Assembly Resolution 40/33 (1985)); Economic 
and Social Council resolution (1989/66); United Nations Guidelines for the 
Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) (General Assembly 
resolution 45/112 (1990)); United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juvenile 
Deprived of their Liberty (General Assembly resolution 45/113 (1990)). 
25 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment (General Assembly resolution 43/173 (1988)) 
26 Raimo Lahti: Towards an International and European Criminal Policy? In: Liber 
Amicorum, Bengt Broms, Helsinki 1999, p.238. 
27 Andrew Ashworth, Mike Redmayne: The criminal process, Oxford University 
Press 2005, p.45. 
28 Article 1 
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was drafted and the Court (together with the Commission)29 were 
established with the aim of also contributing to harmonizing 
legislation affecting human rights in the State Parties.  
No doubt the Court has already contributed to bringing European 
legislation, and within that criminal justice systems, closer to each 
other. However, in the first phase of its operation it took a rather 
cautious approach and demonstrated considerable self-constraint. 
The Convention was adopted with the consent of the then members 
of the Council of Europe and its operation presupposes the 
preservation of that consensus. Decisions of the Court that are 
perceived to go too far, in that they go beyond what the state parties 
agreed upon or are willing to accept at a given moment, may 
threaten the very existence of the Convention and the level of 
protection of human rights reached through the Court’s earlier 
judgments. The United Kingdom, after the Tyrer judgment30, for 
instance, decided not to renew its declaration by which the 
Convention was extended to the Isle of Man.31 There have also been 
other judgments of the Court, which for a period of time shook the 
confidence of the states in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.32  
A further argument against too much judicial activism that limits 
the Court’s potential for harmonizing laws in Europe is that an 
international judicial body lacking adequate legitimacy can hardly be 
given the power to amend or annul legislation adopted by 
democratically elected parliaments. Nor should it touch upon 
consequences of decisions of domestic courts and other decision-
making bodies. That is why the drafters of the Convention shaped 
the rules on its competence in such a manner as to avoid any 
                                                     
29 Prior to Protocol 11 a two-tier system existed: the cases were initially processed 
by the European Commission of Human Rights, through first an admissibility stage 
and secondly if it found it admissible a merits stage. Only then would cases 
referred to the European Court or to the Committee of Ministers for the final 
determination by the Commission or by the State concerned. Individual applicants 
could refer a case to the Court only where the respondent State ratified Protocol 
No.9. 
30 Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, 5856/72 (25/04/1978), A 026. 
31 In this case the question arose whether judicial corporal punishment of juvenile 
offenders on the Isle of Man amounted to degrading punishment within the 
meaning of Article 3. According to the British Government’s submission in this 
regard corporal punishment on the Isle of Man was justified as a preventive 
measure, based on public opinion on the island, which amounts to a local 
requirement under Article 63(3). The Court did not accept this argument and held 
that the punishment concerned was degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of 
the Convention. 
32 See for instance Öztürk v. Federal Republic of Germany 8544/79 (21/02/1984), 
A 073, which invoked severe critics of the Court (See Esser op.cit p.63-64.) In this 
case an offence was involved which under German law was not qualified as a 
criminal offence but as a ‘regulatory’ offence. The issue arose whether Article 6(3) 
e, right to the free assistance of an interpreter in judicial proceedings, is applicable 
to a charge concerning such a petty offence. According to the Court any 
proceeding which involves the question of determination of a criminal charge 
should fall under the guarantees of Article 6 irrespective of its less serious nature. 
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resemblance with that of the highest national courts. The ECtHR 
was not to be seen either as a European constitutional court or as a 
supreme court. While the competence of constitutional courts 
extends to ruling on the compatibility of legislation with the national 
constitution, the Court took the view that the drafters of the 
Convention had confined its competence to the examination of the 
facts of the particular case brought before it without making an 
assessment on the quality of domestic legislation, i.e. on whether the 
law itself was in line with the Convention and therefore should be 
repealed or changed. In the Court’s interpretation it is not its task to 
undertake an examination in abstracto of the legislative provisions of 
respondent states33, nor is it empowered to order them to alter their 
legislation.34  
Whereas supreme courts have the power to amend or quash 
decisions of lower courts, the ECtHR’s competence has been 
restricted to declaring a breach of the Convention and eventually 
awarding compensation to the applicant without ruling on the validity 
of the decision in question or giving instruction on how the violation 
should be remedied. Upon first consideration the binding effect of 
the Court’s judgment simply means that the State found in breach of 
the Convention has to accept the finding, i.e. it may not contest the 
occurrence of the violation.35 We should add that also ratione 
personae is the binding effect of the judgment of the Court limited in 
that it has no legal effect on states other than the one party to the 
case.36  
In brief, for the sake of state sovereignty and because of the 
Court’s limited legitimacy, the drafters of the Convention envisaged a 
modest, self-restraining international judicial body. The Court 
accepted the role assigned to it and this is evidenced among other  
                                                     
33 Marckx v. Belgium 6833/74 (13/06/1979) A31, par. 58: “The Court is not required 
to undertake an examination in abstracto of the legislative provisions complained 
of…”  
34 Belilos v. Switzerland 10328/83 (29/04/1988) A132, par. 78: “The Court notes 
that the Convention does not empower it to order Switzerland to alter its legislation; 
the Court’s judgment leaves to the State the choice of the means to be used in its 
domestic legal system to give effect to its obligation under Article 53 (art. 53) (see, 
mutatis mutandis, the Marckx judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 25, § 
58, and the F v. Switzerland judgment of 18 December 1987, Series A no. 128, p. 
19, § 43).” 
35 Eckart Klein: Should the binding effect of the judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights be extended? In: Protection des droits de l’homme: la perspective 
européenne/ Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective. Mélanges à la 
mémoire de/ Studies in memory of Rolv Ryssdal. Édité par/edited by Paul 
Mahoney-Franz Matscher-Herbert Petzold-Luzius Wildhaber, Carl Heymanns 
Verlag KG, Köln-Berlin-Bonn München 2000, p.707. 
36 Klein op. cit. P.706. 
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ways in its adopting the margin of appreciation doctrine.37 The 
margin of appreciation, on the one hand, is a methodological tool by 
which the appropriate depth of the review to be exercised by the 
Court is defined, and which varies according to the right and the 
question involved. But in addition to serving as a technical device, 
the margin of appreciation is a substantive concept linked closely to 
the subsidiarity principle and the doctrine according to which the 
Court is not a "fourth instance”: it is primarily national authorities 
which are to establish the facts of the case and assess them under 
their national law. It is not for the Court to review the fact-finding 
activity of national agencies, nor is it authorized to rule on alleged 
errors of law. But what is even more important for our purposes is 
that the margin of appreciation has been interpreted to also say that 
“national authorities are generally in a better position than the 
supervisory bodies to strike the right balance between the 
sometimes conflicting interests of the community and the protection 
of the fundamental rights of the individual”.38 Accordingly, it is 
primarily the parties to the Convention who are competent to assess 
whether interference with human rights is justified in the light of the 
particular conditions of their societies. There is an area of discretion 
open to Contracting States39 and unless the practice of a certain 
State is against a clearly established widely accepted European 
standard, the doctrine suggests that the Court should abstain from 
finding a breach of the Convention. Due to the extensive 
interpretation of the margin of appreciation the Court’s role in raising 
the level of the protection of human rights is modest. It rather 
confines itself to extending the level of protection already achieved in 
the majority of states to those who are lagging far behind the 
average.  
In this respect the doctrine of evolutive interpretation also used by 
the Court is of no relevance in that it does not make the Court’s 
functioning more dynamic and activist. The Convention as a “living 
instrument” doctrine simply enables the Court to go above the level 
of protection envisaged by the drafters and what was foreseen by 
the Parties at the time they made the decision to accede to the 
                                                     
37 “…the margin of appreciation doctrine was invented and evolved by the Court 
itself: it was in no way forced on it by member States” Lord Mackay of Clashfern: 
The margin of appreciation and the need for balance. In: Protection des droits de 
l’homme: la perspective européenne/ Protecting Human Rights: The European 
Perspective. Mélanges à la mémoire de/ Studies in memory of Rolv Ryssdal. Édité 
par/edited by Paul Mahoney-Franz Matscher-Herbert Petzold-Luzius Wildhaber, 
Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, Köln-Berlin-Bonn München, 2000 p.840. 
38 Lord Mackay op.cit. p.840. It should be added that in matters of criminal 
procedure, due to the relatively detailed rules of the Convention there is little or no 
room for assessment, for a balancing of interests, and therefore “the margin of 
appreciation plays hardly any role” See P. van Dijk and G.J.H van Hoof: Theory 
and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights. Third Edition, Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague/London/Boston 1998 p.86.  
39 J.G Merrils: The development of international law by the European Court of 
Human Rights, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990 p.151. 
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treaty. The evolutive interpretation doctrine permits the Court to 
adjust the Convention to “present day conditions” but what 
constitutes present day conditions is determined again by what the 
majority of State Parties agree upon and find therefore acceptable at 
a given moment.  
In summary, the doctrine of margin appreciation and of evolutive 
interpretation leave the task of taking the initiative to extend the 
scope of human rights and raising the level of their protection to the 
State Parties. The Court’s role under these doctrines is rather to 
care for the preservation of the standard achieved by the 
autonomous decisions of Contracting Parties and the extension of 
these standards to the minority of States in which at a given moment 
the level of human rights protection is below the standard. This 
function of the Court should not be underestimated, since this may 
prevent States from lowering the standards claiming changes in 
conditions. The maintenance of what has already been achieved is 
guaranteed by the Court’s general practice to follow its earlier case-
law40 and to depart normally from its precedents only if societal 
changes justify a higher level of protection of human rights. Thus by 
observing its precedents the Court may set limits to a downward 
evolution and the lowering of already achieved standards.41  
There is a tension on the one hand between what a human rights 
treaty should aspire to and, on the other hand, the modest role 
assigned to and the imposed and self-imposed constraint on the 
Court. Of course there is no tension if the Convention is nothing 
more than a festive declaration without much practical significance.  
                                                     
40 “The European Court of Human Rights has stated that it would depart from 
earlier decisions for “cogent reasons” for instance “to ensure that the interpretation 
of the Convention reflects societal changes and remains in line with present day 
conditions”. With the citation of cases see Luzius Wildhaber: Precedent in the 
European Court of Human Rights. In: Protection des droits de l’homme: la 
perspective européenne/ Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective. 
Mélanges à la mémoire de/Studies in memory of Rolv Ryssdal. Édité par/edited by 
Paul Mahoney-Franz Matscher-Herbert Petzold-Luzius Wildhaber. Carl Heymanns 
Verlag KG, Köln-Berlin-Bonn München 2000, p.1530-1532. 
41 The evolutive interpretation doctrine would, in principle, allow an “evolution 
downward”. Some commentators actually claim that in deciding on terrorist cases 
the Court has been prepared to accept lower standards as compared to what had 
been set by its earlier jurisprudence. Others, on the other hand, argue that the 
watering down of certain guarantees in fact raises the level of human rights 
protection since this is needed for oppressing activities that threaten democracy 
and the enjoyment of the Convention rights. This leads us to the problem of 
“militant democracy”(see Karl Loewenstein: Militant Democracy and Fundamental 
Rights, American Political Science Review 31 (1937) p. 417-432 and 638-658), 
which should not be discussed in this paper. See Søren C. Prebensen: Evolutive 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. In Protection des 
droits de l’homme: la perspective européenne/ Protecting Human Rights: The 
European Perspective. Mélanges à la mémoire de/ Studies in memory of Rolv 
Ryssdal. Édité par/edited by Paul Mahoney-Franz Matscher-Herbert Petzold-
Luzius Wildhaber. Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, Köln-Berlin-Bonn München 2000 
p.1136-1137  
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This tension is reflected in the text of the Convention as well. The 
preamble makes a covert reference to the subsidiarity principle 
(“governments …. take the first steps for the collective enforcement 
of certain rights…..[emphasis added]) but at the same time a more 
ambitious objective of the Convention is envisaged, i.e. “the further 
realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms” and article 
32 makes it clear that in the end it is for the Court to interpret and 
apply the Convention .“42 
In the first years following its adoption the signatory states actually 
viewed the Convention as a document without much practical 
significance, in that it simply proclaimed minimum standards that 
Western democracies have by far accomplished. The statement of 
the Council of State of the Netherlands is illustrative of this. In its 
advice on whether to ratify the Convention it was of the opinion that 
although there was not much need for the Convention, there was no 
objection to ratification either, since “Dutch legislation already tallied 
altogether with the treaty’s spirit.”43 
The operation of the European Commission for Human Rights44 in 
the first decades after its being established confirmed the 
assessment of the State Parties: it showed “wise self-constraint”45 
and little sympathy for applicants declaring the overwhelming 
majority of individual complaints ill-founded. The Commission’s 
approach had the beneficial effect of dispelling fears of Governments 
and inducing those who had not done so before to accept the right of 
private petition. At the same time the Commission started to be more 
applicant friendly, declaring more and more complaints admissible 
(although improvement in the quality of petitions reflecting a better 
understanding of Strasbourg jurisprudence may have contributed to 
a significant extent to the increase in the number of complaints being 
accepted for further consideration as well).46 The jurisprudence of 
                                                     
42 “The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto…” 
43 Cited by Egbert Myjer: The European dimension: More than a non-committal 
ornament. Notes on the consequences of the ECHR for the administration of 
Dutch criminal justice. In: The Domestic Implementation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in Eastern and Western Europe. Edited by Evert A. 
Alkema-Theo L. Bellekom-Andrew Z. Drzemczewski-Jeroen G.C. Schokkenbroek, 
Engel Publisher, Kehl-Strasbourg-Arlington 1993, p.197.  
44 The European Court of Human Rights was set up in 1959, however in the 1960s 
it produced only 10 judgements, 26 in the 1970s and 169 in the 1980s. There is a 
significant increase in this number starting from the early 1990s, the number of 
cases shows steady increase since then. See further: Philip Leach: Taking a case 
to the European Court of Human Rights, Oxford 2nd edition, 2005 p.6.  
45 Cited by Myjer (op.cit. p.198) from an internal document of the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
46 In the four decades after 1955 the Commission accepted eight per cent of the 
applications only, whereas the ratio has grown to twenty five per cent by 1994. For 
further figures showing the increase in the number of individual applications and 
the ratio of complaints held admissible see David P. Forsythe: Human Rights in 
International Relations, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press 2006 p.124-
125.  
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the Commission and the Court has shown that even in old liberal 
democracies there might be problems with the observance of human 
rights and the Convention bodies have demonstrated that there is a 
genuine need for a regional human rights instrument with its 
monitoring mechanism which is not simply a decoration without any 
practical value.  
As indicated earlier, both the drafters of the Convention and 
members of the Court were aware of the State Parties’ sovereignty 
concerns and the Court’s own “democracy deficit”. That is why, as a 
general rule, the Court has avoided to make any straightforward 
assessment of the legislation adopted by democratically elected 
parliaments of respondent states and confined itself to ruling on 
individual decisions made or measures taken by national authorities 
in the particular case.  
However, there have been exceptions to the general rule right 
from the time the Convention organs started to operate. In principle, 
individual applicants are not entitled to lodge a complaint alleging the 
mere existence of legal provisions they believe to be in conflict with 
the Convention, unless they can prove that they have been affected 
by it through a particular individual measure. But under certain 
conditions the mere existence of a law may constitute an 
unacceptable interference with the individual’s right even if no 
implementing measure is applied.47 In the case of inter-state 
applications there is no restriction at all; any State Party may lodge 
an application against another alleging the violation of the 
Convention through legislation even if the law in question has never 
been applied.48  
Evidently, violations of the Convention may occur even if national 
law itself is in line with the ECHR. In such cases, the individual 
decision or measure taken violates both the Convention and national 
law. There is no reason for the Court to make a negative 
assessment of national law in cases when the state party’s law is 
open to interpretation both in line with and contrary to the 
Convention. However there might be national laws which simply 
cannot be applied in conformity with the Convention, accordingly the 
                                                     
47 See Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom, 7525/76 (22/10/1981) A45, par.41: “…the 
maintenance in force of the impugned legislation constitutes a continuing 
interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life (which includes 
his sexual life) within the meaning of Article 8 par. 1 (art. 8-1). In the personal 
circumstances of the applicant, the very existence of this legislation continuously 
and directly affects his private life (see, mutatis mutandis, the Marckx judgment of 
13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 13, par. 27): either he respects the law and 
refrains from engaging – even in private with consenting male partners - in 
prohibited sexual acts to which he is disposed by reason of his homosexual 
tendencies, or he commits such acts and thereby becomes liable to criminal 
prosecution. It cannot be said that the law in question is a dead letter in this 
sphere…there is no stated policy on the part of the authorities not to enforce the 
law in this respect. 
48 See P. Van Dijk op. cit p.40. 
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cause for the breach is that national authorities follow domestic law. 
If the Court finds a violation it declares, even if not explicitly, not only 
the individual measure but also the legal provision to be contrary to 
the Convention.49  
Under certain conditions, however, overt criticism of national 
legislation is simply unavoidable. In the case of the so-called 
qualified rights50, as well as of the right to liberty (article 5), 
interference is permissible only if it is provided by national law. It is 
not sufficient, however, that the State Party qualifies a law to be as 
such; it also has to meet certain requirements in order to be 
considered as law under the Court’s autonomous standard: it must 
be accessible and has to be formulated with sufficient clarity and 
precision.51 Should the Court come to the conclusion that the 
domestic provision fails to qualify as law for its failure to be precise 
enough, for instance, the ruling also includes the statement that the 
national law is in violation of the Convention. 
Furthermore, when it comes to the enforcement of the Court’s 
judgment, the incompatibility of national law with the Convention 
becomes manifest. The Convention provides that the Contracting 
Parties “undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any 
case to which they are parties.”52 From what has been outlined 
earlier about the respect of national sovereignty of State Parties, a 
rather narrow interpretation of the provision would follow: respondent 
States are not permitted to deny and contest the occurrence of a 
violation if so established by the Court. However, from the general 
obligation of State Parties “to secure to everyone within their 
                                                     
49 In some cases judges may render decisions by disregarding (not applying) 
national laws they find to be contrary to the Convention. In these cases there is 
no need to openly admit the non-conformity of national law with the Convention. 
However, this applies only if the Convention provision is “self-executing” and 
may therefore be applied in lieu of the national norm and only in countries where 
the Convention has a higher status than “ordinary law”. Following the Marckx 
judgment Belgian courts started to disregard the discriminatory provisions of the 
Civil Code and instead applied the provisions on “legitimate children” to children 
born out of wedlock. On the conflicting views of the Belgian high courts and the 
ECtHR on the legitimacy of this practice see. Henry G. Schermers: A European 
Supreme Court In: Protection des droits de l’homme: la perspective européenne/ 
Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective. Mélanges à la mémoire de/ 
Studies in memory of Rolv Ryssdal. Édité par/edited by Paul Mahoney-Franz 
Matscher-Herbert Petzold-Luzius Wildhaber, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, Köln-
Berlin-Bonn München 2000, p.1274-1275. 
50 Qualified rights or primae facie rights – the right is declared, but it is also 
declared that it may be interfered with on certain grounds, to the minimum extent 
possible. Examples of this are the right to respect for private life, the right of 
freedom of thought and religion, the right to freedom of expression, and the right of 
freedom of assembly and association. All these qualified rights are subject to 
interference, if it can be established that this is “necessary in a democratic society” 
on one of the stated grounds. See Andrew Ashworth Q.C.: Human rights, Serious 
crime and Criminal procedure, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002, p.76. 
51 See for examples: Hashman and Harrup v. the United Kingdom [GC], 25594/94 
(25/11/1999) par.31;Maestri v. Italy, 39748/98 (17/02/2004) par.30. 
52 Article 46 
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jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined […….] in the Convention 
one could rather conclude that “abiding by the Court’s judgment” has 
a broader meaning, i.e. States are under the obligation to terminate 
the “offence”. If the breach of the Convention is caused directly by 
the existence of legislation found in violation of the Convention (as in 
the case outlined above, if the mere existence of legislation, even 
without implementing measure, constitutes interference with the 
individual’s right), terminating the “offense” evidently presupposes 
the amendment or the abolition of that law. But also, in cases where 
the legal norm that may not be applied in line with the Convention 
has served as the basis of the individual measure found in breach of 
the Convention, ‘securing the enjoyment of rights” and terminating 
the offence implies the annulment or modification of the legislation in 
question. Thus we see that the effect of the Court’s judgments may 
go beyond the particular case and will have an impact “on the legal 
situation” in the respondent State.53  
Under article 46 of the Convention the execution of the judgments 
is supervised by the Committee of Ministers. The recently adopted 
Rules54 make it clear that by now the restrictive interpretation of the 
judgment’s binding effect, which extends solely to the payment of 
compensation and the prohibition of denying the finding of a breach 
of the Convention55, is not valid. In addition to determining whether 
just satisfaction awarded by the Court has been paid, the Committee 
of Ministers will also examine whether the State Party has taken the 
appropriate individual and general measures, legislative changes 
among them, in order to remedy the applicant’s individual situation 
and to prevent further violations. It should be added that the Court 
itself prior to the adoption of the Rules made it clear “that a judgment 
in which the Court finds a breach imposes on the respondent State 
a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums 
awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to 
supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if 
appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic 
legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to 
redress so far as possible the effects”. 56 
                                                     
53 Peter Leuprecht: The Execution of Judgments and Decisions. In: Macdonald-F. 
Matscher-H.Petzold (Eds.) The European System for the Protection of Human 
Rights. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1993. p. 791.  
54 Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of 
judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements (Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 10 May 2006 at the 94th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, thereafter: 
CM Rules) 
55 See Frowein, Jochen Abraham - Peukert, Wolfgang: Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonventon-EMRK Kommentar, Engel Verlag, Kehl-Straßburg-
Arlington, 1996. P.725-726. 
56 Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy 39221/98 and 41963/98 (13/07/2000) par. 249. See 
also the Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Article 50) 14556/89 
(31/10/1995) A -330-B par. 34: “a judgment in which the Court finds a breach 
imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and 
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The Committee of Ministers, in order to properly accomplish its 
function, may need the support of the Court. The Rules in their 
present form permit the Committee to request the Court for 
clarification if the execution of the “judgment is hindered by a 
problem of interpretation.”57 Not only for practical reasons, (why not 
encourage the Court to make its judgments clear right from the 
outset?), but also for transparency considerations is the 
Parliamentary Assembly’s recommendation legitimate in that the 
Court should indicate in the judgment itself the manner in which 
national authorities should execute it.58  
In fact, the Court, in some of its judgments, has already 
indicated the way the breach of the Convention should be 
remedied. By doing so it has gone beyond the wording of article 41, 
which seems to suggest that just satisfaction is the only 
consequence that may be attached to a finding of a violation.59 The 
decisions indicating the manner in which the breach should be 
remedied also weaken the subsidiarity principle according to which 
the Court’s “judgments are essentially declaratory in nature and 
that, in general, it is primarily for the State concerned to choose the 
means to be used” in order to comply with its obligation of abiding 
with the Court’s judgment.60 In some judgements, upon finding a 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court ordered the 
respondent State to return the applicants’ property61; in another 
case it suggested that carrying out a thorough investigation could 
                                                                                                                                   
make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as 
possible the situation existing before the breach.”  
57 CM Rule 10.1. Prior to the adoption of the new version of the CM Rules the 
Committee was not entitled to ask the Court for interpretation, only the respondent 
State and, subject to considerable restrictions, the applicant had this right. See the 
explanatory memorandum prepared by rapporteur Mr. Erik Jurgens to the 
Parliamentary Assembly report on the execution of judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights (Doc. 8808, 12 July 2000. par. 59.) 
58 “The Court should oblige itself to indicate in its judgment to the national 
authorities concerned how they should execute the judgment so that they can 
comply with the decisions and take the individual and general measures 
required.”(Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1226 (2000) 11.B ii.) 
59 Article 41 – Just satisfaction: If the Court finds that there has been a violation of 
the Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High 
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court 
shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party. 
60 See among others Assanidze v. Georgia 71503/01 (08/04/2004) par. 202. In 
Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece 14556/89 (31/10/1995) A-330-B the 
Court indicated that the respondent States’ discretion is not absolute: “Contracting 
States that are parties to a case are in principle [emphasis added] free to choose 
the means whereby they will comply with a judgment in which the Court has found 
a breach.” (par. 34.) 
61 See Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece 14556/89 (31/10/1995) A-330-B; 
Brumarescu v. Romania. (28342/ 95, 23/01/ 2001) For a detailed discussion of the 
relevant judgments see Philip Leach: Taking a case to the European Court of 
Human Rights, Second Edition Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005 p. 405 and 
406. 
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constitute adequate means of complying with its judgment.62 In 
Assanidze63 the Court ruled that the unlawfully detained applicant 
should immediately be released. It did not question the State’s 
freedom to choose the means whereby it executes the Court’s 
judgment but because of the nature of the violation found it 
considered that the particularities of the violation do “not leave any 
real choice as to the measures required to remedy it.”64  
For the purposes of this paper, (i.e. the ECtHR’s potential to 
shape the rules on criminal procedure in member states), it is of 
course the “general measures” and, among them, instructions to 
amend legislation that are of relevance.65 It should be added that 
individual measures formulated by the Court may also result in 
changes in legislation when their implementation so requires. In 
other words, formulated from the Court’s perspective, instructions 
to take general and individual measures may appear in the same 
judgment. In Sejdovic66, the Court stressed that in the case before 
it, where the violation of the right to a fair trial was caused by the 
applicant’s conviction, “despite an infringement of his right to 
participate in his trial, the most appropriate form of redress would, 
in principle, be trial de novo or the reopening of the proceedings, in 
due course and in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 of 
the Convention.”67 But due to the lack of adequate provisions in 
Italian law, the Court identified the structural or systemic problem 
and also formulated “general measures”, notably a 
recommendation for a change in legislation: “It is inherent in the 
Court's findings that the violation of the applicant's right as 
guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 originated in a problem which results 
from the Italian legislation on trial in absentia and which remains 
capable of affecting others in future. The unjustified hindrance of 
the applicant's right to a fresh determination by a court of the merits 
of the charge against him was not prompted by an isolated incident 
….but was rather the consequence of the wording of provisions of 
the CCP …The facts of the case disclose the existence… of a 
shortcoming as a consequence of which anyone convicted in 
absentia who has not been effectively informed of the proceedings 
against him may be denied a retrial. It also finds that the 
deficiencies in national law and practice identified in the applicant's 
particular case may subsequently give rise to numerous well-
founded applications...”68 “The Court considers that the respondent 
State must remove every legal obstacle that might prevent anyone 
                                                     
62 Acar v. Turkey (GC) 26307/95 (06/05/2003). On the issue see Leach op.cit p.99 
and 100. 
63 Assanidze v. Georgia 71503/01 (08/04/2004) 
64 par. 202. 
65 Also “individual measures” formulated by the Court may result in changes of 
legislation, when for instance their carrying out requires so.  
66 Sejdovic v. Italy 56581/00 (10/11/2004) 
67 Sejdovic judgment par. 55. 
68 Sejdovic judgment par. 44. 
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convicted in absentia who, having not been effectively informed of 
the proceedings against him, has not unequivocally waived the 
right to appear at his trial from obtaining either an extension of the 
time allowed for appealing or a new trial, so as to guarantee the 
right of those concerned to obtain a fresh determination of the 
merits of the charge against them….. The respondent State must 
therefore make provision, by means of appropriate regulations, for 
a new procedure capable of securing the effective realisation of the 
entitlement in question while ensuring respect for the rights 
guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention 69 
The Sejdovic judgment was rendered subsequent to the 
adoption of the Committee of Ministers Resolution inviting the Court 
“… to identify, in its judgment finding a violation of the Convention, 
what it considers to be an underlying systemic problem …”70 By this 
the Court was called upon by the Contracting States themselves 
represented in the Committee to abandon its earlier cautious 
approach and encouraged to give an explicit assessment on 
whether the law of the respondent state was in line with the 
Convention or not and by identifying “the source of the problem” to 
give guidance to national legislation. Obviously, the resolution is the 
reflection of member States’ more limited understanding of the 
concept of sovereignty in that they are now prepared to accept the 
explicit critiques of the Court over the laws adopted by their 
democratically elected parliaments.  
It should be added that, even in the past when the Court strictly 
constrained itself to the analysis of the facts of the particular case, 
refraining from making any assessment of the relevant national laws, 
the reasoning of many of its judgments gave state parties sufficient 
insight into the deficiencies of their laws and the manner in which 
they could be remedied. The judgments in the majority of cases 
were clear enough to enable states to transform the findings of the 
Court in the individual case into generalized legal norms. 
Subsequent to Court decisions, several modifications of the 
provisions on pre-trial detention and those affecting the individuals’ 
right to a fair trial were adopted in a number of jurisdictions.71 
Countries preparing for accession to the Convention used the 
Court’s case-law to check if their legal system was in compliance 
with the Convention and made the necessary changes accordingly.72 
Also the Committee of Ministers was able to draw generalized 
conclusions from the Court’s individual judgments in its 
                                                     
69 Sejdovic judgment par. 47. 
70 Resolution Res(2004)3 of the Committee of Ministers on Judgments Revealing 
and Underlying Systemic Problem, par I. 
71 For an overview of the impact on the substantive criminal law and the criminal 
procedure of Austria, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the Swiss cantons 
respectively and the United Kingdom see the papers published in issues 2 and 3 of 
1988 in the Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft.  
72 See compatibility reports at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human%5Frights/awareness/ 
4.%5Four%5Factivities/Compatibility%5FReports/ 
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recommendations addressed to member states on how to reform 
their criminal procedural laws in several areas. Thus the 
recommendation on the simplification of criminal justice73 made 
reference at several points to the Court’s jurisprudence; similarly the 
recommendation attempting to draw the right balance between the 
interests of witnesses and the defendant’s rights to a fair trial relied 
heavily on the judgments of the ECtHR. 74  
In some judgments, the Court, prior to being encouraged by the 
Committee of Ministers, went beyond the boundaries of the 
particular case and commented on the quality of national legislation, 
giving also guidance on how to amend it narrowing by this the 
States’ freedom of selecting the means of implementation. The Tyrer 
judgment,75 though without explicitly proclaiming it left practically no 
choice for legislation: the only way by which compliance could be 
ensured was to abolish corporal punishment as a criminal sanction. 
The X and Y judgment left no doubt that States, in order to comply 
with their obligation to effectively protect private life, must adopt 
provisions criminalizing sexual abuse of vulnerable individuals.76 In 
Poitrimol77 the Court made it clear that restrictions on defendants’ 
right of being represented by counsel in the appeal stage of the 
criminal process had to be removed in order to guarantee 
compliance with the right to a fair trial.  
The Court’s more straightforward position has, no doubt, 
weakened the subsidiarity principle that leaves States broad 
discretion to choose the means by which to implement its judgments. 
But what has prompted (made) the Committee of Ministers to 
encourage the Court to explicitly instruct State Parties on how to 
execute its judgments, to identify systemic deficiencies in their 
legislation and to give them guidance on how to remedy the 
shortcomings? The text of the Resolution seems to indicate that the 
reason for the adoption was rather pragmatic, notably the intention 
to reduce the number of applications and ease by this the Court’s 
workload. However the Parliamentary Assembly resolution, which 
must have provoked the Committee of Ministers’ action lists further 
reasons, such as the lack of clarity of some of the judgments and 
most importantly, the continuous reluctance of certain States to 
execute the Court’s decisions. One may, of course argue that it is 
                                                     
73 Recommendation No. R (87) 18 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on 17 September 1987. See also the Explanatory Memorandum 
published by the Council of Europe in 1988. 
74 Recommendation No. R (97) 13 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
States Concerning Intimidation of Witnesses and the Rights of the Defence 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 September 1997 at the 600th 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. See, for example par. 11 of the 
recommendation and also examples for cases Kostovski v. the Netherlands 
11454/85 (20/11/1989) A166; Windisch v. Austria 12489/86 (27/09/1990) A186. 
75 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom 5856/72 (25/04/1978) A26. 
76 X and Y v. the Netherlands 8978/80 (26/03/1985) 
77Poitrimol v. Fance 14032/88 (23/11/1993) 
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primarily for political reasons that judgments of the court are 
systematically ignored and that the Committee of Ministers, instead 
of taking firm measures against states which fail to comply with 
their obligation under the Convention78, took the easier way. As the 
case may be the Committee of Ministers’ resolution fits into the 
general trend of Member States’ readiness to renounce part of their 
sovereignty claims evidenced by the development of the 
Convention control mechanism. By Protocol 9 individual petitioners 
were granted the right to invoke the Court subsequent to the 
decision of the Commission and later by adopting Protocol 11. 
contracting parties obliged themselves to accept the jurisdiction of 
the Court and to recognize the right of individual application of any 
person under their jurisdiction.  
In spite of the development outlined the subsidiarity principle, 
though limited in validity, has been maintained. As noted in the 
Parliamentary Assembly resolution the principle still applies in that 
“the primary responsibility for ensuring the rights and freedoms laid 
down in the Convention rests with the national authorities.”79 
However, in the resolution appears the complementary principle of 
solidarity, which suggests the extension of the ratione personae 
binding effect of the Court’s judgments: “the principle of solidarity 
implies that the case-law of the Court forms part of the Convention, 
thus extending the legally binding force of the Convention erga 
omnes (to all the other parties). This means that the states parties 
not only have to execute the judgments of the Court pronounced in 
cases to which they are party, but also have to take into 
consideration the possible implications which judgments 
pronounced in other cases may have for their own legal system 
and legal practice.”80 The Parliamentary Assembly is not a 
decision-making body and its resolutions do not necessarily reflect 
what all member states are willing to accept in practice. Therefore 
one can rightly doubt if States are in fact sharing the above quoted 
conclusion drawn from articles 181 and 19 of the Convention82 and 
from the undisputed principle that the interpretation of the ECHR 
                                                     
78 As stated in par. 4. of the Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1226 (2000) there 
are no special sanctions envisaged in the Convention in cases where states do not 
execute the Court’s judgments. The Committee of Ministers may only use the 
rather drastic measures listed in article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe 
notably to suspend the State, which fails to accept the rule of law and to respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and to request it to withdraw. If such 
member does not comply with this request, the Committee may decide that it has 
ceased to be a member of the Council as from such date as the Committee may 
determine. 
79 par.2. 
80 par.3. 
81 “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” 
82 Article 19 provides for the establishment of the ECtHR “to ensure the 
observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties.” 
  52
ultimately rests with the European Court of Human Rights.83 But no 
doubt, the resolution indicates that the earlier widely shared 
restrictive interpretation of the ratione personae binding effect of 
the Court’s judgments based on article 46 of the Convention 
(States “undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in 
any case to which they are parties”) has by now become 
problematic.  
In summary, recent developments indicate that the ECtHR has 
acquired certain tasks that bring it closer to a kind of a European 
Constitutional Court and a European Supreme Court. Though it 
does not have the power to invalidate or amend decisions of 
national authorities it has been authorized by the State Parties to 
indicate the measures by which breaches of the Convention could 
be remedied. In addition it has acquired the competence to identify 
systemic deficiencies resulting in the violation of human rights and 
formulate general measures, among them legislative changes, to 
prevent future breaches of the Convention. One may wonder if the 
extended competence of the Court will, in fact, raise the level of the 
protection of human rights in Europe but there is no denying that it 
will permit the Court to contribute more actively to forming the 
European model of the criminal process in the future.  
                                                     
83 For the reasoning see paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Draft resolution (Doc. 8808, 12 July 2000) prepared by Mr. Erik Jurgens.  
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Introduction 
 
Effective anti-corruption activity is hardly feasible without specific 
law enforcement bodies, which are assigned to play a special role 
in the field of corruption prevention and control. At present the 
following four basic institutional models of anti-corruption activity 
are established and applied in Europe: 
• law enforcement, 
• preventive, 
• educational, and 
• multi-purpose. 
 
Of these, the fourth model has recently been given particular 
attention. It is defined as “an independent and well-resourced multi-
purpose service – free from political interference with broad 
authority to investigate corruption allegations and freeze assets, to 
request public institutions to reform procedures and reduce risks of 
corruption, to cooperate with the business community to change 
attitudes and to educate the public and mobilise public support”2. It 
is no secret that interest in this model is primarily related to the 
Hong Kong-based Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(hereinafter referred to as “ICAC”) that is high-rated among experts 
in the fields of corruption control and prevention. According to B. de 
Speville, former Commissioner of the ICAC and a current advocator 
of its activities, ICAC has “established a balanced strategy of 
prosecution, prevention, education and community involvement... 
for a long-term campaign to change public attitudes and make 
corruption a high-risk and odious crime.” 3 Hong Kong, which used 
to be characterized as a typical, thoroughly corrupt South Asian 
city, is today one of the forerunners of anti-corruption and 
                                                     
1 This article is based on a study that was made by the author by commission of 
the Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania and the Rambøll 
Management A/S in the framework of the Project “Strengthening of Administrative 
Capacities in the Fight against Corruption”.  
2 Anti-corruption services – good practice in Europe: Results of the Octopus 
Interface meeting Strasbourg, 5 – 7 November 2003. Octopus Interface 2003. 
Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 14 June, p. 9. 
3 OECD Symposium on Corruption and Good Governance. Paris: OECD, 1996. P. 
36 
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according to the Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) among the 20 most transparent regions of the world.4  
It is noteworthy that the multi-purpose model is not widespread 
in Europe: it has been adopted – entirely or partially – only in 
Germany, Croatia, Latvia and Lithuania. Is such a model effective 
in preventing corruption? Does it meet expectations of the 
community? These questions are difficult to answer without explicit 
and well-reasoned assessment criteria. This publication attempts to 
discuss such criteria based on a sample of the Special 
Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania (SIS).  
The SIS is an independent law enforcement body, “which 
detects and investigates corruption-related criminal acts, develops 
and implements corruption prevention measures”5. In 2000-2002 
SIS together with international and national experts developed the 
National Anti-Corruption Programme of the Republic of Lithuania, 
whose main objective is “to reduce the level of corruption in 
Lithuania and aspire it to become a smaller hindrance to building 
economy, promoting democracy, encouraging welfare development 
and strengthening national security”6. 
Despite the obvious differences in political, legal and cultural 
frameworks, there are certain programme-based similarities 
between the SIS and the ICAC. The National Anti-Corruption 
Programme adopted and approved by the Seimas (Parliament) of 
the Republic of Lithuania in 2002 is actually a multi-purpose 
complex programme for corruption control and prevention. One of 
its key principles establishes that “the fight against corruption may 
be effective when the long-term Programme is based on the 
components now universally recognised as essential. Those 
include corruption prevention, investigation of law violations, public 
education and support. In order to be successful, these 
components should be implemented as a whole.7” 
The central role in the implementation process of this 
Programme was assigned to the Special Investigation Service. 
Pursuant to this Programme, the SIS, jointly with the Government, 
monitors implementation of the preventive, investigative and 
educational components of the National Anticorruption Programme, 
                                                     
4 In 2003 and 2004, the CPI of Hong Kong was 8.0 on a 10-point scale, while in 
2005 it was 8.3. 
5 Law on Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania No. VIII-1649 
adopted on 2 May 2000, Vilnius. A new version of the Law adopted on 1 May 
2003. (Official Gazette, No. 38-1657, 2003). 
6 National Anti-Corruption Programme of the Republic of Lithuania approved by the 
Seimas (Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania) Resolution No. IX-711 on 17 
January 2002. 
7 National Anti-Corruption Programme of the Republic of Lithuania. (Official 
Gazette, No. 25-764, 2004, (2004-02-14)). 
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provides methodological assistance to other bodies implementing 
the Programme, and is directly involved in its implementation.8 
It would be misleading to think that the authors of the National 
Anti-Corruption Programme of Lithuania have attempted to adopt 
the Hong Kongese anti-corruption experiences per se. The Anti-
Corruption Strategy and its implementation mechanism contain a 
number of components approved in other Western states such as 
Great Britain and Canada. Nevertheless, the core idea with respect 
to the organisation and implementation method is the same. The 
SIS, like the ICAC, has unrestricted powers to investigate any 
corruption related case within the framework of the current 
legislation; it supports various state and business establishments in 
the implementation of recommendations that forestall corruption 
practices, submits proposals to improve standards of ethics in both 
public and business sectors (e.g., by drafting the Codes of Ethics), 
develops educational methods to improve awareness of school 
children and students about the adverse effect of corruption on 
society, and conducts public anti-corruption education campaigns.9  
International experts in the field of anti-corruption programmes 
and activity have examined the National Anti-Corruption 
Programme of the Republic of Lithuania with overt interest. Its 
development and implementation method through involvement of 
both governmental and non-governmental organizational and 
intellectual resources has been regarded as a “good experience in 
the region”, if not the “best”10. Furthermore, the work of the SIS has 
received a positive assessment from Lithuanian residents11.  
However, the SIS has been a target of ongoing criticism, too. 
The top concern in respect of its work has been ineffectiveness: the 
costs it generates are too high, it does not investigate major 
corruption related crimes, it is politically committed, it lacks 
professional skills, etc.12. Naturally, such criticism does not 
encourage confidence in the activities of an anti-corruption 
institution. It should be noted that the criticism is to a great extent 
caused by insufficient or false information, lack of accountability to 
                                                     
8 Ibid. 
9 The cultural, legal, and political aspects of SIS activity are discussed in: 
Dobryninas, A. Lithuania’s Anti-corruption Policy: Between the “West” and the 
“East”. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research. Vol. 11. Nr. 1. January 
2005, p. 77-95. 
10 Steves, F., and Rousso, A. Anti-corruption programmes in post-communist 
transition countries and changes in the business environment, 1999-2002. EBRD 
Working paper No. 85, p. 15-16.  
11 E.g., based on the results of the victimological survey conducted in 2003, the 
SIS received the highest evaluation among the law enforcement institutions (see: 
Dobryninas, A., Gaidys, V. Is the Lithuanian Society Safe? 2003, p. 27-32.). 
12 Accusations have been made in national newspapers and magazines (Lietuvos 
rytas, Lietuvos žinios, Kauno diena, Veidas, etc.) and in public TV or radio 
discussions.  
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the community and the absence of well-defined criteria for 
assessing the anti-corruption activity. 
The well-defined criteria are of special significance as they 
enable the institution not only to present objective assessments of 
its activity to the public, but also to demonstrate, with regular 
presentations of such assessments, progress of its activity. Public 
assessment presentations and the consequent community-wide 
discussions enhance for their part confidence in the SIS and may 
also provide ideas on how to improve the work of the anti-
corruption institution.  
 
 
Specific features of the assessment of the SIS activity effectiveness 
 
As mentioned earlier, the strategic SIS activity goals are as follows: 
• pre-trial investigation, 
• prevention, 
• education. 
 
These directions are multi-faceted. Investigation belongs to the 
sphere of criminal justice, thus, criminal legislation (Criminal Code, 
Criminal Procedure Code and other laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions) determines primarily the character of this 
kind of activity. It is noteworthy that a part of pre-trial investigation 
material and respective activities are not public (classified), as 
provided for by the respective national laws of the Republic of 
Lithuania. Such activity should be attributed to the control of 
corruption related offences.  
Prevention is generally perceived as a kind of activity outside the 
realm of criminal justice. Although the preventive character of 
criminal laws is discussed in the legal discourse, it is by nature very 
specific, limited and related to the deterrence of a potential 
offender, i.e. an individual refrains from committing a crime in fear 
of punishment. In criminological discourse the concept of 
prevention is wider. It is associated with general prevention 
(change of socio-psychological conditions in order to mitigate the 
impact of respective factors on criminal activity), situational 
prevention (creation of situational conditions impeding commission 
of a crime) and communal prevention (involvement of community 
members in the process of order enforcement)13. 
Education can be seen as a distinct component of general 
prevention, where the development and encouragement of proper 
value systems and standards of conduct are given particular 
attention. Those who have received proper education are 
                                                     
13 See: Graham, J. and Bennett, T. Crime Prevention Strategies in Europe and 
North America. HEUNI Publication Series No. 28. Helsinki: European Institute for 
Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations. February 1995. 
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considered more resistant to different corruption temptations and 
less tolerable to public manifestations of that kind.  
In reality, however, the effectiveness of the SIS activity cannot 
be assessed through these three strategic goals, because there are 
no uniform criteria with which to discern them – the principles and 
the results of the activities are too different. Internal goals of the 
main SIS units in charge of pursuing these goals may even be 
inconsistent.  
For instance, politicians and the general public tend to judge the 
effectiveness of law enforcement bodies by the number of recorded 
and disclosed crime incidents. Such quantitative criteria are 
particularly popular if the number of such crime incidents is 
considered “really high”. Consequently, it is quite natural that the 
relevant institutions wish to improve the statistical data of recorded 
and disclosed crime incidents, and thus demonstrate that they 
make effective use of taxpayers’ money. 
However, constant increase in recorded crime incidents should 
not gratify representatives of the prevention unit. Their 
effectiveness criteria are in fact reverse: the lower the occurrence 
rate of similar crime incidents, the better. This paradox manifests 
itself in the ICAC activity in Hong Kong. This institution, which is not 
without reason considered one of the most effective actors in the 
global fight against corruption, reports annually about the 
increasing number of disclosed corruption cases, notwithstanding 
the fact that effective preventive and educational activity of this 
agency should have reduced the number long ago.  
Quantitative criteria based on the statistical data of disclosed 
corruption related crimes or offences can take still more refined 
forms. In this context the so-called “cost/benefit” criterion seems to 
be particularly attractive. It is based on the assumption that one is 
able to calculate or measure the amount of money returned or 
saved when a crime is discovered or prevented, and then to 
compare it with the costs of crime control and prevention. The ideal 
cost/benefit ratio is below 1, i.e. the costs are lower than the benefit 
gained. The effectiveness of the service is then calculated on the 
basis of this ratio. For example, the performance of the Counter 
Fraud and Security Management Service of the national health 
system of Great Britain seems very efficient: according to the report 
from 1999 – 2005, the benefit gained from its activity was 13 times 
higher than the costs. 14  
Unfortunately, this criterion is plausible only in those cases 
where crimes are of a clearly-defined financial nature (in the 
provided example, these are financial crimes and offences). In the 
event of corruption manifestation, such estimation of financial costs 
                                                     
14 Countering Fraud in the NHS: Protecting Resources for Patients. 1999-2005 
Performance Statistics. NHS CFSMS. 2005, p. 4.  
  58
is not always possible and often bears a macroeconomic 
character15. In such a case, the cost/benefit calculation is in 
practice unfeasible.  
When analyzing the SIS effectiveness criteria, yet another 
problem is worth considering: the fundamental goals pursued 
(curbing corruption) are not very consistent with the institutional 
possibilities of the service. Within the sphere of corruption control, 
the SIS activity is limited to the prosecution of corruption related 
criminal acts (crimes involving corruption are investigated by other 
law enforcement bodies, too, such as the Financial Crime 
Investigation Service and the Economic Crime Investigation 
Service). Quite a number of actions where traces of corruption can 
be detected (e.g. nepotism) are non-criminalized or are not 
considered as law violations per se. Thus, it would not be correct to 
maintain that the SIS is responsible for investigating all corruption 
related crimes. Also, it is worth noting that the SIS is a law 
enforcement body in charge of a certain segment of the criminal 
process, i.e. operational activity and pre-trial investigation, and 
cannot be responsible for the outcome of the entire process.  
Similar comments can be provided also with respect to the other 
two strategic goals within the SIS’s scope of competence, i.e. 
prevention and education. Although the anti-corruption body is free 
to submit proposals on how to improve preventive activities within 
the public institutions and to coordinate the execution of this task, 
the effectiveness of such work depends not only on the agency 
itself but also on the overall political and administrative climate. The 
SIS is a law enforcement body, not a national public administration 
centre, and cannot, therefore, be solely responsible for nation-wide 
corruption prevention.  
Nor is the SIS an educational body, which could assume 
responsibility for instilling civic values in the youth or for the quality 
and implementation of curriculum programmes in educational 
institutions. The only thing it can do is the promotion and 
coordination of anti-corruption education programmes (provided 
that the decision-making bodies see the need for such 
programmes).  
In summary, the SIS does not devise “anti-corruption products”, 
which might be established on the national level and attributed 
solely to this institution. The SIS plays a special role in the fields of 
corruption control and prevention; however, this is not an absolute 
role. Thus, the SIS must not be assessed as an institution 
responsible for the situation in terms of corruption in the state, but 
rather as a body that provides – within the scope of its competence 
                                                     
15 Such financial assessments can be found in publications by anti-corruption 
experts, Gray, Ch., Hellman, J, Ryterman, R. Anticorruption in Transition 2: 
Corruption in Enterprise-State Interactions in Europe and Central Asia 1999 – 
2002. Washington: The World Bank. 2004. 
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– corruption control and prevention services for other judicial 
bodies, public institutions and the general public. Hence, in order to 
assess the SIS activity in the context of corruption curbing, one 
should not look solely at whether the SIS has managed to reduce 
the overall corruption proliferation rate (which would be difficult in 
technical terms, too), but rather at how these specific anti-
corruption services provided by the SIS are viewed in the public 
sphere. Thus, when such assessments are made, one must take 
into account both the distinctiveness of the services and the 
potential consumers. 
In view of the unique character of the SIS as a multi-purpose 
anti-corruption body, one must take into consideration how the 
activities of other similar institutions are assessed. It is noteworthy, 
for instance, that the ICAC does not only give reports on its activity, 
but is also assessed by three Advisory Committees: Investigation 
Supervision, Corruption Prevention and Public Relations. Members 
of these Committees are both executive ICAC officers and 
influential community representatives. Their task is twofold: to form 
a channel through which involvement of the public in the ICAC 
activities is ensured and to assess the said activities. Such external 
assessment could also be employed with the SIS.   
The advice of B. de Speville regarding the assessment of 
progress made in the anti-corruption strategy should also be taken 
into account. He maintains that in order to assess the progress one 
must identify the relevant qualitative and quantitative criteria. The 
public must be kept informed by means of both statistical data and 
special surveys conducted by independent and reliable public 
opinion research companies commissioned by anti-corruption 
institutions16.  
Such provision of information should emphasize the 
abovementioned three functions performed by the SIS – 
prosecution, corruption prevention and anti-corruption education (a 
horizontal assessment dimension) – along with the target groups to 
whom this information will be addressed (a vertical assessment 
dimension). 
In social sciences this specific character of information provision 
is conventionally associated with three groups of social awareness: 
experts, “well-informed citizens” and “people in the street”17. The 
first group is in disposition of accurate and justified information on 
the subject of assessment, while the second, the non-
                                                     
16 B. de Speville, B. Specialised anti-corruption services – good practice in Europe. 
In: Specialised anti-corruption services. Presentations by experts. Background 
document. Octopus Council of Europe. Programme against corruption and 
organised crime in Europe. 27 October 2003. Strasbourg 
PC-TC-022-Interface-03. Octopus Interface 2003. Specialised anti-corruption 
services. Presentations by experts. Background document. 
17 See: Schutz, A. The well-informed citizen. In: Schutz, A. Collected Papers. II: 
Studies in Social Theory. Marinus Hujhoff/The Hague. 1976, p. 122. 
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professionals, is interested in the said issues because of some 
specific aims it wishes to pursue (for instance, political or civic). 
The third group is guided by stereotypes, and awareness of this 
group usually pertains to a certain opinion.  
The application of this methodological scheme to assess an anti-
corruption institution reveals that each group possesses different 
information regarding the corruption proliferation rate in society, 
anti-corruption institutions, programmes and their implementation. 
The groups will accordingly make different assessments of the 
institutions and the processes. The general public, for instance, 
influenced by the mass media, probably feels that the country is 
sinking in the slough of corruption while the special services do 
nothing to put the corrupt officials behind bars. The experts, on the 
other hand, have developed a different attitude towards the same 
problems: they probably emphasize the potential of the legal 
system, the resources available to the anti-corruption institutions, 
the benchmarks and the possibilities of the prevention strategy. 
Naturally, the weight and the value of these two groups cannot be 
the same, and when drafting the assessment methodology it is 
important that the level of social awareness is taken into 
consideration.  
Another methodological remark relates to the form of 
assessment. It is a frequent practice to judge anti-corruption 
attempts on the basis of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
introduced 10 years ago by Transparency International, the leading 
international anti-corruption organization. The CPI is an integrated 
indicator defined on the grounds of surveys reflecting the views of 
business sector representatives and other expertise-based 
research. It is very popular world-wide not only because it follows 
reliable expert assessments but also because it is very easily 
perceived: every state is assessed on a 10-point scale allowing 
easy comparison with other states as well as the recording of 
changes in corruption perception over time. 
Due to the abovementioned reasons it is not advisable to link the 
assessment of the SIS activities with annual CPI changes (even 
though in the case of Hong Kong the high CPI value is definitely 
related to the ICAC activities). Yet the CPI qualitative (assessment 
of research and valuations of the leading international institutions) 
and quantitative (assessment based on a 10-point scale) 
assessment principles may also be used to assess the 
effectiveness of the activities.  
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Effectiveness assessment principles of anti-corruption activities 
 
Assessment of the corruption activities has to begin with an internal 
analysis at the institutional level. B. de Speville suggests18 that 
statistical indicators characterizing activity aspects in terms of the 
institution’s prosecution (corruption control), corruption prevention 
and anti-corruption education are included in the institution’s anti-
corruption report to the public. He further suggests that the report 
should include the public opinion indicators that assess the 
effectiveness of corruption control and prevention. Sociological 
indicators along with other indicators19 for assessment of the 
corruption situation may also be a subject-matter of the SIS public 
report.  
Such a report on anti-corruption activities based on statistical 
and sociological indicators may constitute important information to 
society. Yet, it is not advisable to link the institution assessment 
criteria with just the said indicators. Direct relation between 
effectiveness assessment and quantitative activity parameters may 
result (depending on the established criteria) in unspecified 
findings. For instance, the demand to improve the proportion 
between the number of completed pre-trial investigations and the 
registered applications to investigate corruption manifestations may 
result in an increased number of non-registered applications, and 
consequently make citizens disappointed with the SIS (“unwilling to 
investigate corruption cases”). Or, for instance, increasing the 
number of anti-corruption lectures may affect their quality and 
consequently reduce their impact on the audience.  
For this reason the assessment weight needs to be “transposed” 
from quantitative to qualitative activity parameters. To this aim, the 
assessments of the SIS anti-corruption activities and complex 
strategic goals, such as prosecution, prevention and education, 
should be linked to expert surveys and public opinion polls. 
Following this scheme each of the anti-corruption strategic goals 
should be assessed with a complex indicator based on expert 
knowledge, evaluations given by “well-informed citizens” as well as 
the public opinion. The evaluations are gathered by interviewing 
three independent expert groups, 10 persons in each, and by 
carrying out a representative public opinion survey.  
The first group should consist of specialists having theoretical 
and practical knowledge of operational activities and pre-trial 
investigation (representatives from courts, prosecutor’s offices, 
relevant research institutions, etc). They would provide an expert 
assessment of the corruption control units on the basis of a 
                                                     
18 See: de Speville, B. Ibid. 
19 Such indicators are present in sociological surveys on the corruption proliferation 
rate. See, for example: Alisauskiene, R., Dobryninas, A., and Zilinskiene, L. 
Lithuanian Map of Corruption: 2001-2004. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2005. 
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prepared questionnaire. General corruption prevention and anti-
corruption education assessment would also be performed by the 
same group, but here they would be treated as “well informed 
citizens”, not experts, and their assessments as “informative”, not 
“expert”.  
The second group should include specialists having theoretical 
and practical knowledge of the prevention of crime and various 
forms of deviation. They could be policy makers and public officials 
involved in anti-corruption activities, municipal representatives 
experienced in corruption prevention, scholars, and representatives 
of non-governmental institutions. This group would carry out an 
expert assessment of corruption prevention on the basis of a 
prepared questionnaire. An informative assessment of the strategic 
goals of corruption control and anti-corruption education would also 
be performed (as “well informed citizens”).  
The composition of the third group could be congruent with the 
second; yet, specialists with educational and organizational 
experience in public awareness campaigns would be preferred. 
Representatives of educational establishments, business, youth 
and mass media organizations could also be incorporated. This 
group would carry out an expert assessment of anti-corruption 
education on the basis of a prepared questionnaire. An informative 
assessment of strategic goals of corruption control and corruption 
prevention would be performed, too (as “well informed citizens”). 
All the abovementioned strategic goals also need to be 
assessed in a representative public opinion survey based on a 
prepared questionnaire.  
Each expert or informative assessment could consist of three parts: 
1. Assessment of the functions performed (F), 
2. Social impact assessment (I), 
3. Assessment of inter-agency coordination and cooperation (C). 
 
Questions for structural interview with experts and “well informed 
citizens” need to be agreed upon by the relevant top level 
administration of the SIS units as well as the experts in anti-
corruption activities. The following assessment indicators could be 
recommended to be included in the questionnaire: 
Corruption control (criminal prosecution) F-assessment20: 
• multi-focus activity assessment (are all the potentially corrupt 
public life areas subject to investigation within the scope of the 
SIS competence?), 
• professional performance assessment (are the investigation 
processes unbiased and independent of other sources?), 
                                                     
20 The list of indicators is developed following the recommendations in Countering 
Fraud in the NHS: Aims, Objectives, Principles, and Purpose. Department of 
Health. 10734 CFS XXk XP May 01 (XXX).  
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• quality assessment (are the performed investigations precise 
and reliable?), 
• legitimacy assessment (are the pre-trial investigations in full 
conformity with the punitive justice criterion, i.e., the Criminal 
Code and the Criminal Process Code, as well as with other 
relevant legislation and legal acts; are human rights respected, 
etc.),  
• accuracy assessment (how accurately does the Service define 
the priorities for fighting corruption, i.e., how does this conform 
to the corruption proliferation rate in the society?). 
 
Corruption control (punitive prosecution) I-assessment: 
• assessment of deterrent effect (does the prosecution of corrupt 
persons deter potential offenders?), 
• accountability, transparency and responsibility assessment (is 
sufficient information on the SIS corruption control activities 
provided to the society members, policy-makers, business 
sector and the civic establishments?), 
• integrity assessment (are the officials involved in corruption 
control fair?), 
• assessment of public involvement in corruption control (attitude 
towards the reporters of corruption manifestations? How are the 
reports responded to?). 
 
Corruption control (criminal prosecution) C-assessment: 
• assessment of cooperation with the prevention unit (is there 
close cooperation developed, what are the benefits of this type 
of cooperation, etc.), 
• assessment of cooperation with the anti-corruption education 
unit (similar questions plus one regarding participation in 
collective events). 
 
Assessment of the corruption control by residents: 
• assessment of corruption proliferation rate, 
• awareness of the functioning unit, 
• efficiency assessment in terms of prosecuting corrupt persons 
and preventing corruption manifestations in the public life, 
• assessment of confidence in criminal prosecution service (do the 
society members, policy-makers, business sector and the civic 
society organizations have confidence in the Service?). 
 
Corruption prevention F-assessment: 
• assessment of the analysis regarding the corruption situation in 
the public, 
• assessment of the priorities of anticorruption activities, 
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• assessment of anti-corruption legislation and other standard 
documents initiated by the SIS, 
• assessment of anti-corruption expertise in legislation and other 
standard documents, 
• assessment of the drafted anti-corruption recommendations; 
• assessment of consultancy provision in corruption prevention in 
the public service,  
• assessment of encouragement of investigative journalism. 
 
Corruption prevention I- assessment: 
• assessment of impact of the SIS Code of Ethics implementation 
programmes (on policy-makers, public officials and the business 
sector), 
• assessment of impact of the SIS corruption prevention 
programmes on encouraging transparency, accountability and 
responsibility at the governmental and self-governance 
organizational level, 
• assessment of impact of the SIS on mass media. 
 
Corruption prevention C-assessment: 
• assessment of cooperation with the corruption control unit (is 
there close cooperation developed, what are the benefits of this 
type of cooperation, etc.), 
• assessment of cooperation with the anti-corruption education 
unit (similar questions plus one regarding participation in 
collective events). 
 
Corruption prevention assessment by residents: 
• effectiveness assessment of corruption prevention programme 
carried out by the SIS (on how such a programme contributes to 
curbing corruption in the society), 
• assessment of the SIS initiated changes in the areas most 
affected by corruption (such as health care, public procurement, 
etc.). 
 
Anti-corruption education F-assessment: 
• assessment of dissemination of anticorruption information, 
• quality assessment of general methodological literature, 
• value and ethics-based assessment of the devised educational 
programmes, 
• assessment of anti-corruption campaigns intended for the youth, 
• assessment of educational anti-corruption projects disseminated 
via mass media,  
• assessment of lectures delivered to the public, 
• assessment of assistance and consultancy provided to the 
governmental and non-governmental organizations. 
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Anti-corruption education I-assessment: 
• assessment of awareness of the National Anti-Corruption 
Programme, 
• assessment of impact of the devised anti-corruption educational 
programmes on students and schoolchildren, 
• assessment of change in public attitudes towards corruption 
generated by the SIS anti-corruption public awareness 
campaigns. 
 
Anti-corruption education C-assessment: 
• assessment of cooperation with the prevention unit (is there 
close cooperation developed, what are the benefits of this type 
of cooperation, etc.), 
• assessment of cooperation with the corruption control unit 
(similar questions). 
 
Assessment of anti-corruption education by residents: 
• recollections of general public awareness campaigns, 
• effectiveness of public awareness campaigns in promoting anti-
corruption attitudes in the general public, 
• the SIS role in fostering anti-corruption values among the young 
people, 
• assessment of the SIS activities by mass media. 
 
It is advisable that prior to delivering the assessments, the SIS 
annual performance report which covers the aforesaid strategic 
targets - criminal prosecution, prevention and education – is 
brought to the attention of the experts and “well informed citizens”. 
Moreover, the structured interview could be replaced by 3 
discussion groups (each with 8 to 10 members) where the 
participants would provide individual assessments of the various 
strategic goals of the SIS activities and simultaneously consider the 
presented assessments. The advantage of this method lies in 
better reasoning and justification of the assessment. From the 
technical point of view, however, conducting of such group 
discussions is more complicated (the discussion may take several 
hours). In addition, in this type of assessment process there is no 
anonymity.  
A pilot study of the presented principles of assessment was 
organized by SIS together with Transparency International 
Lithuanian Chapter (TILC) in December 2005 – January 2006. The 
study included four focus groups (the first group was organized in 
order to clarify and improve questionnaires for experts and general 
public, the other three were devoted to the evaluation of SIS activity 
in accordance with the presented principles of assessment) and a 
national representative survey. The results of the pilot study 
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showed that the presented principles of assessment are practically 
implementable, and provided the anticorruption institution with 
important and helpful information for increasing the effectiveness of 
its activity. In addition, the results gave new ideas for improving the 
criteria and procedure of the assessment. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Two fundamental aspects have been taken into consideration in the 
proposed principles of effectiveness assessment of anti-corruption 
activities: the specific character of the Special Investigation Service 
as a multipurpose anti-corruption institution, and the need for public 
accountability resulting from this specific character. 
These principles do not constitute thorough and all-purpose 
assessment criteria of the SIS activity and, therefore, cannot 
replace the detailed activity auditing of the institution. They rather 
emphasize the public perception and assessment of prosecution, 
prevention and education functions declared by the SIS, the 
credentials granted to this institution by the society, and its role in 
acting as the state’s instrument in the anti-corruption activities.  
The methodology emphasizes both “horizontal” (strategic goals 
of anticorruption activities) and the “vertical” (specific activity 
perception aspects) levels. On one hand, this allows assessment 
differentiation between anti-corruption activity and competence 
evaluation, and, on the other hand, enables the presentation of 
integral general assessments in a simple quantitative form. 
Potential qualitative criteria for assessing the SIS and other 
similar anti-corruption institutions have been presented, yet, 
undoubtedly, they need to be specified during the assessment 
process. Therefore, prior to implementation of this methodology it is 
necessary to carry out a “pilot” test. Following the final 
determination in expert and empirical terms of qualitative 
parameters of these assessment principles as well as the 
corresponding weight multipliers, they may turn into a long-term 
effectiveness assessment instrument for the anti-corruption 
institution, which, in a clear and simple form, allows to inform the 
general public about the progress made by the Service in 
forestalling corruption manifestations in society. 
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An Overview of Progress in EU Cooperation in Criminal Justice 
 
What is the EU doing in respect of cooperation in criminal matters? A 
very common view of the European Union is that it is a massive 
intergovernmental bureaucracy that churns out directives and 
regulations that have little, if any, impact on practice. 
But is, in fact, EU cooperation in criminal justice ineffective? If we 
take into consideration the fact that this cooperation did not really get 
underway until the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht gave the EU 
competence in justice and home affairs, quite a lot of work has been 
done in the dozen years since then. This can be illustrated by 
comparing present EU cooperation with the “status quo” of ordinary 
international cooperation, among the police, prosecutors and the 
judiciary. The purpose of this paper is to do just that: see how far the 
EU has gone over the past ten years, when compared to cooperation 
in other parts of the world. The paper will look at the main areas of 
cooperation: the police, prosecution and the judiciary. The paper will 
also look at mutual evaluation, and finally at the drafting of criminal 
law and the formulation of criminal policy. 
 
 
Police cooperation 
 
The global status quo:  
The general rule around the world is that law enforcement 
personnel do not have powers outside of their jurisdiction. Notices 
are communicated through Interpol. A few countries have posted 
liaison officers abroad, and informal contacts are used on an ad 
hoc basis. Otherwise, officially, information may not and is not 
exchanged except through formal bilateral channels, and even then 
only in a few cases. Coordination of cross-border investigations is 
rare, and requires considerable preparation through formal 
channels. 
The European Union reality:  
• an international body, Europol, co-ordinates cross-border 
investigations, and seeks to provide support to domestic law 
enforcement services in specialist fields. 
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• a network of liaison officers has been developed. 
• joint investigative teams (with members from the law 
enforcement agencies of different countries) can be set up. 
• Europol produces threat assessments on organized crime, 
bringing together data from all Member States. 
• within the framework of the Schengen conventions, which are in 
force in over one half of the EU Member States, 
• the Schengen information system allows national law 
enforcement agencies to share data on many key issues almost 
instantaneously with their colleagues in other countries. The 
system encompasses some 50,000 terminals in the Member 
States. 
• law enforcement authorities are allowed hot pursuit across 
borders (under certain conditions). 
• law enforcement authorities are allowed to engage in 
surveillance in the territory of other countries (under certain 
conditions). 
• law enforcement authorities are allowed to engage in controlled 
delivery. 
 
 
Europol 
 
Europol was established in October 1998, when the Europol 
Convention entered into force among the (then) fifteen European 
Union countries. Europol is an international organization that has its 
headquarters in The Hague, in the Netherlands.  
The objective of Europol is “to improve ... the effectiveness and 
cooperation of the competent authorities in the Member States in 
preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and 
other serious forms of international crime where there are factual 
indications that an organized criminal structure is involved and two 
or more Member States are affected by the forms of crime in 
question in such a way as to require a common approach by the 
Member States owing to the scale, significance and consequences 
of the offences concerned.” 
The principal tasks of Europol consist of 
1) facilitating the exchange of information between the Member 
States, 
2) obtaining, collating and analysing information and intelligence 
(including the preparation of annual threat assessment reports on 
organized crime), 
3) notifying the competent authorities of the Member States of 
information concerning them and of any connections identified 
between criminal offences, 
4) aiding investigations in the Member States by forwarding all 
relevant information to the national units, and 
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5) developing a computerized system of collected information. 
 
Europol is also charged with developing specialist knowledge of 
the investigative procedures of the competent authorities in the 
Member States and providing advice on investigations, and with 
providing strategic intelligence to assist with and promote the 
efficient and effective use of the resources available at the national 
level for operational activities. For this purpose, Europol can assist 
Member States through advice and research in training, the 
organization and equipment of the authorities, crime prevention 
methods, and technical and forensic police methods and police 
procedures. 
Work in progress. In October 1999, soon after the Europol 
Convention entered into force, a special European Union Council 
was held in Tampere, Finland, to discuss the strengthening of the 
work of the EU in justice and home affairs. In respect of Europol, 
the Tampere meeting concluded, inter alia, that “Europol’s role 
should be strengthened by allowing it to receive operational data 
from Member States and authorising it to ask Member States to 
initiate, conduct or coordinate investigations or to create joint 
investigative teams in certain areas of crime, while respecting 
systems of judicial control in Member States”. This was an 
important goal, since it would allow Europol a considerably more 
active role in investigations. 
 
 
Schengen 
 
The need for the “Schengen arrangements” arose with one of the 
primary goals of economic integration, the elimination of border 
controls on the transit of persons, goods, capital and services. 
Quite simply, the Schengen area has become a “passport-free 
zone.” Although this elimination of border control undoubtedly 
promotes trade and commerce, at the same time it makes more 
difficult the task of controlling the entry and exit of offenders and 
suspects.  
Due in part to the slowness with which police cooperation was 
being developed and to political differences of opinions over the 
extent of this cooperation (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty creating the 
third pillar was still in the future), some European Union countries 
(originally, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands) decided to move among themselves to a “fast-track” 
alternative. The result was the Schengen Agreement of 1985 and 
the Schengen Convention of 1990, which were designed to 
eliminate internal frontier controls, provide for more intensive police 
cooperation, and establish a shared data system.  
The “Schengen group” currently consists of Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
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the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, as well as, from 
outside the EU, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.1 The United 
Kingdom and Ireland have not joined, since they wish to retain 
separate passport controls. The ten new Member States that joined 
on 1 May 2004 have not yet been approved as “Schengen-ready,” 
but some may join already during 2007. 
Police cooperation within the framework of Schengen includes 
cross-border supervision, “hot pursuit” across borders into the 
territory of another Member State; and controlled delivery (i.e. 
allowing a consignment of illegal drugs to continue its journey in 
order to discover the modus operandi of the offenders, or to identify 
the ultimate recipients and their agents, in particular the main 
offenders). These forms of cooperation have been hard-won: they 
did not see the light of day until after protracted negotiations 
between the Governments concerned, and even then they have 
been hedged by a number of restrictions. 
As a trade-off to ending checks on internal borders, the 
Schengen countries agreed on the establishment of the Schengen 
Information System (SIS). This consists of a central computer (in 
Strasbourg, France) linked to a national computer in each country, 
and to a total of some 50,000 terminals. When fully operational, 
data entered into any one computer (for example data on wanted 
persons, undesirable aliens, persons to be expelled or extradited, 
persons under surveillance, and some stolen goods) would 
immediately be copied to the other national information systems. 
An electronic mail system (SIRENE; short for Supplementary 
Information Request at the National Entry) allows for the transfer of 
additional information, such as extradition requests and 
fingerprints. Yet another data-connected acronym is VISION, which 
refers to the “Visa Inquiry System in an Open-Border Network”. 
 
 
Information gathering and analysis 
 
Law enforcement authorities world-wide would be among the first to 
agree that a more proactive, intelligence-led approach is needed to 
detect and interrupt organised criminal activities, apprehend the 
offenders, demolish the criminal networks, and seize and 
confiscate the proceeds of crime. Information is needed on the 
profile, motives and modus operandi of the offenders, the scope of 
and trends in organised crime, the impact of organised crime on 
society, and the effectiveness of the response to organised crime. 
This information includes operational data (data related to 
                                                     
1 The principal reason for the inclusion of Norway and Iceland is that these two 
countries are part of the passport-free zone formed among the Nordic countries. 
The other three Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are members 
of the Schengen group. Switzerland, in turn, is surrounded by EU Member 
States. 
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suspected individuals and to detected cases) and empirical data 
(qualitative and quantitative criminological data). 
On the global level the arrangements for the exchange of 
operational and empirical data continue to be ad hoc, between 
individual law enforcement agencies or even individuals. Such ad 
hoc arrangements also raise concerns over whether or not 
domestic legislation on data protection is being followed. 
Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (in particular articles 27 and 28) 
should provide a firmer foundation for this exchange of data, but 
national practice will undoubtedly be slow in aligning itself with the 
soft requirements of the Convention. 
The Schengen information system has already been mentioned. 
Within the broader European Union framework, several 
arrangements are already in place for gathering and analysing 
data: 
• a joint action adopted in 1996 deals with the role of liaison 
officers. Their function is specifically to focus on information 
gathering. They are to “facilitate and expedite the collection and 
exchange of information through direct contacts with law 
enforcement agencies and other competent authorities in the host 
State”, and “contribute to the collection and exchange of 
information, particularly of a strategic nature, which may be used 
for the improved adjustment of measures” to combat international 
crime, including organized crime. So far, over 300 liaison officers 
have been posted by EU countries, and they work in close 
cooperation with one another. 
• Europol already produces annual reports on organised crime 
based on data provided by Member States. These annual reports 
are being used in an attempt to define strategies. Over the years, 
the quality and utility of these annual reports have improved, even 
though continued work is being done to improve the validity, 
reliability and international comparability of the data. One particular 
feature of the annual reports is that they contain recommendations 
based on an analysis of the data. (As of 2006, these reports have 
been presented in the form of threat assessment reports.) 
• various decisions have been taken on the exchange of 
information on specific subjects. For example, a decision adopted 
in 1997 requires the exchange of information between law 
enforcement agencies when potentially dangerous groups are 
travelling from one Member State to another in order to participate 
in events.  
• the European Union has created a number of financial 
programmes to encourage the closer involvement of the academic 
and scientific world in the analysis of organised crime.  
• a European police research network is being established to act 
as an information source on research results, other documented 
experiences and good practice in crime control. 
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• on 20 December 2002, Europol and the United States signed an 
agreement on the exchange of personal data. This allows the 
United States to benefit from the operational and strategic analyses 
carried out by Europol on the basis of data from all European Union 
Member States. 
 
 
Work in progress in police cooperation 
 
At the end of 2004, the European Council adopted a new 
programme (the “Hague Programme”) that calls for a number of 
new measures. A key one is the adoption of what has become 
known as the “principle of availability.” This is defined to mean that 
a law enforcement officer in one Member State who needs 
information in order to perform his or her duties can obtain this from 
another Member State, and that the law enforcement agency in the 
other Member State which holds this information should make it 
available for the stated purpose, taking into account the 
requirement of ongoing investigations in that State. The first 
instruments implementing the principle are now being drafted. The 
provision of information would be hedged by some conditions, 
including data protection. 
A second initiative, taken by a smaller group of countries, is 
going in the same direction. Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands are setting up what is known as 
“Schengen III,” a system where the authorities of the different 
countries have direct access to some of the key law enforcement 
related data banks in the other countries. 
Three initiatives are related to criminal records. The one that is 
furthest along (as of the spring of 2006) calls for the expedited 
transfer of criminal records information on request. A second 
initiative derives from a proposal that central European criminal 
records be set up. This encountered such resistance (for a variety 
of legal, practical and technical reasons) that the proposal has 
been scaled down to a model where a centralised data bank would 
contain information only on whether or not criminal records exist 
regarding a specified individual in one of the EU countries; if so, the 
authority requesting the information would turn to the EU countries 
in question. The third initiative deals with the extent to which 
criminal records should be taken into consideration in criminal 
proceedings being conducted in another EU Member State. 
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Prosecutorial cooperation 
 
The global status quo:  
International contacts between prosecutorial authorities are 
based on bilateral and the few multilateral treaties on mutual legal 
assistance. Informal contacts are facilitated by the International 
Association of Prosecutors and other, similar non-governmental 
organizations.  
 
The European Union reality:  
• a special structure, the European Judicial Network, has been set 
up to promote direct contacts between prosecutors. The system 
involves computerized links between the Member States, and in 
time will probably allow automatic and direct translation and 
transmission of requests. 
• several European Union Member States have posted liaison 
magistrates abroad, with a specific mandate to facilitate responses 
to requests for extradition and mutual legal assistance, and a more 
general mandate to promote international cooperation. 
• prosecutorial and judicial co-operation is promoted also by direct 
contacts through the Schengen structures. 
• an international structure, Eurojust, has been set up to assist in 
the coordination of the prosecution of cross-border cases. 
 
 
The European Judicial Network and the strengthening of informal 
contacts 
 
Among the greatest difficulties in extradition and mutual legal 
assistance is the lack of information on how a request should be 
formulated so that it can readily be dealt with in another country, 
and the lack of information on what progress is being made in the 
requested State in responding to the request.  
In those (rare) cases where the practitioner personally knows his 
or her counterpart in the other country, informal channels can be 
used. The European Union has created a structure for fostering 
direct contacts between practitioners, the “European Judicial 
Network” (EJN).2 This network consists primarily of the central 
authorities responsible for international judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, and of the judicial or other competent authorities 
with specific responsibilities within the context of international 
cooperation. The EJN focuses on promoting cooperation in respect 
of serious crime such as organized crime, corruption, drug 
trafficking and terrorism. 
                                                     
2 Joint Action of 29 June 1998. A similar structure has been set up for 
cooperation in civil matters. 
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The EJN is promoting cooperation in a number of different ways. 
First of all, it organizes regular meetings (at least three times a 
year) of representatives of the contact points. These meetings have 
dealt, for example, with case studies, general policy issues, and 
practical problems. Organizing the meetings in the different EU 
Member States provides an additional benefit: the host country can 
present its system for international cooperation, and the 
participants can get to know one another. Both factors are 
important in instilling confidence in one another’s criminal justice 
system. 
Second, the EJN is preparing various tools for practitioners. One 
such tool is a CD-rom that provides practitioners with information 
on what types of assistance can be requested in the different 
Member States (sequestration of assets, electronic surveillance 
and so on) for what types of offences, how to request it, and whom 
to contact. The CD-rom also contains the texts of relevant 
international instruments and national legislation. A second tool is a 
computerized “atlas” of the authorities in the different Member 
States, which shows who is competent to do what in the different 
Member States in relation to international cooperation. Soon, the 
contact points in all twenty-five Member States will be connected 
with one another by a secure computer link that can be used not 
only to follow up on requests, but even to send the requests 
themselves. 
A third tool is a uniform model for requests for mutual legal 
assistance. Consideration is currently being given to developing a 
system for automatic translation of these requests, at first into the 
major European languages, and ultimately into the over twenty 
languages used in the EU. 
 
 
Liaison magistrates 
 
The concept of the liaison magistrate is based on the positive 
experiences with the growing network of liaison officers used to 
promote cooperation between law enforcement agencies. In law 
enforcement, the liaison officer uses direct contacts to facilitate and 
expedite the international collection and exchange of information, in 
particular information of a strategic nature.3 
The liaison magistrate is an official with special expertise in 
judicial co-operation who has been posted in another State, on the 
                                                     
3 The Treaty of Amsterdam of the European Union (article 30(2)(d)) called on the 
European Council to “promote liaison arrangements between prosecuting / 
investigating officials specialising in the fight against organised crime in close 
cooperation with Europol”. In order to create a basis for the development of this 
work, on 22 April 1996 the European Council adopted a Joint Action on a 
framework for the exchange of liaison magistrates to improve judicial coopera-
tion. 
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basis of bilateral or multilateral arrangements, in order to increase 
the speed and effectiveness of judicial cooperation and facilitate 
better mutual understanding between the legal and judicial systems 
of the States in question.4 
The liaison magistrate does not have any extraterritorial powers, 
and also otherwise must fully respect the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the host State.  
Liaison magistrates are - so far - used almost solely by the 
European Union countries. In general, liaison magistrates are sent 
to countries with which there is a high number of requests for 
mutual assistance, and where differences in legal systems have 
caused delays. France has been the most active in sending out 
liaison magistrates, and has sent them not only to the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, but also outside the European Union, to the United 
States. 
Liaison magistrates work on the general level (by promoting the 
exchange of information and statistics and seeking to identify 
problems and possible solutions) and on the individual level (by 
giving legal and practical advice to authorities of their own State 
and of the host State on how requests for mutual assistance should 
best be formulated in order to ensure a timely and proper response, 
and by trying to identify contact persons who might help in 
expediting matters). The exact profile of the work of the liaison 
magistrate varies, depending on such factors as the types of cases, 
and the extent to which there are direct contacts between the 
judicial authorities of the two States. 
The advantages, from the point of view of the sending State and 
the host State, are numerous. Language problems are reduced, 
requests for judicial co-operation can be discussed already before 
they are sent in order to identify and avert possible problems, and 
there is a basis for promoting trust and confidence in one another’s 
legal system. 
 
 
Eurojust: A formal structure for prosecutorial coordination 
 
Even the direct contacts and expertise provided by the EJN and the 
liaison magistrates cannot always provide the type of coordination 
needed in investigating transnational organized crime. Over recent 
years, the idea gradually evolved of setting up a separate entity, 
                                                     
4 A related concept is that of the legal attaché, who is posted in the mission of 
the sending State to look after legal issues in general that concern the host State 
and the sending State. Reference can also be made to temporary exchanges of 
personnel, which are designed to increase familiarity with one another’s legal 
system and foster direct, informal contacts. Neither legal attachés or personnel 
on temporary exchange, however, have the same expertise and job profile as the 
liaison magistrate. 
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somewhat comparable to Europol in the law enforcement field, to 
coordinate national prosecuting authorities and support 
investigations of serious organised crime extending into two or 
more Member States.5 
The idea for the establishment of such an entity received a 
considerable push at the special European Union Council held in 
Tampere, Finland in October 1999. A temporary unit, called “Pro 
Eurojust” (short for “Provisional Eurojust”) started work in Brussels 
in March 2001, and Eurojust itself began its work one year later. As 
of 1 January 2003, it has been located in The Hague, near its 
police “cousin”, Europol. 
Each Member State has sent a senior prosecutor or magistrate 
on permanent assignment to Eurojust. These representatives meet 
every week to discuss both individual cases and general policy for 
coordinating investigations. Plenary meetings tend to be devoted to 
policy issues, while most cases will be dealt with in smaller 
meetings, among representatives of only the individual countries 
involved. 
Eurojust itself does not have any operational powers. Instead, 
the national representatives, having agreed on what needs to be 
done, contact the competent authorities in their own Member State 
for the required action. In addition, individual members of Eurojust 
may have operational powers according to their national legislation. 
One of the topics now being debated is what type of operational 
powers Eurojust itself should be given in the future. One example is 
that Eurojust might be empowered to ask a Member State to initiate 
criminal proceedings or to provide Eurojust with data regarding the 
case.6 
 
 
Judicial cooperation 
 
The global status quo:  
Mutual legal assistance and extradition are based on an 
incomplete patchwork of bilateral treaties and, in rare cases, 
multilateral treaties. These treaties tend to cover only some 
offences, and offer only limited measures. Requests must be sent 
through a central authority. The procedure tends to be slow and 
uncertain, with requests often being frustrated by bureaucratic 
inertia, broad grounds for refusal, and differences in criminal and 
procedural law.  
                                                     
5 See Hans G. Nilsson, Eurojust – the Beginning or the End of the European 
Public Prosecutor? in Europarättslig Tidskrift, vol. 4, 2000. 
6 In order for Eurojust to have the power to ask for data, considerable attention 
will have to be paid to data protection, for example, to how data are to be 
transmitted, who has access to the data, confidentiality, and the maintenance of 
personal records. In this respect, the laws of the different Member States remain 
quite different. 
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The European Union reality: 
• all European Union Member States are parties to broad 
multilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance and extradition. 
• the European Union has decided on standards of good practice 
in mutual legal assistance, and regularly reviews compliance with 
these standards. 
• separate European Union treaties on mutual legal assistance 
and on extradition have been drafted in order to update and 
supplement the existing multilateral treaties prepared within the 
framework of the Council of Europe. 
• the European Union has begun moving towards a system of 
mutual recognition of decisions and judgments in criminal matters. 
Such mutual recognition speeds up cooperation considerably: a 
judicial decision or judgment issued in any Member State can be 
enforced as such in any other Member State. 
• the first steps in mutual recognition have been taken with the 
adoption of the framework decisions on, respectively, the EU arrest 
warrant, the freezing of assets and property, and the enforcement 
of fines. 
• a mutual evaluation system has been established, in which 
experts from different countries assess the practical conduct of 
international cooperation in the target country. 
 
 
Mutual legal assistance 
 
The Member States of the European Union are all parties to the 
1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Crim-
inal Matters. 
The 1959 Convention, however, was drafted almost a half 
century ago. Since then, ideas regarding how mutual assistance 
should be provided have changed considerably, especially in 
Europe, where there has been extensive experience in this sector. 
There has been a clear trend towards simplifying and speeding up 
mutual assistance by eliminating conditions and grounds for 
refusals. Since the European Union Member States have a lot of 
cases in common, they have come to expect certain standards of 
conduct – after all, if the central authority of one country is itself 
slow or sloppy in responding to requests, it can scarcely expect 
others to be better when responding to its requests for assistance. 
In 1998, the European Union adopted a set of standards on 
good practice in mutual legal assistance.7 Each Member State 
prepared a national statement of good practice. These were then 
circulated among all the Member States. The idea here was that 
                                                     
7 Joint Action of 29 June 1998 on good practice in mutual legal assistance in 
criminal matters. 
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the Member States publicly commit themselves to upholding these 
standards, and can be held accountable. 
The set of standards calls upon practitioners, for example, to 
acknowledge urgent requests and written enquiries (unless a 
substantive reply is sent quickly), provide the name and contact 
details of the authority (and, if possible, the person) responsible for 
executing the request, give priority to requests which have been 
marked “urgent”, and where the assistance requested cannot be 
provided in whole or in part, provide an explanation and, where 
possible, offer to discuss how the difficulties might be overcome. 
Although such points may seem trivial and mundane, they all have 
an immediate impact on the day-to-day work of judicial authorities 
involved in international cases. 
The European Union countries have prepared their own Mutual 
Assistance Convention (adopted on 29 May 2000). This is not 
intended to be an independent treaty, but instead supplements the 
1959 Council of Europe convention and its protocol. It brings these 
earlier treaties up to date by reflecting not only the emergence of 
the “good practice” referred to above, but also the development of 
investigative techniques and arrangements. 
Perhaps the most interesting innovation brought in by the new 
Convention is that it reverses one fundamental principle in mutual 
legal assistance. Today, the almost universal rule is that the law 
applicable to the execution of the request is that of the requested 
State. The new Convention provides that the requested State must 
comply with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated by 
the requesting Member State. The requested Member State may 
refuse to do so only if compliance would be contrary to the 
fundamental principles of law of the requested State. 
 
 
Extradition 
 
Prior to 2004, extradition among the Member States of the 
European Union was based largely on the 1957 Council of Europe 
Convention on Extradition. (In addition, the five Nordic countries of 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have adopted 
identical legislation that greatly simplifies extradition among these 
countries.) 
Also here, the Member States of the European Union had 
sought to supplement the Council of Europe Convention by drafting 
new treaty obligations. In 1995, the European Union adopted a 
Convention on simplified extradition within the EU. Essentially, the 
Convention focuses on the many cases where the person in 
question consents to extradition. One year later, in 1996, the 
European Union adopted a Convention on the substantive 
requirements for extradition within the European Union. 
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In October 1999, the European Union agreed on the importance 
of mutual recognition of decisions and judgments which, in its view, 
“should become the cornerstone of judicial co-operation in both civil 
and criminal matters within the Union.” The argument was that 
already today, the Member States of the European Union share 
fundamental values and legal principles. The authorities of a 
Member State should have full faith and confidence in the operation 
of the legal system of the other states. Accordingly, it should be 
made possible for a decision or judgment handed down in one 
Member State to be immediately enforced as such in any of the 
other states. The European Union further identified “fast-track 
extradition” as one priority area where the principle of mutual 
recognition should be applied.  
Work proceeded slowly. For a time, it seemed as if work on 
mutual recognition would be buried by the many legal, technical 
and practical problems involved. The terrorist attacks on 11 
September 2001 changed the situation dramatically, in that the 
European Union decided that the draft “EU arrest warrant” should 
be completed by December 2001. This political imperative 
galvanized those officials responsible for hammering out the details 
and reaching the necessary compromises. Agreement on the EU 
arrest warrant was indeed reached in December 2001.  
Prior to 9/11, work on the EU arrest warrant had been slowed by 
the fact that it represented a paradigm shift in extradition. Simply 
put, the new decision (which entered into force on 1 January 2004) 
replaces extradition among the EU Member States with a new 
system, whereby suspects and convicted offenders are 
“surrendered” to the requesting state. The process no longer needs 
to go through the central authorities. An arrest warrant issued by a 
court in one state will be recognized as valid throughout the EU, 
and is to be enforced by any and all national courts. 
The decision on the EU arrest warrant has brought about a 
significant change in both extradition law and practice. It closely 
resembles the “fast-track extradition” process that had been used 
between Ireland and the United Kingdom, and (in an experimental 
manner) between Italy and Spain. It has considerable potential for 
speeding up the process, in particular since it will eliminate or 
reduce a number of traditional grounds for refusal. Early data for 
2005 suggest that the average time from request to extradition / 
surrender has in fact been cut from about nine months to three 
months. 
 
 
Mutual recognition of decisions and judgments 
 
As was noted above in connection with the presentation of the EU 
arrest warrant, mutual recognition of decisions and judgments has 
traditionally been almost non-existent in international cooperation. 
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Because of jurisdictional limits (and undoubtedly also because of a 
deep-rooted lack of confidence in the criminal justice systems of 
other countries), the almost iron-clad rule is that court decisions and 
judgments cannot be directly enforced abroad. For example, if a 
court in one country orders that a suspect be arrested, that his or her 
assets be frozen, or that his or her house be searched for evidence, 
the authorities of that country have to use mutual legal assistance in 
order to request that the decision be carried out abroad. The process 
inevitably takes some time – time during which the suspect can 
empty out his or her bank accounts and move on to a third country, 
escaping the administration of justice. 
So far, relatively little attention has been paid to recognising the 
validity of a decision taken by a foreign authority or court, and 
enforcing it as such. This principle of mutual recognition would 
enable competent authorities to quickly secure evidence, seize 
assets and immobilize offenders. This would, of course, also be in 
the interests of the victim.8  
There are few bilateral or multilateral treaties on this topic. One of 
the few is the European Convention on the International Validity of 
Criminal Judgments, prepared within the framework of the Council of 
Europe in 1970. Even this treaty has very few signatories, and even 
fewer ratifications.9 Indeed, even most EU Member States have not 
ratified it, and so it has very little practical importance. Furthermore, 
the Convention only applies to legally final judgments, and not for 
example to decisions made in the course of an investigation.10 
With the increasing integration of Europe, and as shown with the 
example of the EU arrest warrant, the EU Member States are now 
moving towards mutual recognition of decisions and judgments. It is 
widely regarded as an effective and indeed almost unavoidable tool 
in cooperation. Furthermore, proponents argue that the close ties 
among the EU countries, and the fact that they are all signatories to 
the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, has led to a situation in which all 
                                                     
8 Protecting the interests of the victim is one of the priorities of the European 
Union. On 15 March 2001, a framework decision was adopted in order to ensure 
uniform minimum legal protections for victims in criminal proceedings. A Council 
Directive was adopted on 24 April 2004 on unification of compensation to victims 
from the State.  
9 Of the 25 EU Member States, only Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden have ratified the 1970 Convention 
as of the spring of 2006. The other countries that have ratified it are Albania, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Iceland, Norway, Romania, San Marino, Turkey and Ukraine. An 
additional seven EU countries and one other country have signed, but not yet 
ratified, the Convention. 
10 There is one further exception to the lack of mutual recognition internationally. 
The five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) 
recognize one another’s decisions and judgments, and refusals are almost 
unheard of. This system is based on the fact that the Nordic countries share very 
much the same legal system, and also otherwise have long-standing cooperation 
with one another. 
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Member States should have full faith and confidence in the 
operation of the criminal justice system in one another’s country. To 
give an example, if a judge in one country orders that a suspect 
should be arrested, courts in all other European Union countries 
should have confidence that the decision was made according to 
law and with due respect to human rights.11 
In the view of the Tampere European Council in October 1999, 
mutual recognition should become the cornerstone of judicial co-
operation in both civil and criminal matters within the European 
Union.  
The EU arrest warrant, described above, is the prime example that 
can be given of mutual recognition. A second framework decision 
was adopted soon afterwards (on 28 February 2002), on the mutual 
recognition of decisions on the freezing of assets and property. The 
framework decision makes it possible, for example, for the decision 
of a court in one Member State on the freezing of the accounts of a 
suspect to be enforced immediately in any and all of the other 
Member States. On 14 February 2005, a third decision on mutual 
recognition was adopted, this time on financial penalties.  
 
 
Work in progress on judicial cooperation 
 
In November 2004, the heads of State of the EU countries adopted 
an updated programme on progress in justice and home affairs. In 
respect of mutual recognition, they ordered that work should 
proceed on instruments related, respectively, to the gathering and 
admissibility of evidence, conflicts of jurisdiction and the ne bis in 
idem principle, and the execution of final sentences of 
imprisonment or other (alternative) sanctions. In addition, work is 
underway on an instrument dealing with pre-trial release and 
supervision. As of the spring of 2006, work is proceeding on such 
new instruments, but the pace of work appears to be slowing. 
 
 
Mutual evaluations 
 
Over the years, the Member States of the European Union have 
made a number of commitments to improving their response to 
organized crime, and to improving international cooperation. These 
commitments were undoubtedly made in good faith, and with all 
intention to implement them in full. However, the practical reality of 
investigation, prosecution and adjudication (for example, lack of 
resources, and differences in priorities in different sectors and on 
                                                     
11 As noted earlier, an analogy can be made with the “full faith and credit” 
doctrine contained in article IV, section 1 of the Constitution of the United States. 
According to this section, “Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the 
public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State.”  
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different levels) can mean that the work that is actually carried out 
remains at odds with the commitments. 
One way to diagnose what problems exist is to carry out expert 
reviews. The OECD has instituted a system of mutual evaluation of 
Member States on measures taken to prevent and control money 
laundering. These evaluations are carried out by teams of experts 
from different countries who, because of their background, are able 
to talk as colleagues with experts and practitioners in the target 
country, and ask the right questions and set the answers that they 
are given into the proper context. This approach has been deemed 
so successful that the European Union has adopted it on a broader 
scale. Accordingly, on 5 December 1997 the European Union 
decided on the establishment of a mechanism for evaluating the 
application and implementation at the national level of international 
undertakings in the fight against organized crime. 
Following the OECD model, small international teams of experts 
visit the target country, interview practitioners, report on their 
assessment and make recommendations. The assessment is 
confidential,12 and the target country is given every opportunity to 
correct any errors that may have been made.  
So far, two rounds of evaluations have been carried out in all 
Member States. The first round dealt with mutual legal assistance 
and urgent requests for the tracing and restraint of property, and 
the second round dealt with law enforcement and its role in the fight 
against drug trafficking. A third and fourth round, dealing 
respectively with the exchange of information between Member 
States and Europol, and the European Arrest Warrant, are nearing 
completion during the spring of 2006. 
The Member States have been quite satisfied with the way in 
which the mutual evaluations have been carried out. The process 
has not only contributed to greater understanding of the differences 
that exist between the countries, but has also resulted in many 
changes in law and practice.  
In October 2002, the European Union adopted a more 
streamlined mutual evaluation mechanism to be used in respect of 
anti-terrorism measures. This mechanism relies primarily on written 
responses from the Member States to specific questions, to be 
followed up if necessary by on-site visits by experts.  
At the meeting of the heads of State in November 2004, it was 
decided to develop further evaluation measures. A proposal from 
the Commission is expected to this effect during the summer of 
2006. 
 
 
                                                     
12 With the permission of the country in question, the report can be published. 
Indeed, all of the reports so far have in fact been published.  
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Cooperation in the formulation of domestic law and policy 
 
The global status quo:  
International cooperation on the formulation of domestic law and 
policy is almost entirely limited to general provisions in bilateral and 
multilateral treaties, and to even more general recommendations, 
resolutions and declarations. 
 
The European Union reality:  
• the European Union has adopted decisions calling for 
criminalization of a number of offences. The definitions are 
generally rather tightly drawn, and have forced countries to amend 
their legislation accordingly.  
• the European Union has begun cooperation in the prevention of 
crime, including organized crime. 
• the European Union has adopted a number of action plans and 
programmes that have had a clear effect on policy and practice in 
all the Member States. 
• there are signs that the European Union may be moving towards 
“communizing” criminal law, in other words to a situation where, 
instead of each individual Member State determining the contents 
of its criminal law and criminal procedure, the decision is taken by 
all twenty-five Member States working together. 
 
 
Criminal law and criminal procedure 
 
On the global level, in the area of criminal law and criminal 
procedure, very little international cooperation exists. Where it does 
exist, it primarily concerns the very few substantive provisions in 
bilateral and multilateral treaties, such as the minimum definitions 
of participation in a criminal organization, corruption, money 
laundering and obstruction of justice in the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. There are also 
a number of resolutions, recommendations and declarations 
regarding criminal law and criminal justice, but these have tended 
to have little actual impact on law, practice and policy. 
This is not the case with the European Union, where not only is 
there extensive discussion about the harmonisation of both criminal 
and procedural law, but much has been done in practice.  
The question of how far the criminal law and procedural law of 
the Member States should be harmonised is a subject of 
considerable controversy. Everyone appears to agree that some 
degree of harmonisation is necessary in order to ensure smooth 
international cooperation, as long as by “harmonisation” one means 
the approximation or co-ordination of different legal provisions or 
systems by eliminating major differences and creating minimum 
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requirements or standards. To use a musical analogy, we can 
continue to play our national music, as long as it is in harmony with 
the music of the other twenty-four Member States. 
Everyone also appears to agree that at this stage at least we are 
not talking about the unification of criminal and procedural law 
within the European Union, in the sense that the twenty-five distinct 
legal systems would be replaced by one system. To use the 
musical analogy, no one supports the idea of replacing the 
orchestra with a single synthesizer, no matter how technically 
advanced. 
The process so far has involved a focus on certain key issues, 
where the Member States have agreed that harmonised legislation 
is necessary. Among the offences that have already been dealt 
with are fraud and counterfeiting, drug trafficking, trafficking in 
persons and illegal immigration, corruption, racism and 
xenophobia, football hooliganism, money laundering, arms 
trafficking, participation in a criminal organization, terrorism, and 
environmental offences. 
 
 
Work in progress 
 
With the current focus on mutual recognition in the European 
Union, there are fewer initiatives on further harmonisation of 
criminal and procedural law. Work continues to be underway on the 
minimum provisions on the constituent elements of offences and 
penalties relating to racism and xenophobia. This project had 
ground to a halt during the spring of 2003, largely over the 
concerns of some countries over the freedom of speech. An 
attempt to resuscitate the work was made at the beginning of 2005, 
but with little more success. 
A major project has to do with the procedural rights of suspects 
and defendants in criminal proceedings. Essentially, this project 
has sought to define what the minimum rights of the defence are. 
The discussions have revealed that, although all EU Member 
States are signatories to the European Human Rights Convention, 
there are still considerable areas of disagreement as to specific 
rights. As of the spring of 2006, the future of the project is very 
much in doubt. 
The Commission has advanced various proposals for further 
harmonisation, for example in respect of tax offences; violation of 
intellectual property rights; and the penalties for counterfeiting 
offences. A considerable amount of attention has also been 
focused on money laundering, and on the freezing of the assets of 
offenders. For example, a framework decision on money laundering 
and on the identification, tracing, freezing or seizure, and 
confiscation of the instrumentalities and proceeds of crime was 
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adopted on 26 June 2001, and the Commission is preparing a 
further proposal on cash payments and money laundering. 
One general priority area is the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Union, for example against subsidy fraud, 
embezzlement and corruption. Here, there is a much further-
reaching proposal, originally in the form of a so-called “Corpus 
Juris” project,13 which was subsequently replaced by a Commission 
“Green Paper” on a European Public Prosecutor. Briefly, this 
proposal seeks not only to harmonise the definition of offences 
against the financial interests of the European Union, but also to 
set up a European Public Prosecutor system, using identical 
procedural law provisions in each Member State. Proponents have 
said that this degree of uniformity is necessary to prevent 
organized criminal groups from utilising differences between the 
Member States. Critics, in turn, see this as an attempt to create a 
supranational criminal law and procedural law, which in time may 
lead to the unification referred to above.  
This disagreement emerged once again when the new 
Constitutional Treaty was being drafted in 2002 and 2003. The 
proponents of the European Public Prosecutor concept succeeded 
in getting reference made to it in the Constitution, but only as an 
idea that is to be reconsidered when the Constitutional Treaty 
enters into force.  
The European Public Prosecutor project raises broader issues of 
how far the harmonisation of criminalisations can go, and who can 
make the decisions. Questions of criminal law have so far always 
been reserved to the Member States themselves to decide, on the 
basis of consensus. Article 31(e) of the Treaty of Amsterdam gave 
the Commission a right of initiative in these matters. The exact 
implication of article 31(e), however, has been questioned. Most 
Member States have been of the view that the Commission is 
limited to the right of initiative, and only the Member States 
themselves may make any decision on criminalization. However, a 
minority – and the Commission – have been of the view that article 
31(e) in effect gives the Commission the right to oblige Member 
States to adopt criminalisations on certain issues, if criminal law 
sanctions are the only way to protect Community interests.  
For several years, an uneasy working compromise had been 
used: decisions under article 31(e) were made in tandem, with the 
Commission taking a decision on matters within its power, and the 
Member States (through the Council) taking a decision at the same 
time on matters within their powers.14  
                                                     
13 See http://www.law.uu.nl/wiarda/corpus/engelsdx.html. The project was first 
presented on 17-18 April 1997.  
14 To complicate measures, the Constitutional Treaty – when and if it enters into 
force – gives the Commission greater powers of initiative, and in practice puts an 
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The basis for this working compromise came to a jolting end on 
13 September 2005, when the Court of the European Communities 
issued a long-awaited ruling. On 19 December 2002, the Council 
had adopted a framework decision on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law. The Commission has argued 
that the Council had no right to take such a decision, since 
environmental matters clearly belong under the first pillar, where 
the Commission has the right of initiative and (to some degree 
together with Parliament) the right of decision. The Council, in turn, 
unanimously decided that criminal law matters – even when related 
to what would otherwise be a first pillar matter – belong under the 
third pillar and are thus in the competence of the Council. When the 
Council took this decision, the Commission brought the case to the 
Court of the European Communities. 
In its decision C-176/03, the Court of the European Communities 
essentially ruled that under certain conditions, provisions relevant 
to the protection of the environment through criminal law could and 
indeed should be taken under the first pillar. The reasoning of the 
Court, however, was narrow enough to lead to considerable 
disagreement between the Commission and the Council as to what, 
exactly, the Court had determined. While there was agreement that 
the original framework decision on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law had to be revisited, there was no 
agreement as to whether this was true of Council decisions taken in 
other areas. Apparently, conclusions will have to await further 
decisions of the Court on parallel cases. 
 
 
The prevention of organized crime 
 
Organised crime, just as is the case with crime in general, does not 
spread at random. It is often a planned and deliberate activity. 
Accordingly, it depends to a great deal on the presence of 
motivated offenders, on the existence of the opportunity for crime, 
and on the orientation of the work of those who try to prevent and 
respond to organised crime. In line with this so-called situational 
approach, the Member States are exploring ways to ensure that the 
commission of crime is made more difficult, that committing crime 
involves greater risks to the offender (in particular the risk of 
detection and apprehension), and that the possible benefits to the 
offender of committing crime are decreased or eliminated. 
Also the Tampere European Council stressed the importance of 
crime prevention. It suggested that common crime prevention 
priorities should be developed and identified. Elements for an 
emerging crime prevention policy are contained in the Council 
resolution of 21 December 1998 on the prevention of organised 
                                                                                                                                   
end to the requirement that Council decisions on home and justice affairs must 
always be made by consensus.  
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crime. In March 2001, the Commission and Europol presented a 
report on a European strategy on the prevention of organised 
crime. 
One further step in developing and identifying priorities was 
made on 15 March 2001, when the European Union decided on the 
establishment of a crime prevention network. This network consists 
of contact points in each Member State, representing not only the 
authorities but also civil society, the business community and 
researchers. The network functions by organizing meetings, 
compiling a database and otherwise by seeking to gather and 
analyse data on effective crime prevention measures on the local 
and regional level in order to disseminate information on “good 
practices.” At the summit held in November 2004, the heads of 
State agreed that the European Union Crime Prevention Network 
should be further strengthened and professionalised.  
 
 
European Union policies and programmes 
 
On 16-17 June 1997, the European Union adopted a Plan of Action 
to combat organised crime. Instead of the resolutions, 
recommendations and declarations that have so often been 
adopted in other fora - regrettably often with little practical impact - 
the European Union decided, for the first time anywhere, on 
specific action, with a clear division of responsibilities, a clear 
timetable and a mechanism for implementing the action plan. The 
strong consensus reached by Member States on the 1997 Plan of 
Action helped to create the political and professional climate 
required on both the EU level and the national level to take and 
implement the necessary decisions.  
The 1997 Plan of Action changed the rate of the evolution of 
international cooperation against organized crime. Examples of the 
progress that has been achieved are the mutual evaluation 
mechanism, the entry into force of the Europol Convention, the 
establishment of the European Judicial Network, criminalization of 
participation in a criminal organisation, the establishment of a 
variety of funds to support specific measures, the adoption of joint 
actions on money laundering, asset tracing, and good practices in 
mutual assistance, the pre-accession pact with the candidate 
countries, and the identification of further measures in respect of 
the prevention of organised crime.  
The period allotted for the 1997 Plan of Action ended on 31 
December 1999. A follow-up plan was adopted in March 2000. 
Specific forms of crime that are the focus include economic crime, 
money laundering and off-shore centres, terrorism, computer crime, 
and urban crime and youth crime. 
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At the same time, broader strategies for dealing with justice and 
home affairs were being developed. When Finland held the 
Presidency of the European Union during the second half of 1999, 
the Tampere European Council (15-16 October 1999), adopted a 
set of priorities not only in the response to cross-border crime, but 
also in respect of migration and asylum issues.  
Five years down the road, these various priorities – known in the 
European Union as the “Tampere milestones” – have been replaced 
by an updated and quite ambitious programme adopted by the 
heads of State in November 2004 (the “Hague Programme”).  
 
Among the points stressed in the Hague Programme are the 
following: 
• the sharing of information among law enforcement and judicial 
authorities (while maintaining the proper balance between privacy 
and security); 
• establishment of a coherent overall approach to combat 
terrorism; 
• strengthening the prevention of organised crime; 
• strengthening the tools to address the financial aspects of 
organised crime; 
• improving general crime prevention; 
• creating a “European judicial culture”; and 
• promoting the principle of mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions.  
 
 
Cooperation with candidate countries and other third countries 
 
Even if all the European Union Member States could effectively 
develop their laws and systems to prevent and control organized 
crime within their borders, this would not be enough. Preventing 
and controlling organised crime requires broader, global co-
operation. 
One particular focus within the EU is cooperation with the so-
called candidate countries. For several years in advance of the 
mammoth enlargement of the European Union in May 2004, the EU 
negotiated actively with the then ten “candidate countries.” The 
infusion of extensive technical assistance and millions of euros, 
combined with the strong political pressure exerted from within and 
from without these countries, resulted in the ten countries being 
able to carry out an extensive reform process in a remarkably short 
time. 
This same process is now underway with Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Romania and Turkey. Other countries, including 
Albania, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine, have already indicated their 
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interest in becoming members, and may thus soon be brought 
within the scope of this cooperation.  
In this process, considerable attention is being paid to the 
prevention and control of organized crime. The European Union 
has already adopted a large number of measures (referred to as 
the acquis communautaire), and the Member States have 
implemented them in their domestic legislation and practice. In 
order to avoid a situation where organized criminal groups take 
advantage of a sudden expansion of the European Union, also the 
candidate countries must fully accept and implement the acquis. 
A second focus for the EU is the Russian Federation. In 1999, a 
special European Union Action Plan was prepared on common 
action with the Russian Federation on combating organized crime. 
This in essence sets up a structure and process for continuous 
consultations and cooperation between the European Union and 
the Russian Federation. In addition, there is a broader “partnership” 
agreement with the Russian Federation (and with Ukraine) that 
provides a basis for cooperation. 
Other geographical areas with which the European Union is 
seeking to strengthen co-operation include the Mediterranean, 
South Eastern Europe, China, North America, Latin America and 
the Caribbean. In December 2005, the Council decided to take a 
more proactive approach to its external relations in justice and 
home affairs. The decision identified a number of ways in which the 
EU would work with partners on a range of issues. At the same 
time, it was decided that the EU should from time to time focus on 
certain regions and certain issues. To start with, these points of 
focus would include Afghanistan and drugs, the Western Balkans 
and organized crime, and Northern Africa and illegal immigration. 
Russia is also to be given a special focus in this manner.  
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States (and the 
response to the threat of terrorism) understandably enough 
became a top priority. This could be seen in the broad range of co-
operative measures put into place, ranging from cooperation 
between the US authorities and Europol, to the very rapid 
negotiation of agreements on extradition and mutual legal 
assistance between the EU and the US. These agreements were 
significant in several respects. They were specifically between the 
United States and the European Union, and not between the United 
States and the (then) fifteen Member States of the EU. To a large 
extent, they brought up to date the bilateral agreements that the US 
had with the European countries. 
The European Union is also active in working through 
intergovernmental organizations such as the Council of Europe and 
the United Nations. For example, throughout the negotiations on 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime and on the United Nations Convention on Corruption, the 
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European Union countries worked very closely together in seeking 
to ensure that the resulting Convention was as effective and broad 
as possible.  
 
 
Concluding comments: Can the EU keep up the pace?  
 
In 1992, cooperation among the EU countries in criminal justice did 
not have very many special features, asides from informal and, 
often, ad hoc meetings looking at such special issues as terrorism 
and radical groups. More formal cooperation was based primarily 
on the conventions worked out within the framework of the Council 
of Europe. 
In the dozen or so years since then, so much has changed. The 
establishment of Europol and Eurojust, networks of liaison officers 
and liaison magistrates, decisions on the approximation of 
legislation, the first decisions on mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions, a system of mutual evaluation … the list of innovations 
has become quite lengthy. 
Can the pace of change remain the same? The Hague 
Programme is very ambitious, and contains a large number of 
measures. Even so, there are several reasons to suggest that the 
pace will slow down, perhaps even considerably. 
One reason has to do with the working methods of the EU. 
Decisions on police cooperation and on cooperation in criminal 
matters have to be adopted by consensus. Getting the Ministers of 
fifteen countries to agree on at times highly technical legislative 
measures was difficult; following the enlargement in 2004, it has 
proven to be even more difficult to get twenty-five ministers to 
agree. It is possible that towards the end of 2006 the EU will begin 
to discuss replacing the requirement for consensus with a 
requirement for a qualified majority, but this discussion can be 
expected to last for some time.  
Another, somewhat related, reason is that there are too many 
areas requiring attention, and the EU can only deal with a few 
matters at a time. It is likely that the EU will decide, towards the end 
of 2006, on a few priority areas in which it should work. 
But there is also a fundamental reason why the pace of change 
will in all likelihood slow down. From 1992 on, the European Union 
has been developing a unique degree of international cooperation 
in criminal matters, and the groundwork has already been laid. The 
main structures are in place (such as Europol and Eurojust, the 
EJN and the networks of liaison officers and liaison magistrates), 
the most important cross-border crimes have been covered by EU 
decisions, and much of the basic forms of cooperation (surrender of 
fugitives, the freezing of assets) have been covered. Certainly more 
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work is needed on, for example, improving the exchange of 
information, but the broad outlines are in place.  
Even with a slower pace, however, the European Union will 
continue exploring new ways to strengthen cooperation in order to 
achieve the basic goal: ensure that the EU becomes an area of 
“freedom, security and justice,” where persons can freely move 
from one edge of the EU to the other, but offenders can still be 
brought to justice even when they or their offences cross national 
borders. The EU will thus continue to be a laboratory for the testing 
of new forms of cooperation. 
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As Justice, Liberty and Security has become a key component of 
EU ‘Third Pillar’ activities, and organised crime has ascended in 
importance as a political issue for the EU and the G-8 most 
powerful industrialised countries, it is no longer possible to see 
‘serious crime’ policy in purely national or in purely law enforcement 
terms (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2005; Harfield, 2006; Levi and Maguire, 
2004). Notwithstanding the creation of the UK Serious Organised 
Crime Agency in 2006, which specifically is mandated as a ‘harm 
reduction’ rather than ‘law enforcement’ agency – though with law 
enforcement powers – there are undercurrents of opposition among 
the British police to claims about how serious and widespread 
‘organised crime’ is: many provincial police in many countries see 
the subject as a political (with both small and large ‘p’) mechanism 
for reallocating glamour and resources away from local policing by 
‘top slicing’ their budgets in favour of ‘high policing’.  
In the wider European arena, there has been a flurry of anti-
organised crime activity in the European Union and the Council of 
Europe, based around ‘threat assessments’ of variable quality (for 
recent examples, see Council of Europe, 2006; Europol, 2006; for a 
general critique, see van Duyne and van Dijk, 2007). This has 
accelerated since the 1996 EU Dublin Summit (itself stimulated by 
the Irish government’s response to the high-profile contract killing 
of crime journalist Veronica Guerin) and the 1999 Tampere 
Summit, with high level multi-disciplinary groups seeking areas of 
co-operation, implementing a High-Level Joint Action Plan and 
finally getting Europol off the ground constitutionally by 1999. Both 
the EU and the Council of Europe have extended their activities 
into EU applicant countries and others, training them in anti-
laundering implementation and ensuring as part of the acquis 
communautaire that legislation and some implementation 
machinery is in place before accession to the EU. Part of the 1998 
Joint Action was a commitment to criminalise membership of 
criminal organisations – influenced by the Italian legislation but 
harder to apply in less regimented settings – and tough action 
against criminal offshore finance centres. In the still wider 
international arena, the Financial Action Task Force (started only in 
1989) and the UN have vied for activism and prestige in anti-
laundering and crime prevention, especially in the drugs issue but 
later on all-crime anti-laundering measures, as the boundaries 
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between proceeds of different types of crime become increasingly 
blurred. The arrival in the top UN Drug Control and Crime 
Prevention post in Vienna of Pino Arlacchi, a sociologist-turned-
politician Mafia expert1, placed organised crime at the top of the 
1998 UN criminological agenda. This great political confluence has 
led to international pressure to harmonise or, in EU terminology, 
‘approximate’ the fight against organised crime, even if people do 
not always have a clear understanding of what ‘it’ is, and there has 
been pressure to harmonise (i.e. increase) powers to cooperate 
over organised crime and terrorism, as in the European Arrest 
Warrant and European Evidence Warrant.  
 
 
Criminal justice and prevention approaches 
 
There are two dimensions of shifts in approach to the control of 
organised crime in the UK and other European countries. The first 
relates to traditional criminal justice approaches, including: 
 
1. substantive legislation, relating especially to money-laundering 
and proceeds of crime legislation; 
2. procedural laws involving mutual legal assistance (including the 
establishment of Eurojust, whose detached national prosecutors 
and investigative judges seek to facilitate urgent cases, and – in 
the aftermath of the terrorism attacks of 11 September 2001 – 
the European Arrest Warrant that will free EU member states 
from the formalities of extradition, and the European Evidence 
Warrant, agreed in 2006); and  
3. investigative resources, including the formation of specialist 
organisations culminating in the Serious Organised Crime 
Agency (though not a national fraud squad, since fraud other 
than Value-Added Tax and excise fraud – which hits government 
coffers directly – does not appear to be a policing priority – see 
Doig, 2006; Fraud Review, 2006; Levi and Pithouse, 
forthcoming).  
 
There has been ongoing reform of anti-laundering and crime 
proceeds legislation around the world (Gilmore, 2004; Stessens, 
2000), and greater policing (including customs & excise) involvement 
in financial investigation, still mainly in the drugs field but increasingly 
in excise tax fraud and, post-11 September 2001, terrorism. There 
has been the development of an Egmont Group of Financial 
Intelligence Units world-wide, whose aim (not always realised in 
practice) is to facilitate inter-FIU enquiries across borders. Despite 
some inhibiting effect from the European Court of Human Rights 
and Data Protection Commissioners in some member states, the 
exchange of intelligence internationally and the depth of proactive 
                                                     
1 Signor Arlacchi left at the end of 2001. 
  94
surveillance – with the UK at the permissive extreme and Germany, 
because of its federal structure and data protection laws, at the 
other – have transformed the potential for intelligence-led policing 
(and disruption) of organised crime activity across borders. 
However, apart from questions of demand for illegal goods and 
services, one factor blocking the view of this Panopticon is limited 
resources. The historic tension between the local and the central 
has bedevilled policing since its inception in England and Wales, 
and since the great majority of police chiefs expect to lose 
resources from any centralisation, this gives them motivation to be 
sceptical about organised crime. Although the concrete histories are 
different, this also applies to other European countries.  
The other major plank of emerging activity is measures to 
prevent organised crime. The unpopularity of bankers and of drugs 
traffickers has enabled the State to regulate for the interests of the 
State rather than the banks themselves certain areas of financial 
services activity that otherwise might have been very difficult, and 
in this sense, the demonology of ‘organised crime’ has been very 
‘useful’. Likewise, in attempts to cut down on ‘people trafficking’, 
truck drivers were fined heavily and their trucks impounded for 
carrying illegal migrants across the Channel: this led large firms to 
introduce new technology for checking (by carbon dioxide levels) 
whether their trucks were stowaway-free. There has also been a 
focus on taking out drugs manufacturers and distributors in 
countries of origin, rather than waiting till they were close to the 
shores of the UK or other European countries.  
There is no absolute demarcation between the above and 
criminal justice interventions: as countless European police officers 
have asserted to this author (not always based on evidence), 
repressive measures are preventative. Controls on money 
laundering and asset confiscation/recovery, for instance, are 
intended to increase the probability of identification/conviction of 
organised criminals, to deprive them of the fruits of crime and to 
prevent their future harm by administrative and financial 
incapacitation (Levi and Reuter, 2006). But there are other ways in 
which situational opportunity and designing out crime concepts are 
utilised to deal with crimes that are ‘organised’. 
Table 1 represents the three main ‘non-traditional’ approaches to 
the prevention of organised crime that can be found at present. 
Like situational prevention techniques, this is a kind of ‘natural 
history’ classification of broad intervention methods, each of which 
may work by several mechanisms.  
 
 
 
 
 
  95
Table 1 Non-traditional approaches to organised crime prevention 
Community 
approaches 
1. Community crime prevention  
2. Passive citizen participation: giving 
information about harms and risks, hotlines 
3. Active citizen participation: civic action groups
Regulatory, disruption and non-
justice system approaches  
4. Regulatory policies, programmes and 
agencies (domestic and foreign, including 
non-governmental organisations and IGOs 
such as the IMF, OECD/FATF and World 
Bank)  
5. Routine and suspicious activity reporting by 
financial institutions and other bodies 
6. Tax policy and programmes  
7. Civil injunctions and other sanctions  
8. Military interventions 
9. Security and secret intelligence services 
10. Foreign policy and aid programmes (US 
‘certification’ of countries as 
adequate/inadequate in their anti-drugs 
measures) 
Private sector involvement 11. Individual companies 
12. Professional and industry associations  
13. Special private sector committees  
14. Anti-fraud and money laundering software 
15. Private policing and forensic accounting 
 
 
(a) Community approaches 
 
Traditional situational crime prevention neglects the area of 
community action, considering it as being too far from the proximal 
‘causes’ of crime. Nevertheless, in the arena of organised crime, 
community action has an impact on the pool of willing offenders, 
whether they are positively involved in crime or are simply unwilling 
testifiers against offenders or passive assistants in the components 
of crime. Williams and Godson (2002) discuss as an example of 
criminality prevention some social experiments in Palermo, where 
25,000 children annually attend an educational program designed 
to change the cultural norms that allow the Mafia to flourish2. In 
Sicily, there have also developed local active citizen groups, though 
such anti-Mafia activism remains dangerous to those advocating it 
openly, and anger is hard to turn to constructive, long-term use.  
                                                     
2 Whilst this would seem to be a good thing in itself, its effects in practice remain to 
be evaluated: these effects might take the form of greater willingness to pass 
information to the authorities (a shorter-term effect) or lesser willingness to assist 
or join Mafia-type associations in future (a much longer term effect). 
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Hicks (1998), in exploring the potential for a greater role of crime 
prevention strategies in tackling organised crime, stresses the 
linkages between unorganised property crime and more organised 
criminality because – especially when unemployed – drug users 
require cash and crime is an important source of it.3 Moreover, one 
of the most recent trends in urban property crime has been the 
organisation of young offenders by adults to commit burglaries and 
car thefts (though one might counter that this phenomenon is 
hardly new: it goes back at least to the criminal careers of Jonathan 
Wilde and also Ikey Solomons - who was the model for Dickens’ 
Fagin - and the Victorian rookeries). According to Hicks (1998: 334) 
the connection between unorganised and organised crime 
demands that preventative approaches, traditionally applied to the 
former, also be conceptualised to support local intervention to 
address the substructure of organised crime. However, it is worth 
noting that when applied to crop substitution for drugs and to 
employment alternatives to money-laundering, for example, the 
economic dimensions cannot sensibly be ignored by focussing 
simply on changing ‘hearts and minds’: ignoring the legal sanctions, 
crime is often more profitable than the alternative. 
Nevertheless, as a total concept in attacking organised crime, 
community crime prevention approaches are limited because at 
some stage of the organised crime process – from financing 
through to laundering – other jurisdictions are likely to be involved 
which have less interest in crime suppression, unless they can be 
persuaded or forced to assist by some international action, 
including shaming and the threat of economic sanctions (see Blum 
et al., 1998; Gilmore, 2004; Levi and Reuter, 2006; Williams and 
Godson, 2002).  
 
(b) Regulatory, disruption and non-criminal justice approaches 
 
The second category in Table 1 covers a wide range of activities, 
which have in common the use of the powers of state agencies 
other than those whose main responsibility concerns law 
enforcement or criminal justice. One important aspect of this is the 
use of powers in the financial and tax areas, where in essence the 
focus of the attack is upon the financial assets of organised 
criminals rather than on criminal prosecution as such. (Tax evasion 
was the only charge feasible against Al Capone, but the use of tax 
prosecutions against gangsters has never been a feature of British 
criminal justice.) Thus, in the Irish Republic (Criminal Assets 
Bureau Act 1996) and the UK (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002), as 
well as in the United States, civil law means and standards of proof 
                                                     
3 In our view, there is a risk factor also not just in the need for cash but also the 
susceptibility to blackmail of drug or ‘hard porn’ users working in the financial 
services industry should they fail to assist fraudsters and money launderers. There 
are plausible anecdotes about such cases, but we have been unable to unearth 
any concrete examples. Such internal co-operation may also occur voluntarily. 
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are used to ‘recover’ for the State the assets deemed to be derived 
from crime, irrespective of whether or not anyone is ever convicted 
or even prosecuted for those crimes. The aim here is to undermine 
both the motivation of criminals to become ‘top organisers’ and 
their resources to be able to do so. This can be reinforced by 
extended powers to confiscate large (in the UK, in 2006, as low as 
£1,000) cash sums inland that do not have a legitimate explanation, 
as contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. A second, rather 
different, aspect is the use of the regulatory powers of local 
authorities, environmental and licensing agencies and the like, to 
disrupt the ‘businesses’ of organised criminals by making it more 
difficult for them to obtain necessary licenses, find suitable 
premises, and so on. This can be seen in experiments commencing 
in the Wallen ‘red light’ district of Amsterdam and then extending 
throughout the Netherlands, where tight controls are exercised over 
property ownership, with intensive reviews of intending and existing 
owners and their associates to ‘keep organised crime out’ (van de 
Bunt and van der Scoot, 2003; Levi and Maguire, 2004). Civil 
injunctions have been used under US Federal and State RICO laws 
to place corrupt unions and businesses under court-approved 
management, and quite apart from high-profile arrests that may 
accompany the civil measures, this appears to have had an impact 
on this highly visible form of structured organised crime, measured 
for example by garbage disposal and fish market prices (Jacobs, 
1999; Levi and Smith, 2002), though there is less evidence of 
impact on other crime phenomena in the US. 
 
 
Regulating the money trail 
 
A major component of the regulatory efforts to prevent and detect 
organised crime relates to money laundering. This term evokes 
images of sophisticated multi-national financial operations that 
transform proceeds of drugs trafficking into clean money. What was 
formerly a genteel sovereign right of any nation to assure ‘customer 
confidentiality’ has become redefined pejoratively as unacceptable 
‘bank secrecy’ that facilitates the drugs trade (Levi, 1991). In this 
global risk management process, ‘modern’ areas of law enforcement 
have sought to combine targeting the suspected person (Maguire, 
2000) with targeting (or seeking to target) activities that might give 
rise to organised crime opportunities, such as international financial 
transfers, and/or the conversion of large sums into foreign 
currencies. They have also tried to create an ‘audit trail’ for proceeds 
of crime by requiring all financial institutions to identify their 
customers. (Though this does not prevent gangsters and fraudsters 
from employing ‘front men’ to lend their names to accounts.) 
The logic of controlling the crime proceeds money trail is that 
profit motivates crime, and because drugs and vice sales – 
certainly at street level - are (or are believed to be) in cash, the 
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‘organisers’ (to the extent that they exist) have to find some way of 
converting these funds into financial resources that appear to have 
legitimate origins. If they are prevented from doing so, their 
incentives to become major criminals are diminished, so there is 
both a general and a specific threshold preventative effect from 
anti-laundering efforts. These preventative effects can be 
reinforced by (i) requirements on financial and other ‘risk-prone’ 
institutions to report large cash and/or ‘suspicious’ transactions to 
specialized police or administrative financial intelligence units – the 
sort of ‘responsibilisation’ process noted by commentators on 
‘governance-at-a-distance’ as a feature of late modern society; and 
(ii) proceeds of crime confiscation or forfeiture laws that are 
intended to incapacitate both individuals and criminal organizations 
from accumulating substantial criminal capital and the socio-
economic power that accrues from this. When Pablo Escobar 
offered to pay off the Colombian National Debt in exchange for not 
extraditing him to the US, we can safely say (if his offer was 
credible) that such socio-economic power exists: though the 
Colombian government, perhaps worried about US counter-
measures, turned him down. Whether such socio-economic power 
is possessed by any ‘organised criminal’ in the UK or in any other 
EU country remains more doubtful, however (unless one takes the 
flexible if legally hazardous approach to labelling corporations as 
‘organised criminals’ recommended by Ruggiero, 1996). 
An anti-laundering strategy requires a major global infrastructure 
of compatible legislation and mutual legal assistance both for 
financial investigation and for proceeds of crime restraint and 
confiscation. However, the reason why this is in section (b) of the 
table rather than sections (a) or (c) is that these anti-laundering 
activities have become grafted onto the more conventional 
apparatuses of financial regulation administered by the Basle 
Committee of Banking Supervision and by the International 
Monetary Fund, not always comfortably. The mode of governance 
selected for the spread of anti-laundering performance monitoring 
has been primarily mutual evaluation by peer countries within 
regional bodies and within the 39-member Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF), set up in 1989 by the G-7 most industrialised 
countries to give practical effect to the 1988 UN Vienna Drugs 
Convention. However in 2000, powerful FATF countries decided to 
penalise financially those (actually, non-member) countries who did 
not co-operate to their satisfaction, requiring financial institutions to 
take greater care (and slow down) when transacting business with 
countries that are publicly ‘named and shamed’: if the countries did 
not change, further sanctions were threatened and, at the end of 
2001, the tiny Pacific island of Nauru became the first to suffer 
these sanctions; yet of the 23 countries judged in 2000 and 2001 to 
be ‘non-cooperating’, only Myanmar (Burma) remained on the list 
by 2006. This is an example of attempts to control globalisation 
processes that facilitate crime, especially ‘organised crime’ and, 
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latterly, terrorism. Insofar as some preventative measures involve 
imposing costs on private sector interests or even eliminating major 
chunks of profitability, there may be substantial political resistance, 
depending on the relative power of such interest groups in the 
localities concerned4. Without these pressures to conformity, there 
would remain a global (non)system of regulatory arbitrage – the 
ability to locate key operations where regulation is lightest, whether 
this lightness is based on lack of legal powers to invade banking or 
corporate secrecy or is based on charisma, corruption or economic 
power - of which criminals can take advantage if they have the 
discipline, knowledge and contacts.  
 
(c) Private sector involvement  
 
Some of the private sector involvement has been discussed above, 
as it has been compelled by legal requirements placed on private 
sector institutions to play their part in crime opportunity reduction. 
An increasing number of banks have spent large sums – especially 
after the September 11 attacks - on fancy software to try to identity 
patterns of laundering electronically, mainly to avoid reputational 
risk and huge fines from regulators as well as possible jail 
sentences for designated Money-Laundering Reporting Officers. 
However the choice of electronic methods results also from an 
awareness that systems based on human awareness of customers 
cannot readily cope with the billions of transactions whizzing daily 
around the world without any staff seeing them. Furthermore, 
electronic systems offer some alternative intelligence to reduce the 
risks of corrupt staff turning a blind eye to particular customers’ 
activities.  
Except for the sense that the world’s economic system and their 
economic welfare is harmed by terrorist finance, few of these 
measures would be undertaken to enhance profitability, but there 
are other areas in which the private sector has invested in 
measures against organised crime because these threaten its core 
interests. Thus, the telecommunications industry, the payment card 
industry, the record & film industry, and the clothing industry have 
paid for small groups of investigators to carry out undercover 
operations and disrupt factories and key crime networks attacking 
their core interests. Much of this work is transnational because 
factories in Bulgaria, China, Malaysia, Rumania, Russia, Taiwan 
                                                     
4 In a Small Island Economy, an entrepreneur can exercise almost total domination, 
through charisma, corruption or prospective economic damage should s/he 
withdraw. Where leading politicians personally have a large (declared or 
undeclared) stake in the interests affected, the difficulties of engineering change 
are most acute. In such cases, there may have to be incapacitation at the 
international level, as in the economic sanctions imposed by the US in their 
kingpins and other legislation which makes it an offence to transact business for 
particular individuals or even nation states such as Iraq or Libya. 
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and Turkey may be churning out millions of CDs and DVDs or fake 
Levis that cut into their profits and branding, even if many of the 
poorer cut-price purchasers would not have been able to buy the 
goods at full price. Moreover, quality counterfeit credit cards can be 
used to generate duplicate identities, leading to hundreds of 
millions of pounds in real losses to banks and merchants. Visa, 
MasterCard and American Express also try to ensure that corrupt 
merchants are not allowed to open new accounts, at least within 
the same country. The reason why these measures are taken 
against organised crime rather than simply ‘crime’ is that well-
organised operations (whether networks or hierarchical gangs) can 
do an enormous amount of economic damage very quickly. In a 
world of competitive profit-seeking, some individual companies will 
do more than the collective industry bodies, especially if they have 
advanced software. (For a detailed review of these issues, see Levi 
and Pithouse, forthcoming.)  
 
 
Effectiveness of organised crime prevention 
 
The impact of anti-organised crime measures on outcomes remains 
insufficiently analysed, since there are little reliable data on the 
‘before’ or ‘after’ (a) levels or (b) organisation of drugs and people 
trafficking, European Union fraud, etcetera (Black et al., 2000; Levi 
and Maguire, 2004; van de Bunt and van der Schoot, 2003). For 
example, the law enforcement agencies in EU and Council of 
Europe member countries are required to return annual counts of 
the number of organised crime groups, but quite apart from quality 
monitoring issues, it is not obvious whether a reduction in the 
number is a good thing (less harm has been caused or there is a 
lesser threat to society) or is a bad thing – it is an indicator of 
monopoly or oligopoly rather than of looser networking, and 
therefore a greater threat to society. Some approximations for illicit 
use can be made from self-report studies or from sophisticated 
techniques for estimating prevalence, but these do not explain or 
enable inferences to be made about how offending is organised. 
Very few countries or institutions will now accept strangers or even 
established clients bringing in briefcases full of cash - 500 Euro 
notes offer the biggest amount of currency-per-square metre - 
without some plausible legitimate explanation, so there is a 
commonsense effect on ease of cash laundering. (Though there is 
a corresponding negative effect on the ease with which overseas 
workers can send money quickly and easily back to their families.) 
However, there is no evidence that fewer drugs or trafficked women 
have become available as a result of the sorts of measures 
discussed above. In the private sector sphere, industry and public 
sector fraud data suggest some impact from data matching and 
from the coordination of data at an industry-wide level (Levi, 2006; 
Levi and Pithouse, forthcoming).  
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Furthermore, despite exhortations, it is not always obvious how 
much policing has changed: despite some direct resource increase 
to SOCA and institutional changes in the UK for example, there has 
been little general police support for radical shifts in staff to 
financial investigation from equally prized and media-supported 
areas of crime and disorder. On the other hand, one of the 
advantages of moving away from a traditional criminal justice 
approach is that once established, bureaucracies can become 
entrenched in ‘law and order solutions’ which obstruct alternative 
problem-solving approaches to complex social issues. Quite apart 
from the huge federal economic and privacy costs of the War on 
Drugs, many US state and local forces have become highly 
dependant on income from drugs-related Federal ‘equitable 
sharing’ and ‘adoptive forfeiture’, and there is some evidence of 
goal displacement there as enforcement agencies target forfeitable 
assets rather than just serious offenders (Blumensen and Nilsen, 
1998). This has not yet happened outside the US, partly because 
post-conviction reversal of the burden of proof typically yields 
modest results and crime proceeds income is not redirected fully 
towards the police (van Duyne and Levi, 2005; Kilchling, 2002; Levi 
and Reuter, 2006). The measurement of changes in organised 
crime and the assessment of whether these are beneficial or not 
are in their infancy, quite apart from any ideological viewpoints 
about the desirability of policing the leisure habits of poor and rich 
alike. Nor is sufficiently known about the organisation of the upper 
reaches of the drugs trade in Europe (Dorn et al., 2005), though the 
middle market is better analysed (Pearson and Hobbs, 2001). 
 
 
Organised crime: natural Evolution or responses to control? 
 
The explanation of how and why crime groups develop in the way 
that they do is important, but the argument here has been that a 
focus on what ‘organised crime’ is or is not doing is unilluminating 
because it imposes a false coherence on a diverse subject matter 
of people and activities. The organisation of crimes results from the 
interaction of crime opportunities, offender and prospective 
offender skills and networks, and formal control efforts (whether 
through the criminal law, administrative law or disruption). It is thus 
a dynamic process that evolves as offenders adapt (or fail to adapt) 
to their changing environment, including facilities offered by the 
legal commercial environment, such as container trucks and ships, 
car repair firms (Tremblay et al., 2001), payment card issuers and 
merchants (Levi, 2006), and financial institutions. There are many 
cases where crime networks adapt to police preventative tactics 
even in the course of one series of frauds; and the losses of drugs 
or excise-evaded shipments constitute mainly opportunity costs 
from which higher members of crime groups develop counter-
intelligence strategies or just accept risks and losses of (often 
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female) ‘mules’. If criminals fail to develop their technical skills or 
find people they need to add to their networks to commit crimes 
effectively, then evolution in crime prevention – stimulated by 
private and public sector cost-saving – and in technology may force 
them to desist from crime or to resort to those crimes such as street 
robberies and thefts which cannot be eliminated by the spread of 
surveillance technology (though the technology may enable them to 
be identified more easily and reliably subsequently). In other words, 
there may be crime type displacement rather than geographical 
displacement of the same criminal activity.  
Aggregate changes in routine activities, fashion, 
decriminalisation and prevention technology – as well as in criminal 
networks - may produce changes or apparent changes in modes of 
‘organised criminality’. As with national ‘defence’ systems, this can 
easily escalate into more general rises in gun possession which – 
fuelled by the use as well as the economic value of crack cocaine – 
can generate higher rates of actual violent shootings. Yet though 
there is much in this as a general trend – all the ethnographic, 
policing and survey data point to the dramatic rise in the size of 
illegal drug markets in Europe - we should not be seduced by this 
periodisation. Several armed robbers turned to bankruptcy frauds 
as early as the late 1960s, and later to credit card fraud, social 
security fraud, and even to fraud against the European Union - 
either alongside or subsequent to drug dealing - but this move into 
the moderately upmarket areas of fraud has hardly dented those 
other types of crime, so arguably it is expansion rather than 
displacement. Some Russian crime syndicates (including wealthy 
businesspeople in the US) have shown the capacity to engage in 
vast international frauds (van Duyne and Block, 1994; Williams, 
2001), but so too have long-term Caribbean and Swiss residents 
operating businesses globally for decades without being defined as 
part of the ‘organised crime problem’ (Block and Weaver, 2004).  
McIntosh (1975) more usefully and analytically distinguishes 
methods of organising crime in terms of the technological and 
policing barriers the particular crime confronts: where prevention 
precautions are high, organisation shifts from routinised craft 
groups - pickpockets, and even safecrackers - to looser, perhaps 
even one-off, alliances between project criminals. But this does not 
by itself tell us how the pre-existing social organisation of criminals 
in its wider context shapes those factors, nor how the 
organisational arrangements develop as a result of the efficiency 
and trust judgements made by criminal actors in a dynamic model.  
An interview-based study of bankruptcy fraudsters found 
substantial variations in the organisation of that form of crime 
during the 1960s and 1970s, but since the sixteenth century, 
fraudsters in particular have found cross-border crime attractive 
because it creates problems of legal jurisdiction, investigative cost, 
and practical interest by police, prosecutors, and even creditors 
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themselves (Levi, 1981). European Union harmonisation and 
expansion does not itself make any difference to this, except (1) in 
providing new pretexts or ‘storylines’ for fraudsters to use to get 
credit or investment, and (2) inasmuch as it changes the structures 
of control, e.g. reducing customs paperwork makes VAT evasion 
easier, or the UK’s ratification of the European Convention on 
Mutual Assistance makes co-operation and conviction easier (see 
Passas and Nelken, 1993). 
Despite some advances (see Coles, 2001), the lack of more 
than the most rudimentary research base on patterns of criminal 
relationships in most European countries - including the UK - 
means that academics and most enforcement agencies have little 
systematic information about how domestic criminals meet and 
decide what to do, let alone how and to what effect/lack of effect 
Euro-criminals meet. In the global sphere, the analytical poverty is 
more extreme still (though see UNODC, 2002, for an interesting 
attempt to improve analysis). Major offenders do not advertise their 
services in the media, and apart from common holidays in Spain, 
marinas, and casinos, such contacts may often be tentative, 
hedged around with the problem of negotiating trust in an ambience 
in which betrayal (perhaps by an undercover agent, especially an 
American or British one) can have very serious consequence not 
just for freedom but for retention of proceeds of crime. (Though 
clever regulatory arbitrage can put knowledge of variations in legal 
rules in European countries to good effect in frustrating successful 
prosecutions.) Most plausible is the notion that Euro-criminals are 
either crime entrepreneurs who already exploit international trade 
for the purposes of fraud and/or smuggling, or money-launderers 
who put their clients in touch with each other. Ruggiero (1996) has 
argued that both corporate and organised crime can be understood 
as variations on the same theme, but though there are cigarette 
companies that may (at best) ‘fail’ to clamp down on the smuggling 
levels of their products in order to avoid other companies 
increasing their own market share at their expense, the Ruggiero 
view risks over-homogenising both upperworld and underworld.  
The role of fences, criminal professionals (accountants, 
lawyers), money-launderers and transportation firms may be 
important in facilitating networks, though they themselves may 
have to be ‘brokered’. Such an intelligence methodology may bring 
increased risks for those upperworld members whose connections 
with the underworld may not previously have been noticed: but if 
neither the person nor the activity is part of the police and 
intelligence surveillance set, they may still remain safe from 
intervention (see Gill, 2000).  
Gradually, criminologists have begun to see ‘the causes of 
crime’ as including an analysis of how crime is organised socially 
and technically. To understand how this is possible, we need to 
examine crime as a business process, requiring funding, technical 
  104
skills, distribution mechanisms, and money-handling facilities. The 
larger the criminal business, the more likely all these elements will 
be required, with the special business problem that what they are 
doing is illegal and, if caught and convicted, they – and their 
bankers or lawyers – could all go to jail for very long times as 
‘organised criminals’.  
There are international groupings engaged in the commission of 
very serious social harms, though not all of them are labelled 
‘organised criminals’. There may be more such groupings than 
there were 25 years ago, but despite the apocalyptic visions not 
only of the political right but of sociologists such as Castells (1998), 
however, it seems far less likely that non-European crime ‘cartels’ 
will dominate the West with their economic power than that there 
will be an increasing number of financial attacks on economic 
targets and a continuing devolved and networked supply of illegal 
goods and services, with some larger operators in countries where 
the evidential rules or the inefficiency/corruption of officials make 
proof of involvement too difficult. Though judgements of incidence 
and prevalence of threats may differ, there is general agreement 
that networked crime is more efficient than hierarchical ‘planned 
centralism’ for long-term criminal survival, at both national and 
transnational levels (Levi and Naylor, 2000; Williams, 2001). For 
criminals intending to stay in business for a long time, unless they 
are extraordinarily gifted and/or live in an extraordinarily corrupt 
haven, ‘small is beautiful’.  
Furthermore, it appears that non-economic ties are the bedrock 
upon which is founded the longer-term stability and security of 
crime networks, only some of whose participants are full-time 
criminals.  As the legal economy demonstrates, the mere fact that 
global markets exist does not mean that multinational 
conglomerates are the only or even best suited organisations able 
to supply criminal consumer needs. When the illegality of the 
activities imposes severe constraints on financing, recruitment, 
advertising, sales and the collection and consolidation of funds, 
criminal growth may be inhibited. For all but those who simply want 
to develop a moral panic to get more powers and resources, what 
is important (for crime control as well as academic understanding) 
is to appreciate the subtlety, complexity and depth of field of the 
organisation of crimes. In doing so, we should bear in mind that 
many different forms of organisation can co-exist in parallel, and 
that to be an ‘organised criminal’ does not mean that one has to be 
a member of an ‘organised crime syndicate’. There are layers of 
different forms of enterprise criminal, some undertaking wholly 
illegal activities and others mixing the legal and illegal depending 
on contacts, trust and assessment of risks from enforcement in 
particular national markets (Levi, 2007; Naylor, 2004). Which of 
these we choose to call ‘organised criminals’ is a matter of 
judgment (and libel laws), and we need to be clearer about which 
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segments of the criminal market we are referring to before we can 
be sure we are discussing the same thing when we use the tern 
‘organised crime’. As for the future of organised crime prevention 
strategies, the Netherlands and the UK have been probably the 
highest profile countries to develop such an approach, but long-
term rolling out and sustaining of such prevention strategies is 
about quality of implementation rather than just the presence or 
absence of a formal process. Moreover, it is important to consider 
carefully what we mean by ‘prevention’, since the review by Levi 
and Maguire (2004) found that in Europe, this can vary from normal 
law enforcement actions (arrests and seizures) to much wider 
ranging efforts to disrupt criminal markets and opportunities. Such 
efforts require periodic evaluation, and whether the broader 
approach takes off and ‘works’ may need to be reconsidered before 
the end of the next 25 years of HEUNI! 
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Introduction 
 
The process of co-operation between law enforcement agencies is 
considered to be an integral element of post nine-eleven policing. 
The setting up of European Union wide law enforcement agencies, 
EUROPOL and FRONTEX for example, demonstrate the focus on 
building co-operative agreements between law enforcement 
agencies within and external to the European Union. For example, 
EUROPOL is defined as: 
“… the European Law Enforcement Organisation which aims at 
improving the effectiveness and co-operation of the competent 
authorities in the Member States in preventing and combating 
terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of 
international organised crime.”  
(Europol 2006) 
 
The concerns of EUROPOL are those issues upon which 
international co-operation is focused and resourced to address. At 
the inauguration of FRONTEX the EU commissioner responsible 
for Freedom and Security, Franco Frattini, defined the relevant 
threats in the following terms: 
“The spectre of international terrorism, the human tragedies of 
victims of trafficking and the equally sad and grave consequences 
of illegal immigration into the EU, are constant reminders that we 
need to do even more to combat the many and diverse threats 
facing this area. The European citizens rightly expect us to find 
efficient solutions to these security problems. But these solutions 
must always fully respect human rights and preserve the integrity of 
the common, free travel area provided by the Schengen 
cooperation.”  
(FRONTEX 2006) 
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The areas of concern for EUROPOL and FRONTEX provide the 
first area of co-operation in policing. This level can be defined as 
cross-border co-operation in defining the problem. The second 
level is one that has a focus on policy development and in some 
cases ‘capacity building’ in order to strengthen international 
responses to crime. The level of activity in this area is one that is 
concerned with harmonising legal and procedural processes, for 
example extradition; this area can be defined as procedural forms 
of co-operation. The final area of co-operation is varied but very 
much located at the level of law enforcement practice; that is how 
do practitioners exchange information and co-operate with each 
other across borders; this can be defined as ‘practical co-
operation’. Each of these various forms of co-operation will be 
discussed. This paper will then address the issues and dilemmas in 
international co-operation and conclude with some policy 
recommendations in this area. 
 
 
Defining the problems 
 
The process by which the areas of international co-operation are 
identified is a lengthy one and subject to a number of varied 
interpretations. For example in relation to the Estonian experience 
the definition of the problems that required international co-
operation in law enforcement was different according to the 
perspective of the person defining the problem. In research 
conducted by Hebenton and Spencer in the late 1990s (Hebenton 
and Spencer 2001) it is apparent that the definition of the areas of 
co-operation are highly contested, especially when the process of 
co-operation is focused on the provision of assistance in law 
enforcement policy and practice. The process of the provision of 
assistance is an interactive one. Donor countries establish funding 
streams in order to initiate certain forms of co-operation and 
development in the recipient countries. The focus of these 
assistance programmes is usually enveloped in the language of 
‘democratic development’. In the early 1990s in relation to the 
Baltic States of the former Soviet Union a number of countries 
established programmes that were involved in the promotion of 
democratic processes and institutions and the building of capacity 
in the area of democratic procedures. So, for example Canada in 
the early 1990s established the ‘International Centre for Human 
Rights and Democratic Development’ and the European Union and 
Council of Europe established dedicated assistance funds for the 
promotion of democracy in the countries of the former Soviet 
Union. There were a large number of other countries also making 
assistance available under the banner of promoting democratic 
institutions (see Hebenton and Spencer 2001). 
  110
The provision of assistance by the donors may not be 
unconditional and not as altruistic as is portrayed. There is a 
process by which the recipient country has to negotiate with donor 
countries to be viewed as eligible or deserving of assistance. This 
is the initial phase in the identifying and defining the problem. The 
recipient will, in most cases, be in the position of having little 
influence on how the problems are defined. So, the donor countries 
establish the ideological framework within which the problem and 
issues to be addressed are to be framed. Furthermore, the focus of 
the problems will be ones that have a direct connection to the 
problems identified within the donor country. So, in order to be 
seen as eligible for assistance the recipient country will have to 
agree to the range of problems identified by the donor country. The 
motivation for many donor countries in relation to assistance in 
relation to law enforcement is focused on the growth of 
‘transnational criminality’ and its associated problems, especially 
those related to the undermining of ‘legitimate’ economic growth 
and activity. Therefore, many donor countries made assistance 
conditional on legislative developments in relation to transnational 
and cross-border crime and focused assistance programmes to 
tackle the issues of cross-border crime. In many respects this 
concentration on cross-border crime provided another layer of 
protection for the donor countries by allowing them access in terms 
of personnel to the new state’s law enforcement structures and the 
provision of ‘experts’ from the donor country through co-operation 
agreements; this can be seen as a means for donors to extend 
their areas of influence and their mode of law enforcement practice. 
The second area of concentration by donor countries was to 
encourage and assist new states to establish the ‘rule of law’. This 
was viewed as crucial to democratic development, and because 
many new states were perceived as vulnerable to corrupt and 
illegal practices in law enforcement due to the ‘weakness’ of their 
law enforcement procedures and structures. Consequently, if 
effective, efficient and productive market economies were to be 
developed it was perceived that the rule of law and ‘good 
governance’ were pre-requisites. The donor countries had a 
number of interests in promoting this democratisation agenda; the 
protection of their own domestic interests in relation to combating 
different forms of cross-border crime, the development of effective 
and stable markets in the new states, and the development of the 
‘European Project’ with the inclusion of the new states of the former 
Soviet Union. In relation to the donors the provision of assistance 
had to be constructed so that it met some if not all of the needs 
they identified in relation to either cross-border crime reduction, the 
reduction of criminal activities in their country or opportunities for 
the growth of their economies. These are all areas of negotiation 
between the donor and recipient country. However, it is not simply 
as easy as the recipient country agreeing to the conditions set out 
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by the donor. The donor also has to beware because there are 
problems and pitfalls in establishing relationships of co-operation. 
It is clear that the recipient countries are in the main ones that 
the donor selects because of strategic reasons. These reasons 
may be related to a criminal justice strategy of crime reduction or 
combating cross-border and ‘organised’ crime. However, a 
recipient country presents the donor with a number of dilemmas 
and problems. First, to establish co-operation a high level of trust is 
required in order to share information and on occasions practical 
decision making. There has been evidence in many recipient 
countries of corruption within the criminal justice sector. Such 
corruption is more often than not systemic so that forming 
relationships of trust that are deep enough to allow for the sharing 
of intelligence is difficult. Hebenton and Spencer summarise the 
problems associated with corruption and its effects very succinctly: 
“…in some cases, endemic corruption and mismanagement 
have sapped much investment in development, endangering the 
success of international assistance generally, including the 
provision of aid and economic opportunities. Thus, the selected 
focus of international cooperation on strengthening the economic 
and technical infrastructure of society, while ignoring law 
enforcement (police) functions, has proved too narrow in two 
respects: first, the increasing burden of crime control in the 
recipient countries detracts in general from the success of broader 
assistance. Secondly, crime, through corruption, has directly and 
indirectly siphoned off some of the development assistance.” 
(Hebenton and Spencer 2001, 2) 
 
So, donors are faced with a number of problems in providing 
assistance and these are exacerbated if corruption is present 
throughout the political, economic and legal systems. Such 
systemic forms of corruption not only result in there being a loss of 
development assistance but, perhaps, more importantly there is no 
basis for trust relationships to develop between the parties. The 
failure by the recipient state to tackle corruption at all levels will 
usually result in the donor deciding that there is no benefit to be 
gained from the provision of assistance.  
The second problem for the donor is that the provision of 
assistance is by no means a transparent process. For example; a 
donor country offers assistance in the area of money laundering. 
The donor country identifies this as an important area of assistance 
as there are concerns that the recipient country is being used to 
launder the proceeds of crime. The money laundering laws in the 
recipient country are either very vague or non-existent and so the 
donor decides to build capacity in this area of the criminal law and 
in relation to the practice of law enforcement officials. The donor 
country not only provides direct training courses but also study 
visits for law enforcement professional and policy makers from the 
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recipient country to the donor country. At a similar point in time 
another donor country identifies a problem with the regulation of the 
banking industry and the potential for money laundering. It offers 
assistance to the recipient country in forms of visits and training. 
The recipient country is in a position of being offered assistance 
from two different donor countries on essentially the same area of 
law enforcement practice. They accept both forms of assistance for 
a range of reasons; the recipients do not want to appear to be 
ungrateful to one donor, they want to establish and maintain 
contacts, there is a need to maintain and foster ‘good relationships’ 
and the recipient country can estimate the benefits from the 
assistance in financial terms. Both forms of assistance are 
accepted; however, it may be in the best interests of the recipient to 
not publicise the two forms of assistance as if each of the donors 
found out they may be concerned that their own influence has been 
diluted. Second, the donors may also wish to keep their assistance 
discreet and so appreciate the low profile of their assistance. From 
an arrangement such as this the recipient has a problem in that the 
assistance may well be delivered from two very different policing 
traditions and perspectives. For example, if one of the donor 
countries is North American and the other European there will be a 
difference in the legal structure, the methods of policing and even 
the underlying values of law enforcement. 
So, defining the areas of assistance is fraught with difficulty, for 
the donor countries it is important to ensure that assistance 
delivered meets their needs as well as those of the recipient 
country. Consequently, the problems identified as requiring the 
provision of assistance may have an ‘international’ dimension, for 
example money laundering, cross-border crime, whereas the 
problems identified by the recipient have a domestic focus, youth 
crime, acquisitive crime or the rise in violent crime. Second, the 
donor country has to develop relationships of trust between 
individuals and at the institutional level. This is difficult if there is 
systemic corruption throughout the criminal justice system. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to build trust relationships where the 
motivation and values of the law enforcement professional is called 
into question. Finally, the lack of transparency in relation to what 
assistance is being provided is also a hindrance to the 
development of trust relationships and for the recipient country can 
lead to confusion in the development of the most appropriate style 
of policing as the different forms of assistance bring with them 
different policing traditions and values. 
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Procedural forms of international assistance 
 
“Without law enforcement and judicial cooperation that results in 
investigation, prosecutions, and crime prevention, international 
agreements lack meaning in practice. Therefore, it is the 
implementation of the agreements that is the real measure of 
success of international cooperation.” 
(Albanese 2005)` 
 
This form of co-operation is mainly concerned with ensuring a 
consistency of approach to defined areas of law enforcement. For 
example, the workshop organized by HEUNI at the recent Eleventh 
United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
focused on the issue of extradition (Aromaa and Viljanen 2005). 
This is an important area of international co-operation and there 
have been a number of international agreements and protocols in 
relation to extradition. However, these co-operative relationships 
are fraught with difficulties as well as positive aspects. In relation to 
the latter there are a number of benefits; first, working to 
internationally agreed protocols and procedures ensures a 
framework to ensure a consistency of approach to specific 
problems, for example extradition. Second, internationally agreed 
protocols and procedures can apply a subtle political pressure to 
those countries which may be more lax in meeting the conditions of 
the agreement or may not wish to implement it in its entirety. 
Thirdly, it provides an agreed set of working practices that enable 
practitioners to ensure ‘good practice’ and finally provides a series 
of formalised links between practitioners across borders; so there 
are a number of very real advantages to this form of international 
co-operation. This procedural level of international assistance is 
very different to the type of assistance that defines a series of 
problems and then provides assistance to aid ‘developing’ or 
‘transitional’ states to tackle such problems. However, the 
procedural form of assistance is not without its difficulties. 
First, it relies upon a commitment by the countries involved in 
being transparent and open, and in some cases may require 
legislative changes in order for the co-operation to be effective. 
This openness is not necessarily forthcoming especially in 
countries where there are high levels of corruption as the 
transparency may either threaten to expose the corrupt practices or 
disrupt them. Second, the need to develop systems and 
approaches to the area of co-operation may require investment in 
the countries’ infrastructure at a number of levels. For example, it 
may be necessary for investment in technological equipment and 
for developing and transitional countries such equipment can be 
expensive and will need to be prioritised above a number of 
domestic demands in health care and education for example. 
Politically, there may be very few visible benefits to co-operation 
and therefore it requires the richer countries to be supportive of the 
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infrastructure needs of developing and transitional states. Third, 
there will be a significant need in some countries for training. These 
needs may be various with the requirement to train law 
enforcement staff in the use of new technology and understanding 
how to analyse and use the data such equipment provides 
effectively. It may also be necessary to develop a ‘culture’ of co-
operation; that is developing procedures and systems to aid co-
operation and to encourage the sharing of relevant information. In 
many cases it is important that the formal procedures are adhered 
to by law enforcement personnel because to circumvent 
procedures can result in evidence being compromised or certain 
key actions not being undertaken at the correct stage of a process. 
Consequently, there are costs in terms of time and money 
associated to co-operation. There is a need to plan co-operation 
effectively in order to ensure that the systems and procedures are 
developed and allow for the training needs of law enforcement 
professionals to be met.  
Forms of international co-operation are also vulnerable to the 
rapidly changing dynamics of crime. As forms of co-operation are 
agreed and implemented it may be that the criminal activity that the 
co-operation is designed to combat develops strategies that 
circumvent the agreements and processes implemented through 
international co-operation. In many situations international co-
operation is a reactive form of law enforcement. International co-
operation can only be seen to be proactive where it relies on 
legislation to proscribe certain activities. For example, extradition 
arrangements rely on international co-operation to ensure that the 
correct procedures are followed in extradition proceedings; 
however, what is required initially is for countries to put in place the 
legislative arrangements that permit extradition. The final problem, 
as identified by Albanese (2005), is that of too many procedures 
and protocols: 
“…too many global instruments might become burdensome or 
difficult to implement. Therefore, an approach to working 
agreements based on mutual interest by type of crime, or by 
region, appears to be the best approach.” 
(Albanese 2005,7) 
 
As forms of assistance develop so the international instruments 
required to make it work are also developed; however, as these 
begin to increase in number and complexity, it becomes more 
difficult for each country to meet all the requirements placed upon 
them. This is particularly so for developing and transitional states 
where the capacity required to meet the requirements of 
internationally agreed instruments may not exist due to changes in 
personnel and the need to recruit and educate the right people to 
do the job. As mentioned above the forms of co-operation required 
may also be a high priority for developed countries, for example a 
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tight framework for extradition, yet for developing and transitional 
states the maintenance of order may be a much higher priority. 
Once again we find ourselves having to address the thorny issue of 
defining the problem. It has to be noted that the definition of a 
problem of substance in one country may not be a problem of 
particular merit in another. For example, in the early 1990s in the 
Baltic States there was an emphasis on co-operation in relation to 
illicit drugs. This was because the Baltic States were seen as a 
corridor for the movement of drugs into the EU. However, for the 
Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania drugs were not a 
problem of significance; there was little disposable income and so 
there was no significant market for illicit drugs. So, the fact that 
Estonia, for example, might be a transit route was not a high priority 
for Estonian law enforcement as the drugs being moved could be 
argued have no significant effect on Estonian society whereas 
youth crime was viewed as a problem of significance (Hebenton 
and Spencer 2001).  
Albanese (2005) is right to urge caution in developing 
procedures that become burdensome and overly bureaucratic; 
however, the strategy of working on ‘…agreements based on 
mutual interest by type of crime, or by region…’ is also bedeviled 
by the problem of agreeing what the mutual interest actually is and 
which is the region of most concern. 
 
 
Practical co-operation 
 
Co-operation in law enforcement requires law enforcement 
practitioners to establish relationships of trust and mutual respect. 
These relationships are forged in a number of settings that include 
international conferences, exchanges between different countries, 
shared training programmes and the day to day working 
relationships that are based on favours and the sharing of 
information and intelligence. An example of such a form of co-
operation is that of the Finnish PCB coop: 
“In Finland, a model referred to as Police-Customs-Border 
Guard-Cooperation (PCB-coop) was developed to meet the needs 
of improved authority cooperation within the country. This model 
was then extended to incorporate also the Russian counterparts 
who participate in regular cross-border meetings which amount 
annually to hundreds at local level, about 100 at regional level, and 
2-4 at executive level.” 
(Spencer et al 2006) 
 
The example above demonstrates that there are a number of 
‘cross-border’ meetings; the most numerous of these are at the 
local level. These would essentially be small scale meetings only 
involving a few police officers and border guards from the different 
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countries. The official process of co-operation would be the 
exchange of information and agreement on certain forms of action 
in relation to specific cases. However, such forms of co-operation 
also establish working relationships which are based on a shared 
understanding of the task and a sense of being part of a wider law 
enforcement community. This sense of belonging to a wider law 
enforcement community is important to many practitioners. The 
idea of being accepted by the wider community confers status for 
individuals in relation to how they do the job. The concept that the 
day to day working methods can be shared is important in 
legitimating what is being done and at the same time being one of 
the means of acceptance into the wider law enforcement 
community. 
While such day to day contacts, as described above, contribute 
to co-operation there are other forms of practical co-operation that 
are valued by practitioners. Research into international co-
operation in the transitional Baltic States in the late 1990s (see 
Hebenton and Spencer 2001) indicates that there are various forms 
of co-operation. First, the provision of training courses, such 
courses may be provided by a single country, for example Finland 
to Estonia. These courses establish links between the practitioners 
providing the training and the recipients. In the case of the driving 
skills course provided by Finland to the transitional Baltic States it 
was apparent that one of the objectives was to provide a ‘European 
model of policing’, so the donors recognised that the provision of 
courses in the spirit of co-operation provided opportunities to 
develop an overall policing culture that had similarities to their own. 
Co-operation provides the opportunity for the development of 
shared cultures in relation to law enforcement practice. The 
exchange of ideas between practitioners provides the opportunity 
for old practices to be challenged and new shared practices 
instigated. The sharing of a ‘culture’ or ethical approach to law 
enforcement can also result in a lower level of tolerance of 
corruption.  
International co-operation at the practice level also brings with it 
a number of problematics. First, it requires an agreement at the 
practice level of who is doing what and this requires clear lines of 
accountability and responsibility. On paper this may appear 
relatively straightforward but as Albanese (2005) has noted there 
may be difficulties in relation to the standardisation of legislative 
frameworks. There is an additional problem of ensuring a continuity 
of practice; that is ensuring that law enforcement personnel in 
different countries undertake their tasks with a similar approach. 
This can be crucial in relation to evidence gathering for example or 
interrogation where evidence presented may be inadmissible in one 
jurisdiction and not in another. This indicates that there is a level of 
management above the working relationships forged at the 
practitioner level, and the Finnish PCB coop is an example of 
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placing a management layer on top of the practitioner co-operation 
meetings. Second, there is a need to develop policy frameworks to 
guide managers and practitioners. In some cases such 
developments are placed with an external agency in order to 
ensure that procedures are followed and to eliminate duplication. 
EUROPOL is an example of attempting to implement systems and 
aid communication. However, for many law enforcement officers 
systems appear to be a hindrance rather than an aid and so they 
will attempt to circumvent the systems in order to attain their goal. 
The usual reason given for such tactics is that the demands of law 
enforcement are ones that require quick reactions and the wider 
systems are usually unresponsive and by the time the requested 
information has been received the situation has developed and 
moved on. Consequently officers tend to rely on the informal 
contacts they have established to get the information or intelligence 
they need.  
These individual relationships are both an asset and a potential 
problem. In many respects it is these personal contacts between 
law enforcement officers that allow for the sharing of information 
and intelligence. It is clear that these relationships are highly valued 
and are protected and respected; however, if international co-
operation were to rely solely on such relationships then the 
development of formal procedures that allow all officers to engage 
in the information sharing process would be lost and so the system 
would become reliant on personal relationships of trust rather than 
integrity of the law enforcement institutions involved in the co-
operation. It also provides the potential for the informal means of 
sharing to be less than complete, it might be that the law 
enforcement personnel do not have all the required information 
and, finally, such relationships may jeopardise an enquiry or the 
integrity of the evidence. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
International co-operation in law enforcement is viewed by all 
participants as a positive and necessary element of the law 
enforcement task (see for example Hebenton and Spencer 2001, 
Aromaa and Viljanen 2005). In many respects the United Nations 
Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice which takes 
place every five years is where international agreements are made 
and the strategic frameworks required to implement international 
co-operation are put in place. However, this process is also highly 
problematic (see Spencer 2005) but for all of its potential problems 
it demonstrates the value attached to international law enforcement 
co-operative arrangements and relationships. At a more localised 
level recent work by Spencer et al (2006) demonstrates how 
countries involved in combating the illegal movement of people 
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develop co-operative relationships at the heart of their strategic 
responses: 
“There is some evidence that EUROPOL has been a successful 
agency in the countering of illegal immigration with shared 
operations and the apprehension of organised crime members 
involved in facilitation. The setting up of FRONTEX, similar to the 
Finnish model of “PCB-coop” indicates a development in the EU 
strategy to protect borders by collaboration with external countries.” 
(Spencer et al 2006, 14) 
 
However, all of the various forms of co-operation come with 
associated costs. In relation to co-operation and the provision of 
assistance there are difficulties with defining the problems to be 
addressed and issues of how recipient countries can prioritise the 
needs for legislative change and a shift of focus from the domestic 
agenda to the international agenda when domestic issues appear 
most pressing and there is a scarcity of resources, both staff and 
finances. 
The forms of assistance that are based on procedural issues 
also have issues of defining the problem and the ordering of 
priorities and furthermore there are issues of ensuring that the 
development of strategic co-operation between countries does not 
result in the burden of bureaucracy which only results in 
practitioners attempting to circumvent the demands of systems and 
protocols. The form of co-operation at the local level also requires 
monitoring to ensure that practitioners practice effectively. Whilst 
positive individual relationships oil the wheels of co-operation they 
may also short cut the processes that are there to ensure a full 
search of available databases is undertaken. However, the over 
formalisation of co-operation results in higher levels of scepticism in 
relation to issues of trust between parties and so a tendency to 
guard and protect information.  
In 2001 Hebenton and Spencer (2001) set out a model for the 
provision of international assistance, and it is appropriate some five 
years later to see such a model having an application in the field of 
co-operation. It is important that when international co-operation is 
established between a number of partners there is a bringing 
together of relevant professionals to define the terms and 
boundaries of the proposed co-operation. This should also include 
an audit of the costs and benefits of co-operation to each of the 
parties. This would take account of the legislative requirements and 
also the difficulties in developing standardised forms of procedures 
and practices (Albanese 2005). This process of consultation would 
also define the dynamics and territory (Hebenton and Spencer 
2001) of the proposed co-operation and would establish the co-
operative relationship on a firm basis. Second, it is necessary to 
include professionals at all levels as they are keepers of different 
types of knowledge; practitioners may have an intimate knowledge 
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of what is happening on the ground whereas managers understand 
the broader policy context and the constraints placed upon the co-
operative relationships. Failure to include all parties will ultimately 
result in a breakdown of the system of co-operation and in 
communication. It is also important to establish clear methods of 
implementation. All parties will need to know what has to be done 
and what the timescale is to achieve the framework for the co-
operative relationship. This should provide a clear set of aims for 
the co-operative relationships and it is against these that the 
relationship should be evaluated. Many law enforcement 
professional are adamant that these co-operative relationships 
work but rarely is there any independent evaluation of such forms 
of co-operation. 
The concept of co-operation appears to be a good one, yet this 
paper has indicated that to make it work requires commitment from 
the parties involved, transparency to ensure best practice and an 
acknowledgment that unless the problems and pitfalls are 
recognised the ideal of co-operation will probably not be achieved. 
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The international crime victims survey 
 
One of the most important and most frequently cited shortcomings 
of the UN Crime Survey is that figures of crimes recorded by the 
police cannot be reliably used as a measure of the level of crime, 
especially not for comparative purposes across countries 
(Newman, 1999). Rates of crimes recorded in police 
administrations are determined by domestic criminal legislation, 
public reporting of crimes and the capacity and willingness of the 
police to officially recognize such reports. As a general rule, rates 
of crimes recorded per 100 000 inhabitants tend to be higher in the 
more affluent countries, e.g. Sweden and Denmark. These rates do 
not reflect the volume of crime as experienced by the public. They 
should rather be seen as indicators of the effectiveness of law 
enforcement rather than of levels of crime.  
Over the past three decades more and more countries have 
started to conduct sample surveys among the general population 
on experiences with crime as an alternative source of information 
about crime to what the police themselves record. Such 
victimization surveys provide important additional information on 
crime as experienced by the public, rates of reporting crimes to the 
police, experiences of victims with the police, fear of crime and the 
use of crime prevention measures. If the research methodology 
used is standardised, the surveys also offer a new opportunity for 
the collection of crime statistics, which can be used for comparative 
purposes (Alvazzi del Frate, Zvekic, van Dijk, 1993).  
In 1987 the initiative was taken by a group of European 
criminologists chaired by the author to launch a fully standardized 
survey, called the International Crime Victims Survey. In 1989 the 
first ICVS was carried out in thirteen countries, mainly from 
Western Europe and North America (van Dijk, Mayhew, Killias, 
1990). At the UN Crime Congress in Cuba in 1990, staff members 
of UNICRI proposed expansion of the survey to developing 
countries through a series of pilot studies in capital cities across the 
world. In collaboration with UNICRI, the ICVS was conducted in 
capital cities of ten or more developing countries in 1992 (Zvekic, 
Alvazzi del Frate, 1995). The subsequents sweeps of 1996 and 
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2000 were executed in a selection of countries from all world 
regions (Alvazzi del Frate, Hatalak, Zvekic, 2000). Execution in 
developing countries was promoted by UNICRI through a system of 
grants and the provision of technical assistance. Most of this 
pioneering work was funded by the Dutch Ministries of Justice and 
of Development Aid. 
The fifth survey was carried out in 2005 in forty countries, 
including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, 
Mozambique, Cambodia and Hong Kong. Altogether surveys have 
been carried out in around 30 industrialized countries and in 50 
cities in developing countries and countries in transition (van 
Kesteren, Mayhew, and Nieuwbeerta 2000; van Dijk, 2006). Over 
300,000 citizens have to date been interviewed in the course of the 
ICVS. This process has resulted in a body of victim survey data 
across a variety of countries, unmatched by any other 
criminological data set (Kury, 2001). All historical data sets of the 
ICVS can be consulted at the websites of UNICRI and of 
Gallup/Europe (www.unicri.it; gallup-europe.be/EUICS).  
The results of the ICVS have been published in several 
monographs. Key results were also included in the UN’s Global 
Report on Crime and Criminal Justice of 2000 (Newman, 1999). In 
the secondary analyses of European and North American data 
carried out by HEUNI composite indices were used which combine 
police data with results of the ICVS (Kangaspunta, Joutsen, Ollus, 
1998; Aromaa, 2003).  
In April 2005 UNODC and UNICRI presented a joint working 
paper for the UN Crime Congress in Bangkok on Trends in Crime 
and Justice. This report, subtitled Work in Progress, combined 
results of the UN Crime Survey with those of the ICVS. In addition 
new data were presented on non-conventional types of crime such 
as corruption and organized crime drawn from surveys among 
business executives about perceived risks for their companies. The 
report was subsequently also distibuted among attendants of the 
14th Crime Commission in Vienna in 2005. An extended and 
revised version was later prepared by van Dijk (2006; forthcoming). 
This paper will highlight some of the key results. 
 
 
Levels of volume crime 
 
The ICVS interviews samples of households about their recent 
experiences with the most frequently occurring types of 
conventional crime (volume crime). National samples include at 
least 2,000 respondents who are generally interviewed with the 
CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview) technique. In the 
countries where this method is not applicable because of 
insufficient distribution of telephones, face-to-face interviews are 
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conducted in the main cities, generally with samples of 1,000-1,500 
respondents1. 
The ICVS provides an overall measure of victimisation in the 
previous year by any of the eleven “conventional” crimes included 
in the questionnaire. Among the eleven “conventional” crimes, 
some are “household crimes”, i.e. those which can be seen as 
affecting the household at large, and respondents report on all 
incidents known to them. A first group of crimes deals with the 
vehicles owned by the respondent or his/her household: A second 
group refers to break and enter (burglaries): and a third group of 
crimes refers to victimization experienced by the respondent 
personally, including robbery, pickpocketing, assault and sexual 
offences. 
The results of the ICVS 1996 and 2000 show that on average 
31% of citizens living in urban areas suffered at least one form of 
victimization over the twelve months preceding the interview. 
Victimization rates are highest for city dwellers in Latin America 
(39%) and Africa (36%). Victimization rates are moderately high in 
Oceania (Australia only) and Western and Central Europe. 
Victimization rates below the global average are found in North 
America, Eastern Europe and Asia.  
It is noteworthy that the variation in regional rates does not fully 
conform to the commonly held notion that levels of crime are driven 
by poverty. The low crime rate of Asia is clearly at odds with this 
notion. The rate of the Eastern European countries below that of 
Central and Western Europe also belies easy generalizations about 
the relationships between poverty and crime. 
Figure 1 shows the regional distribution of one year victimisation 
rates for burglaries, robberies and assaults and threats as 
observed in the ICVS. The ICVS defines burglary as house-
breaking for purposes of theft. Robbery is defined as theft from the 
person by use of force, thus involving direct contact between victim 
and offender (“contact” crime). Rates for all types of crimes refer to 
percentages of persons victimized at least once by such crime in 
the course of the last year. 
 
 
                                                     
1 The cost of data collection was much reduced by the use of random digit dialling 
and CATI techniques. In recent years the increase of the proportion of mobile only 
users in several countries has raised concerns about the representativeness of 
samples limited to landline phone numbers. Results of pilot studies conducted in 
the framework of the ICVS and elsewhere suggest that mobile only users differ in 
many respects from the general population but not necessarily to the extent that 
results of crime victimisation surveys cannot be reliably approached through 
sophisticated reweigthing of landline based data.  
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Figure 1 – Victimisation rates by burglary, robbery and 
assault/threat in the course of one year (percentages of persons 
victimized during last year) 
 
 
The differences among the regions were larger for the two 
crimes involving property, which were by far the highest in Africa 
and Latin America. Burglary in Africa was four times more frequent 
than in Western Europe. Robbery in Latin America was eight times 
higher than in Western Europe, North America and Australia. 
Contrary to a common perception, rates of burglary as well as of 
robbery and assault/threats are not higher in the USA than in most 
parts of Western Europe. In fact USA rates are significantly lower 
than those of, for example, England and Wales and The 
Netherlands (van Kesteren et al., 2002).  
The data in respect of robbery confirm the validity of the concern 
about urban violence in several main cities in Latin America and 
Africa, including in some of the newly established democracies 
such as South Africa (Shaw, van Dijk, Rhomberg, 2003). 
The crime category of assault and threat is defined in the ICVS 
as personal attacks or threats, either by a stranger or a relative or 
friend, without the purpose of stealing. It is another “contact” crime 
and although physical consequences may be minor in most cases, 
it may well have important emotional repercussions for victims. 
Assaults on women are more likely to be domestic in nature than 
assaults on men. In a third of the cases of violence against women, 
the offender was known at least by name to the victim. In one of 
five of the cases the crime was committed in the victim’s own 
house. The level of violence against women is inversely related to 
the position of women in society, with developing countries showing 
much higher rates (Alvazzi del Frate, Patrignani, 1995). 
0,0 2,0 4,0 6,0 8,0 10,0
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Table 1 shows the ranking of countries on the basis of one-year 
overall victimization rates, based on results of ICVS surveys carried 
out in the period 1996-2000. For a few countries which did not 
participate in these two rounds of the ICVS, rates from the 1992 
survey were added (their country names are printed in italics). 
In interpreting country rates, it must be borne in mind that they are 
based on relatively small samples with an average size of 1,000 
respondents. The actual rates among the population may deviate 
from the ones given here. As a general rule there is a less than 10 % 
chance that the overall victimization rates of the population deviate 
more than three percent points from the rates of the samples. 
Individual country rates, then, cannot be seen as exactly right but 
certainly provide a reliable indicator of which countries have 
relatively high, moderately high, or relatively low rates of 
victimization.  
 
Table 1 World ranking of countries according to victimization of 
public by any crime in the course of one year rank number and 
percentage victims per year (source : ICVS 1996-2000 mainly)  
 
Fifteen countries with highest rates 
1 Colombia 50.7 % 6 Mongolia 41.8 % 11 Tanzania 37.6 % 
2 Brazil 48.1 % 7 Cambodia 41.5 % 12 Uganda 37.3 % 
3 Zimbabwe 47.5 % 8 Estonia 41.2 % 13 Namibia 36.4 % 
4 Costa Rica 45.5 % 9 Bolivia 40.1 % 14 South Africa 36.4 % 
5 Swaziland 44.6 % 10 Mozambique 38.0 % 15 Paraguay 36.3 % 
 
Selected countries with medium high rates  
20 France 34.5 % 29 Australia 32.1 % 38 Sweden 30.4 % 
21 UK 34.4 % 31 Poland 31.7 % 39 Netherlands 30.3 % 
23 Argentina 33.7 % 33 Italy 31.4 % 40 Germany 29.3 % 
24 Spain 33.1 % 36 United States 30.7 % 48 Canada 26.9 % 
27 Nigeria 32.2 % 37 India 30.5 % 51 Russian Fed 26.3 % 
 
Fifteen countries with the lowest rates 
52 Romania 24.5 % 57 Macedonia 
FYR 
21.6 % 62 Norway 16.4 % 
53 Belarus 23.6 % 58 China 21.6 % 62 Japan 15.3 % 
54 Georgia 23.5 % 59 Indonesia 21.4 % 63 Croatia 14.3 % 
55 Malta 23.3 % 60 Korea, Rep. 20.9 % 64 Philippines 9.1 % 
56 Switzerland 22.6 % 61 Panama 20.3 % 65 Azerbaijan 8.3 % 
Rates of countries in italics based on ICVS 1992 
 
 
The countries with the highest prevalence rates for conventional 
crime are mainly from Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa, with the 
exception of Mongolia, Cambodia and Estonia. A high prevalence 
rate was also found in Papua New Guinea (not included). 
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Countries of Europe and North America are almost without 
exception situated in the middle category. Contrary to common 
perception, overall rates of volume crime – such as burglary, 
robbery and assault/threats– are not higher in the USA than in most 
parts of Western Europe. In fact USA rates are significantly lower 
than those of, for example, England and Wales and France (see 
also van Kesteren, Mayhew, Nieuwbeerta, 2000). The overall rate 
of Canada is somewhat below the mean of the European Union 
and that of the United States of America.  
Countries with the lowest rates form a fairly mixed group with a 
strong representation of Eastern European and of both affluent 
Asian countries (Japan, South Korea), middle-income ones (China) 
and poor ones (Philippines, Indonesia). Switzerland, although less 
so than in the first round of the ICVS, is still qualified as one of the 
countries with the safest cities in Western Europe.  
The preliminary results of the ICVS 2005 allow a comparison of 
the 2004/2005 rates with rates recorded in previous rounds of the 
ICVS for some developed countries (EU countries, Australia, 
Canada and the USA). Available trend data point to a continued 
downward trend in victimization by common crime across these 
developed countries since 2000 (van Dijk, Manchin, van Kesteren, 
2006).  
 
 
Homicide rates 
 
For obvious reasons, data on completed homicide are not available 
through victim surveys. Fortunately homicide represents one of the 
few types of crime for which data from police and health 
administrations are available which can be used for tentative 
comparisons at the international level. This is due to a relatively 
uniform definition and to relatively high reporting and recording 
rates across all countries (Zimring, Hawkins, 1997). As pointed out 
by Altbeker (2005) police recorded homicide rates to some extent 
suffer from the same flaws of underreporting and poor recording as 
other police recorded crime statistics. In countries where security 
forces are among the main perpetrators of violent crimes reporting 
will be low. In many developing countries administrative systems 
and communication infrastructures of police services preclude 
proper recording of even the most serious types of crime.  
Statistics on police-recorded homicides are recorded through the 
United Nations Crime Survey, the latest covering 2000 up to 2002. 
The other main source of information are the health statistics 
collected by the World Health Organization through hospital 
surveys (WHO, 2002). The WHO statistics reflect the views of 
medical doctors on the causes of death of hospitalized patients and 
are independent from police administrations. Comparisons of the 
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country rates according to the UN Surveys and the WHO revealed 
a reasonable degree of agreement (Rubin, Walker, 2004).  
However, an analysis of rates over a 16-year period, showed 
WHO rates to be on average 15 percent higher (Shaw, van Dijk 
Rhomberg, 2003). The explanation for this higher count of the 
WHO might be that hospitals classify as homicides cases of assault 
resulting in death - whereby the perpetrator did not intend to apply 
lethal force. Further analysis revealed that the higher counts of 
WHO do not occur in developed countries. The discrepancies are 
limited to middle-income countries (WHO 19 % higher) and 
developing countries (WHO 45 % higher). The latter finding 
suggests that the main reason for the differences is that in 
developing countries even for as serious a crime as homicide a 
significant proportion of crimes committed is never reported to the 
police or never recorded.  
The United Nations surveys show a global average of 7 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants per year in recent years. The 
WHO counted for the year 2000 over half a million homicide-related 
deaths or 8.8 per 100,000. Males account for 77% of all homicides 
and have rates that are three times those of females (13.6 and 4 
respectively). The highest rates are found among males aged 15-
29 years (19.4 per 100.000). 
For the purpose of this publication, the latest available national 
homicide rates were taken from the sixth, seventh and eighth UN 
surveys, covering the period 1990 to 2002 (most rates relate to 
1998 to 2002). To increase coverage of countries, data were added 
from the WHO dataset for twelve countries not participating in any 
of the UN surveys. In the cases where these were rates of middle 
income and developing countries, statistical adjustments were 
made to achieve better comparability with the UN rates. Through 
this procedure homicide rates could be calculated for 111 
countries. 
Figure 2 shows regional rates for completed homicides. 
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Figure 2 Homicides per 100,000 population in 2002 or latest year 
available, per world subregion; sources: UN, WHO. 
 
 
Homicide rates are highest in Southern Africa, which in this 
respect is in a category of its own with rates above 30 per 100,000 
population or three times the world average. 
Southern Africa is followed by Central America, South America, 
the Caribbean and Eastern Europe, while other regions show much 
lower rates.  
The lowest levels reported were in North Africa, Middle-East/ 
South-West Asia, West and Central Europe and East and South 
East Asia. Homicide rates in North Africa appear to be the lowest 
on earth with many countries maintaining rates below 1 per 
100,000 inhabitants (see for details below). Apart from North Africa, 
such low rates can only be found in some parts of Western Europe. 
The differences between different parts of the Western world are 
particularly noteworthy. North America, here represented by the 
USA and Canada, stands out with higher rates than both Western 
Europe and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). In terms of 
homicides Canada is more similar to Western Europe than to its 
southern neighbours. If Mexico were included in the rates for North 
America the regional rate would be even higher. 
Eastern Europe contrasts starkly with Western Europe, with 
countries such as Russia (19,8) showing extremely high rates. High 
homicide rates in the former Soviet countries have also been 
observed in previous statistical overviews (Aromaa et al., 2003).  
0,8
1,1
2,5
2,7
3,3
3,4
4,1
5,0
6,6
6,7
6,8
8,2
11,7
13,5
15,5
15,8
31,5
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
North Africa
Near and Middle East
West and Central Europe
East and South East Asia
SouthEast Europe
Oceania
West & Central Africa
South Asia
East Africa
Central Asia
North America
World
East Europe
Caribbean
South America
Central America
Southern Africa
homicide per 100.000
  128
Previous analyses of data from Europe and North America have 
shown that the levels of various forms of violence are correlated, 
although not strongly (van Dijk, 1999). The high homicide rates 
observed in (subsaharan) Africa and the Americas are 
accompanied by high levels of robberies, assaults and sexual 
assaults (see hereunder). 
 
 
National homicide rates 
 
Country rates for homicides are collected through the UN survey, 
supplemented by data from the WHO report on Health and Violence 
(WHO, 2002). Table 2 shows results. 
Table 2 World ranking of countries according to rates of homicide 
per 100,000 population in 2002 or latest available year (110 
countries); sources: UN and WHO 
Fifteen countries with highest homicide rates: 
1 Swaziland 88.6 6 El Salvador 31.5 11 Bahamas 14.9 
2 Colombia 62.7 7 Guatemala 25.5 12 Kazakhstan 14.5 
3 South Africa 47.5 8 Puerto Rico 20.6 13 Mexico 13.0 
4 Jamaica 33.7 9 Russian Fed. 19.8 14 Ecuador 13.0 
5 Venezuela, RB 33.1 10 Brazil 19.5 15 Paraguay 12.0 
 
Selected countries with medium high homicide rates 
16 Estonia 10.4 56 Turkey 3.3 80 Canada 1.7 
26 Thailand 8.5 56 Switzerland 2.9 89 Italy 1.1 
44 United 
States 
5.6 59 Australia 2.8 90 Germany 1.1 
46 Cuba 5.3 67 Sweden 2.5 92 Indonesia 1.0 
53 India 3.7 73 United 
Kingdom 
2.0 96 Netherlands 1.0 
 
Fifteen countries with lowest homicide rates 
97 Bahrain 1.0 102 Austria 0.8 107 Israel 0.5 
98 Jordan 1.0 103 Greece 0.8 108 Morocco 0.5 
99 Saudi Arabia 0.9 104 Oman 0.6 109 Cyprus 0.3 
100 Singapore 0.9 105 Hong 
Kong 
0.6 110 Myanmar 0.2 
101 Luxembourg 0.9 106 Japan 0.5 111   
Source: 
Black= UN Survey on Crime Trends and the Operation of Criminal Justice 
Systems, 8th survey, 2002 data 
Blue= UN Survey on Crime Trends and the Operation of Criminal Justice 
Systems, 7th survey, 2000/1999 data 
Red= UN Survey on Crime Trends and the Operation of Criminal Justice 
Systems, 6th survey, 1997 data 
Green= WHO data from World Report on Violence and Health 20022. 
                                                     
2 In middle and low income countries the data show significantly more cases of 
homicide than the UN Crime Surveys, 18 and 45 percent respectively. (See: Shaw, 
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Diagnosing organised crime with the use of statistical “markers” 
 
According to common definitions of organized crime in 
criminological literature (Kenney, Finckenauer, 1995; Levi, 2002) 
defining traits of organized crime are the use of extreme violence, 
corruption of public officials, including law enforcement and judicial 
officers, penetration of the legitimate economy (eg through money-
laundering) and interference in the political process. These 
elements are not only incorporated in national anti-mafia laws in 
some countries, including the USA and Italy (Fijnaut, Paoli, 2004) 
but also used as operational definitions by the European police 
community through the so called Falcone checklist (Levi, 2002).  
If comparing official police-based information on garden variety 
crimes as burglary or street robbery seems no longer feasible, 
there is little hope for optimism regarding the comparison of police-
based information on more complex crimes. At the global level it is 
to be expected that the number of police-recorded cases of 
organized crime correlates inversely with the seriousness of the 
problem. Where organized crime rules, few of such cases will ever 
be investigated, let alone brought before a court. Statistics on drug 
seizures can illustrate the point. Seizures of drugs by police or 
custom authorities of a country are likely to reflect law enforcement 
priorities and professional capacities rather than the global flow of 
drugs. In the field of complex crimes, statistics of police-recorded or 
court-recorded crimes are a source of misinformation. 
As discussed above, the level of conventional crime can be 
successfully estimated through the administering of standardized 
victimization surveys among the public or samples of business 
executives. Through direct contacting of key groups of the public, 
bypassing the domestic legal institutions, at least some of the 
methodological problems can be avoided. There seems to be no a 
priori reason why the same approach could not be followed to 
estimate the extent of organized crime in a country, for example by 
interviewing business executives, the key target group of 
racketeering and extortion, one of the most important 
manifestations of local organized crime in many countries.  
Since 1997 the World Economic Forum has carried out surveys 
among CEO’s of larger companies to identify obstacles to 
businesses in an increasing number of countries, reaching a total of 
102 in 2003. From the onset, one of the questions in these 
‘executives opinion surveys’ asked about the prevalence in the 
country of ‘mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion (imposes or not 
serious costs on businesses)’. 
                                                                                                                                   
M., van Dijk, J. and Rhomberg, W., 2003). Therefore these data have been 
adjusted in order to match the UN data. 
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An analysis was conducted of the patterns of answers given to 
this question on perceived mafia prevalence from the seven annual 
rounds of WEF surveys conducted since 1997. To further reduce 
sampling error, the scores of the surveys were averaged. The 
resulting mean scores are based on sample sizes of 500 and over. 
They reflect the perceived prevalence of organized crime in the 
period 1997 to 2003 according to business executives. 
In order to facilitate further statistical exploration, a composite 
index was constructed based on the averaged rankings of countries 
on the WEF surveys of 1997 to 2003 and the assessments of 
organized crime prevalence of an international risk assesment 
group (MIG), covering a total of 156 countries.3 This so called 
Organized Crime Perception Index (OCPI) refers to the level of 
different types of organized crime activities such as extortion and 
drugs, arms and people trafficking as perceived by potential victim 
groups and experts. The widespread perception among key 
persons that such activities are rampant in a country provides by 
itself no proof that this is actually the case, but it provides ground 
for further enquiries. It can be regarded as a statistical “marker” of 
organised crime presence. 
As mentioned above, instrumental violence, corruption of public 
officials and money-laundering are regarded as universal 
secondary characteristics of organized crime. It is hard to imagine a 
high level of organized crime in a country without a significant 
amount of these three systemic mafia-related phenomena. Lethal 
violence, for example, is not by itself a unique characteristic of 
organized crime. Nor is the absence of such violence hard 
evidence that organized crime is non-existent on the territory. 
However, a high prevalence of ‘killings’ in a country can be used as 
a ‘marker’ of mafia-type criminal activity. Where homicide rates are 
high, organised crime activity is likely to be significant and vice 
versa.  
Statistical indicators were selected for the prevalence of each of 
these three defining systemic characteristics or “markers” of 
organized crime activity in countries: instrumental violence, high-
level corruption and money-laundering. In an attempt to develop a 
proxy measure of ‘mob-related violence ’, rates were calculated of 
the number of police-recorded homicides per country minus the 
number of convictions for homicide. Both types of data were drawn 
from the latest UN crime and criminal justice surveys. The resulting 
rate of ‘unsolved homicides’ was used as proxy indicator of ‘mob-
related homicide’. Similarly a proxy indicator of ‘high level 
corruption’’ was derived from studies of the World Bank Institute. 
Indicators of money-laundering and the extent of the black 
economy were taken from the World Economic Forum reports.  
                                                     
3 For an explanation of the methodology of the index, please consult 
Kangaspunta, Joutsen and Ollus (1998) or van Dijk (2006). 
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The strong statistical relationships between the organized crime 
perception index and four other indicators of secondary 
manifestations of organized crime activity justify the construction of 
a composite organized crime index combining the five interrelated 
indicators. An important strategic advantage of the composite index 
is the incorporation of at least one objective measure of organized 
crime activity, the rate of unsolved homicides according to official 
administrations. Scores on this composite index cannot be 
dismissed by governments as being based on ‘just perceptions’. 
The scores are corroborated by the official ‘dead body counts’ of 
their own police authorities as reported to the United Nations 
through the Crime Survey. 
Table 2 depicts the regional distribution on the Composite 
Organized Crime Index, based on data from world regions. For 
diagnostic purposes, the table presents both the exact scores and 
rank number on the composite index and the rank numbers for the 
five source indicators used. 
Table 2 Regional mean scores on composite organized crime index (COCI) and data on 
source indicators: perceived organized crime prevalence, grand corruption, money-
laundering, extent of shadow economy and the rates of unsolved murders per 100,000 
population 
 Average of 
the 
composite 
organized 
crime 
index 
Organized 
crime 
perception 
(rank) 
Informal 
sector 
(rank) 
Unsolved 
homicides 
(rank) 
high level 
corruption 
(rank) 
money 
laundering
(rank) 
Oceania 33 1 1 1 2 1 
West and 
Central Europe 
35 2 2 2 4 3 
North America  44 4 4 4 6 4 
East and South 
East Asia 
45 5 3 7 3 6 
Central America  50 4 13 3 8 13 
Near and Middle 
East 
50 7 6 11 1 2 
World 54      
South Asia 54 14 8 8 7 11 
North Africa 55 6 5 6  5 
East Africa 55 12 9  11 9 
Southern Africa 56 10 12 5 12 10 
South America 58 11 14 10 13 12 
SouthEast 
Europe 
58 15 10 12 9 14 
West & Central 
Africa 
60 13 11 15 5 8 
East Europe  70 17 16 14 14 16 
Central Asia and 
Transcaucasian 
70 16  13 15  
Caribbean 70 9 15  16 15 
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The regional scores and rank numbers of the composite index 
and those on its five constituting indicators show a high degree of 
consistency. Deviations from the overall pattern are relatively high 
rank numbers on informal sector and money-laundering of the low 
crime region of Central America. Among the high crime regions, 
West and Central Africa shows a relatively low rank number on 
homicides. This result could point to a shortcoming in the available 
statistics - homicide statistics for Nigeria are for example missing - 
or to the different nature of organized crime in the region. Such 
blatant deviations at any rate suggest the need of focussed further 
research.  
 
 
Country scores 
 
The combination of data from different sources allows the 
calculation of scores for a large number of countries (see table 3). 
To facilitate assessments of the organized crime situation of 
countries both the absolute scores and rank numbers on the 
Composite Organized Crime Index and the rank numbers for each 
of the constituting indicators/markers are included. The rank 
numbers for different indicators are mostly in the same range as 
the COCI rank but many deviations can be found. Deviations of 
single indicators from the COCI rank can point to specific features 
of organized crime in the country or to deficiencies in some of the 
measures4. In both cases further research is indicated. In some 
cases the diagnosis can only be very tentative due to lack of 
sufficient information on the source indicators. At this stage of 
development, the utility of the index lies in the possibility to carry 
out analyses of the macro correlates of organized crime rather than 
in the benchmarking of individual countries (van Dijk, 2006).  
                                                     
4 It should also be noted that the total number of observations for indicators is 
somewhat smaller than for the COCI index. Especially the number of observations 
for unsolved homicides is available for significantly fewer countries (62). The 
formula used to calculate the index takes this into account. 
  133
Table 3 World ranking of countries according to scores on the 
Composite Organized Crime Index and source indicators (156 
countries)5 
Fifteen countries with the highest scores 
Country Composite 
organized 
crime index 
COCI 
rank 
Organized 
crime 
perception 
index 
rank 
Informal 
sector 
rank 
High level 
corruption 
rank 
Unsolved 
homicide 
rank 
Money 
launde- 
ring rank 
Haiti 100.00 1 1   10 
Paraguay 95.74 2 20 2   4 
Albania 93.90 3 1  19 2  
Nigeria 91.93 4 7 7 4  11 
Guatemala 91.57 5 21 10   1 
Venezuela 89.57 6 6 8 12  7 
Russian Fed. 88.20 7 14 17 3 4 16 
Angola 87.90 8 25 4   9 
Ukraine 87.40 9 9 6 2 16 2 
Colombia 86.81 10 3 41 26 1 5 
Mozambique 86.54 11 42 5   3 
Bangladesh 84.69 12 11 24   15 
Kazakhstan 83.78 13 49  7 3  
Pakistan 83.71 14 8 9 6 52 
Jamaica 83.42 15 17 16  22 
 
Fifteen countries with moderately high scores 
Country Composite 
organized 
crime index 
COCI 
rank 
Organized 
Crime 
Perception 
rank 
Informal 
Sector 
rank 
High level 
corruption 
rank 
Unsolved 
homicide 
rank 
Money 
launde-
ring rank
Bolivia 79.79 18 41 3 20  19 
Mexico 75.03 22 26 31 17  23 
Indonesia 74.51 25 13 60 5  42 
Peru 72.64 28 32 11 33 5 28 
Turkey 72.08 30 55 15 22  26 
Brazil 69.24 33 27 37 25  41 
South 
Africa 
66.07 38 16 39 38 8 54 
Argentina 59.39 48 34 21 30 59 14 
Egypt 56.17 56 58 46 36  59 
China 55.48 59 35 54 10 46 51 
India 53.79 64 56 38 29 33 43 
Italy 46.81 69 57 59 35 52 49 
United 
States 
36.36 81 85 85 45 15 84 
Japan 32.67 86 70 94 27 56 90 
Chile 30.59 90 90 74 57 21 85 
Canada 25.06 97 93 73 51 62 88 
 
 
                                                     
5 In the calculation of the composite OC index only the figures which are based on 
at least 2 values are showed. According to the GAD survey however, perception of 
crime is very high in Iraq, Congo, West Bank and Gaza (all in top 5) 
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Fifteen countries with the lowest scores 
Country Composite 
organized 
crime index 
COCI 
rank 
Organized 
Crime 
Perception 
rank 
Informal 
Sector 
rank 
High level 
corruption 
rank 
Unsolved 
homicide 
rank 
Money 
launde-
ring 
rank 
UK 23.90 99 99 84 62  94 
Norway 22.08 100 104 90 58 53 82 
Luxembourg 21.11 101 107 102   81 
Germany 20.21 102 101 89 56 57 92 
Switzerland 19.98 103 105 97 65 54 66 
Jordan 19.38 104 97 77  51 96 
Netherlands 18.91 105 95 92 66 41 93 
Denmark 18.41 106 112 86 64 42 89 
Sweden 18.30 107 111 80 60 44 98 
Australia 16.79 108 106 101 54 37 99 
Bahrain 15.28 109 89   49  
Singapore 14.10 110 110 99 61 58 97 
New Zealand 12.83 111 109 93 63 48 100 
Iceland 12.46 112 114 95   102 
Finland 10.41 113 113 98 67 34 101 
 
 
Within Europe organized crime prevalence increases diagonally 
from the North West to the South East, with levels being low in 
England and Germany, higher in Spain and Italy and by far the 
highest in Russia, Albania and Ukraine. 
As said, the country rates should not be taken at face value but 
be used as a basis for further enquiries. In Asia rates are the worst 
in parts of South Asia (Pakistan, Bangladesh). But also the 
emerging superpowers, China and India are rated above Italy on 
this composite index. In the international literature on organized 
crime India is rarely the focus of attention. Perhaps this is a serious 
oversight. Research on Chinese organized crime is mainly 
focussed on Chinese expatriates. Limited available research 
findings on homeland China point to collusion between corrupt 
communist party members and local gangs in remote areas 
(Zhang, 2002). More research on the role of the organized crime-
corruption in these two countries seems warranted.  
In Africa, Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique stand out with the 
highest scores. Nigerian organized crime activity in both the 
country and the region has been well-documented (Shaw, 2002, 
UNODC, 2005). A detailed account of how organized crime 
threatens to penetrate state and businesses in Southern Africa, 
notably in Mozambique, is given in Gastrow (2003). In Latin 
America Haiti, Paragua, Guatemala, Venezuela and Colombia 
show the highest scores. High scores are also observed in 
Jamaica. None of these scores will come as a surprise to informed 
readers. 
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The world map of organized crime emerging from this index 
differs fundamentally from that of conventional crimes. The 
perceived prevalence of organized crime and the overall ICVS 
rates of victimization by volume crime was found to be unrelated (r 
= 0.15, n.s.).  
The level of volume crime in a country says very little about the 
level of organized crime. This result suggests that levels of volume 
crime and of organized crime are determined by different factors at 
the macro level (van Dijk, Nevala, 2002). 
 
 
Towards a comprehensive index of lawfulness 
 
In this paragraph the various indices of crime and justice discussed 
will be integrated into one composite index of ‘lawfulness’. This 
lawfulness index allows a rapid identification of countries where the 
degree of ‘lawfulness’ is comparatively high and of those where it 
leaves something, or much, to be desired. We will also highlight the 
close links between rule of law and economic performance by 
showing the relative positions of countries on both ‘lawfulness’ and 
the Human Development Index. The results will illustrate the 
universality of the lawfulness development link across world 
regions, regardless of average levels of wealth. In each and every 
region countries with poor economic performance can seek 
inspiration for reform in the judicial infrastructures and related 
economic successes of neighbouring countries.  
As just said, we have called our ‘catch-all’ index of security and 
crime: the index of lawfulness. For a society to be lawful, it is not 
sufficient if the State plays by the rules and addresses crime 
problems effectively, civil society must also be part of the solution6. 
This notion has inspired Italian scholars to develop the concept of a 
‘culture of legality’ or ‘culture of lawfulness’. The concept of 
‘lawfulness’ refers to both the quality of formal institutions upholding 
the rule of law and the normative orientation of the public. The state 
and the citizens must mutually reinforce each other in their efforts 
to ensure a safe and just society7. 
                                                     
6 The concept ‘rule of law’- or ‘Etat de droit’ in French refers to the institutional and 
legal capacity of governments to uphold the law, including basic human rights. The 
concept refers to the relationships between the state and its citizens rather than to 
the relationships between citizens.  
7 A culture of lawfulness is described as a culture supportive of the rule of law : 
‘Without such a culture, there would almost certainly be more crime. Most people 
act in a manner consistent with the law because of their expectations that others 
will behave similarly and that this is best for everyone. In the absence of a culture 
of lawfulness, many will be freer to satisfy their immediate needs and preferences, 
even in the presence of elaborate laws. On the other hand, without laws and law 
enforcement, the culture of lawfulness is, on its own, unlikely to provide for the rule 
of law. There must be specific processes for rulemaking and rule enforcing. The 
culture needs enforcement, but the enforcers need the culture’ (Godson, 2000). 
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In the previous paragraphs we presented a series of indicators 
which capture different aspects of the ‘culture of lawfulness’. 
Statistical indicators were presented of several aspects of the state 
of crime in countries. In our opinion the most reliable, comparative 
measure of conventional crime is the percentage of the public 
victimized by conventional crime as measured by a standardized 
victimization survey (the ICVS). A new indicator of perceived 
prevalence of organized crime was constructed, based on surveys 
among business people and security experts. This indicator was 
found to be closely related to the rates of unsolved homicides, 
grand corruption, money-laundering and the size of the informal 
economy (see Tables 3 and 4). Another new indicator of street 
level corruption was constructed, using ICVS data and data from 
other sources (Buscaglia, van Dijk, 2000). This indicator was 
closely correlated with the well known Corruption Perception Index, 
annually published by Transparency International, covering a very 
large number of countries (Transparency International, 2003).  
In order to include as many countries as possible, we decided to 
use the ICVS overall victimization rate, the organized crime 
perception index and the corruption perception index of TI of 2002 
as constituting components of a comprehensive index of 
lawfulness.  
Elsewhere several performance measures were presented of the 
functioning of the security and justice sector in countries (van Dijk, 
2006). One of the key indicators is a newly designed composite 
police performance index, based on subjective and objective 
measures. Widely used is a composite measure of the rule of law, 
designed by the World Bank Institute (Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 
2003). We decided to include these two criminal justice 
performance indicators in the new index of lawfulness as well. 
Our statistical analyses have shown that indicators of organized 
crime, corruption, police performance and rule of law are closely 
related to each other. They are also, though less strongly, related 
to the indicator of conventional crime, the ICVS victimization rate. 
Using the scores on these five main indicators of the state of crime 
and justice, a composite index of lawfulness was constructed, 
covering 158 countries.  
This comprehensive index reflects both the quality of domestic 
legislation and legal institutions (the indicators of police 
performance and the rule of law) as the extent to which nationals 
are exposed to the three main types of crime (conventional crimes, 
organized crime and corruption). It captures in one single index the 
main dimensions of the statistical data on levels of crime and 
justice currently available. 
  137
The index was constructed in such a way that high scores reflect 
comparatively high levels of justice and low levels of crime. 
Countries were included in the ranking only if three or more 
sources were available.8 
 
Table 4 presents country scores according to this new index. 
 
Table 4 World ranking of countries according to scores on the index 
of lawfulness, combining indicators of police performance, rule of law 
and of the prevalence of various types of crime  
 
Twenty-five countries with highest country scores: 
1 Iceland 100.0 10 Netherlands 91.2 19 Barbados 83.5 
2 Switzerland 99.1 11 Norway 91.0 20 Chile 83.5 
3 Denmark 98.0 12 Austria 90.6 21 Jordan 83.2 
4 Finland 97.3 13 Canada 89.8 22 Hong Kong 82.5 
5 Luxembourg 97.1 14 United 
Kingdom 
89.8 23 Belgium 82.1 
6 Australia 95.5 15 Ireland 85.7 24 Puerto Rico 81.4 
7 Sweden 94.3 16 United States 84.7 25 Israel 81.4 
8 New Zealand 92.2 17 Malta 84.5       
9 Singapore 92.2 18 Germany 84.1       
 
Twenty-five countries with moderately high scores 
26 Japan 81.0 73 Poland 56.4 112 Cuba 42.2 
27 France 80.9 80 Turkey 52.9 123 Iran 40.3 
33 Tunesia 77.7 85 Bulgaria 51.4 125 Nigeria 39.7 
34 Botswana 76.9 87 Argentina 50.8 129 Albania 38.9 
39 Spain 71.7 88 South Africa 50.8 130 Mexico 37.5 
47 Italy 68.5 98 Indonesia 46.3 132 Guatemala 36.3 
63 Thailand 59.7 104 Russian Fed 44.7 133 Colombia 36.2 
65 India 58.8 107 Brazil 43.3    
68 China 58.2 109 Algeria 43.2    
 
                                                     
8 One of the indicators of perceived organized crime prevalence is based on the 
ratings of an international network of security experts working for one of the major 
security consultancy firms (MIG). Similarly based on the opinions of locally-based 
experts the USA-based PRS Group offers country ratings on a variety of risk 
dimensions to the international business community (www.countrydata.com). One 
of their risk dimensions is a measure of the degree of law and order in a country, 
assessing ‘the strength and impartiality of the legal system’ and ‘popular 
observance of the law’. With these two components the measure captures both the 
quality of criminal justice responses and the general state of crime. As a check on 
the soundness of our own comprehensive index of lawfulness, we looked at the 
relationship between the country scores on this index and on the law and order 
ratings of the PRS Group. The two measures were found to be highly correlated 
(r= .79; N= 156). 
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Twenty-five countries with the lowest scores 
134 Sierra Leone 35.0 143 Honduras 32.2 152 Sudan 24.7 
135 Cote d'Ivoire 34.2 144 Tajikistan 31.8 153 Kenya 23.8 
136 Jamaica 34.1 145 Turkmenistan 29.2 154 Pakistan 23.7 
137 Eritrea 33.8 146 Venezuela, RB 29.1 155 Bangladesh 20.6 
138 Cameroon 33.7 147 Congo, Rep. 28.9 156 Iraq 15.9 
139 Angola 33.6 148 Burundi 26.1 157 Congo, 
Dem rep 
14.5 
140 Niger 33.1 149 Myanmar 25.8 158 Haiti 13.7 
141 Ecuador 32.5 150 Yemen, Rep. 25.8    
142 Bosnia&Herz. 32.5 151 Chad 25.7    
 
The country scores are also presented in the form of a global map. 
 
Figure 2 World map of the degree of lawfulness of countries, 
reflecting the state of security and crime across the world 
 
 
As discussed in chapters seven and fifteen, organized crime, 
police performance and rule of law are linked to the level of 
terrorism: where governance and criminal justice are weak, 
organized crime is more prevalent and more terrorist attacks are 
launched. Our index of lawfulness was, as expected on the basis of 
these previous findings, correlated with the index of terrorism (r= 
.37). Although the terrorism index was not itself included in the 
measure of lawfulness, high scores on lawfulness indicate low 
levels of all types of crime, including terrorism. It can rightly be 
World Countries
by law fullness
77.8 to 100   (30)
59.7 to 77.8  (30)
47.6 to 59.7  (30)
39.9 to 47.6  (28)
13.7 to 39.9  (33)
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seen as a comprehensive measure of the state of security and 
justice in countries. 
 
 
Lawfulness and human development 
 
The governance-economic performance link is well-established in 
recent work of the World Bank Institute and others (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2003). As was to be expected, our index of 
lawfulness is strongly related to indices of Human Development (r.= 
.69, n= 158, p< 0.000). The correlation between lawfulness is 
strongest for the group of Western countries (r.= .83). Within 
Europe the correlation is almost perfect (r.= 91). On the basis of the 
lawfulness index, the level of human development of individual 
European countries can be estimated within very small margins. In 
other world regions the correlations between lawfulness and human 
development are also strong. 
In Figure 3 we present a final overview of our analytic results in 
the form of scatter plots depicting the degree of lawfulness of 
countries and their level of human development worldwide and for 
the Western countries respectively. The scatter plots visualize once 
again how closely human development and lawfulness are linked. 
Although the precise causal mechanisms at play are not yet fully 
understood, improvements on the vertical axis depicting human 
development seem hard to obtain without concurrent improvements 
in lawfulness.  
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Figure 3 Country scores on the comprehensive index of lawfulness 
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Conclusion 
 
Those convinced of the utility of collecting and analyzing 
comparative crime statistics for political and academic reasons, find 
themselves in a quandary. Because of the intrinsic opposition of 
many governments, the production of international crime and 
justice statistics is chronically underfunded. As a result, the case for 
such statistics must be made on the basis of fragmentary, dated 
and in some respects flawed statistics. In this situation, many 
experts are inclined to stay on the scientifically safe side: if 
international crime statistics are presented it is to illustrate their 
methodological weakness rather than their potential to inform policy 
making and advance grounded theories of crime at the macro level. 
From a scientific perspective such a cautious approach might be 
commendable. But as Aebi, Killias, and Tavares (2003) as well as 
Kaufmann et al. (2003) have pointed out, it plays in the hands of 
those who prefer such information not to be, or ever become, 
available for self serving, political reasons. It means capitulating to 
political forces that would prefer comparative criminology to remain 
‘statistically challenged’ for ever. In our opinion, the time has come 
to break the politically imposed omerta of criminologists on 
comparative crime and justice. The new generation of 
criminologists is well-travelled and increasingly internationally 
oriented in its interests. They will hopefully revolt against the 
conspicuous absence of credible international statistics in their 
chosen field of study. The time has come to fully exploit the 
potential of survey research among general and special 
populations to arrive at sound indicators of crime and perceived 
performance of criminal justice and to combine these with improved 
statistics on manpower and performance. With the help of such 
comprehensive sets of metrics on crime and justice, macro 
criminology will finally get out of its slumber and increase the scope 
and policy impact of the discipline. 
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Everything has been said already, but as no one listens, we must 
always begin again quoted in Malimath Committee on Reforms of 
Criminal Justice System for India, 2003 
Stronger than the tread of armies is an idea whose time has 
come. Nowhere is this more true than in relation to implementing 
basic guarantees to ensure that victims of crime, terrorism and 
abuse of power are treated in line with fundamental principles of 
justice. Nowhere is this more true than ensuring that governments 
use what is known to reduce victimization. 
HEUNI has played a critical role in bringing reason to criminal 
policy but it also has done more to make crime policy across 
Europe and the world balanced. It has stood for efforts to prevent 
crime and enforce laws. It has fought with the pen to remind 
governments that human rights are not just for the accused but for 
the public and victims of crime. Tremendous progress has been 
made in identifying what needs to be done. Almost every aspect of 
crime policy involves issues of victims. Yet much work still remains 
to get a strategic vision in place that reduces the numbers of 
victims of crime, saves taxpayers money and treats youth at risk as 
troubled instead of just trouble. 
The shift is difficult from internationally recognized standards to 
international implementation of those standards. No government 
can afford to throw more and more of taxpayers’ funds to policies 
that are exclusively geared to reaction and repression. It is time to 
get smarter with how law enforcement and criminal justice are 
used. It is time to balance the expenditures on reactive and 
repressive enforcement with investment in pre-emptive and 
preventive strategies. It is time to guarantee support and justice for 
victims of crime, terrorism and abuse of power. HEUNI must stay 
the course. 
It is time for all professionals who interact with victims to be 
trained and follow guidelines to provide aid and respect for victims. 
The future for victims depends on the support of lawyers, law 
professors, citizens and so on to help governments to take action to 
pass legislation that: 
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• addresses victim rights 
• promotes programs to provide victim assistance 
• institutes policies that prevent and reduce victimization.  
 
Canada is just one country where policies and programs lag a 
long way behind public opinion and internationally recognized 
human rights standards for victims of crime and abuse of power. It 
was CAVEAT a grass roots victim lobby group in Canada that 
organized a petition that got two and half million signatures – more 
than any other in Canadian history on any issue.  
Treating victims fairly and effectively does not take rocket 
science. It takes firm decisions to act. Yet the federal, provincial 
and territorial governments still confuse punishment of offenders 
with support and justice for victims. Action to bring support and 
justice for victims of crime in Canada up to international standards 
is long overdue. Canada´s parliamentary committee on Victims: A 
voice not a veto set out some minimal actions to bring support and 
justice for victims up to international standards but the actions fall 
far short. Canada is an inventor of world famous innovations to 
meet the needs of victims but these remain isolated successes in a 
patchwork of services and support. 
As we will see below, governments across western Europe now 
are supposed to meet universal standards for support services, 
mediation and so on. The USA has radically transformed support 
and justice for victims of crime. Following the murder of the spouse 
of a distinguished senior lawyer and a petition of 500,000 
signatures, the Prime Minister of Japan intervened to pass 
legislation to establish fundamental principles of justice for victims 
of crime including a high level committee to implement the required 
programs. Countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Mexico 
have all modified their constitution to include a set of rights for 
victims. Yet victims of crime in most countries in the world remain 
orphans of justice policy. 
In Less Law, More Order (Waller, 2006), I argue that 
governments should take the following percentages from their 
expenditures on law enforcement and criminal justice and 
reallocate them  
• five per cent for effective prevention of victimization 
• three percent for the services, compensation and legal 
assistance that is needed for victims of crime 
• two percent to fund the reform process that is needed to make 
support and justice for victims as well as effective prevention of 
victimization a reality.  
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Governments cannot hide behind the excuse that they do not 
have the funds when so much progress can be made through such 
a small percentage of what they currently spend. Using a 
percentage rather than absolute sums make the effort 
proportionate to the means of the country. So why not act? 
Now it is time to move towards a convention on support and 
justice for victims of crime, abuse of power, and terrorism with the 
support of governments, academics and non-governmental 
organizations. Like the petitions in Canada and Japan, we must 
organize petitions to demonstrate the interest of voters in fair 
treatment for victims. 
 
 
Challenge 
 
One in four adults will be a victim of some type of common theft, 
assault or other crime each year in almost every country in the 
world according to the International Crime Victim Survey. Children 
and youth will be bullied and abused. Many more will be the victims 
of offenses committed by drivers of cars. 
They will all suffer loss, injury and trauma as a result of crime. 
The rights of these victims still have not been adequately 
recognized. In addition, the decreasing proportion who contact law 
enforcement or criminal justice will suffer hardship when assisting 
in the prosecution of offenders. 
It is not more police, prisoners or judges that will reduce crime 
but real investment in tackling the risk factors that cause crime and 
victimization. Without this investment in what is known to reduce 
victimization, countries will stand by for a rapidly rising number of 
victims who deserve attention and assistance when the economic 
momentum slows. 
Victims are a silent and forgotten majority in our midst. Not all of 
those victims will suffer death but the rates of violence against 
women alone should make our political elite rethink their strategic 
plans in line with recommendations such as those of the World 
Health Organization (2004, 2004, 2002) or the National Research 
Council of the US (see Waller, 2006). The World Health 
Organization can add statistic after depressing statistic on violence 
against women and children, violence between young persons and 
so on. 
Someone once said “The death of one man is a tragedy, but the 
death of millions is but a statistic.” We often fail to see the tragedies 
behind the statistics. The names, faces and voices of those 
tragedies should be seen and heard. But the political elites must do 
the simple things that will make a difference. 
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If you become a victim of a crime, you need to be treated 
decently, caringly and justly even if law enforcement and criminal 
justice systems do not give much of their time. If you are robbed 
walking down the street, it should be your right to expect other 
citizens to come to your help. If you call the police or walk miles to 
a police station, it should be your right to expect the officer to listen 
to you and assist you in getting social or medical assistance, 
information on what he will do, and what services can support you. 
If you are a victim of sexual assault, it should be your right to get an 
officer or counsellor of the same gender. It should be your right to 
get medical attention and counselling to recover.  
It should be your right to get reliable information on how to avoid 
being attacked again. It should be your right to be able to seek 
restitution from the offender expeditiously and be paid before the 
offender pays money to the State. If you are injured and the 
offender cannot pay reparation, it should be your right to get 
compensation from the State. It should be your right to participate 
in the criminal court process with legal representation to protect 
your safety, your search for the truth and your need for restitution. 
But more than anything, you want recognition of what has 
happened.  
 
 
International standards 
 
Criminal justice in today’s world falls far short of addressing victim 
needs even in the best of systems. 
In 1985, the governments of all the nations of the world adopted 
the resolution of the UN General Assembly which called upon 
Member States to take the necessary steps to give effect to the 
provisions contained in the Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, inter alia by: 
a) implementing social, health, including mental health, 
educational, economic and specific crime prevention policies to 
reduce victimization and encourage assistance to victims in 
distress;  
b) sponsoring collaborative action-research on ways in which 
victimization can be reduced and victims aided, and to promote 
information exchanges on the most effective means of so doing; 
c) rendering direct aid to requesting governments designed to 
help them curtail victimization and alleviate the plight of victims; 
 
The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power defines who are victims of crime and 
abuse of power, and clarifies that the principles of justice include: 
1. Access to justice and information 
2. Reparation 
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3. Compensation from the State 
4. Services 
 
Since then, considerable progress has been made internationally, 
including: 
• UN General Assembly adoption of the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in 2005. 
• Establishment of the UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime in 2000 and its optional protocol in 2002 on 
trafficking that include specific sections for victims; 
• UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) interest in 2002 in 
the Basic Principles for the Implementation of Restorative Justice in 
the context of Criminal Law; ECOSOC adoption in 2005 of the 
Guidelines on Justice in Matters Involving Child Victims and 
Witnesses; 
• ECOSOC acceptance in 2002 of the UN Guidelines for the 
Prevention of Crime; 
• Adoption of the Statute of Rome in 1999 (and later the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence) to establish the International Criminal 
Court; 
 
Also some implementation initiatives have included: 
• Courses by the UN Institutes such as those recently organized 
by UNAFEI on violence against women and children, another on 
prevention of victimization and a third on victim support and justice. 
• UN Commission funding in 2003 for 19 pilot projects to 
implement the UN Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power from 1985; 
• UN Commission approval of the Guide for Policy Makers on 
Implementation of the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, and the Handbook on 
Justice for Victims on the Use and Application of the Declaration of 
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 
in 1999; 
• UN Commission endorsement of the website 
www.Victimology.nl in 1998; 
 
When governments ratify the Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the optional protocol on trafficking, they 
commit to action for victims. They have agreed norms on crime 
prevention and also on restorative justice. The majority of nations 
ratified the Statute of Rome which gives effect to the principles in 
the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power. Indeed several of the operative paragraphs 
are taken verbatim from that declaration. Also, they have recently 
adopted the Guidelines on Justice in Matters Involving Child 
  149
Victims and Witnesses, inspired by the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
Victims are the central reason for the work of the World Health 
Organization to prevent violence. Why not make the prevention and 
support of victims the central focus for the strategic plan of the UN 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice? Why not a 
commission on outcomes rather than processes? Why not rename 
it, the UN Commission on Safety and Justice? 
In December 2005, the World Society of Victimology WSV and 
the International Victimology Institute (INTERVICT) at the 
University of Tilburg in The Netherlands brought together experts 
from across the world for an informal meeting on ways to promote 
the use and application of existing international standards and 
norms on victims of crime and similar violations. This meeting 
prepared a draft resolution for the meeting of the UN Commission 
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Vienna in April, 2006. 
This resolution was adopted in a modified form that encouraged the 
organization of an inter-governmental meeting of experts on the 
implementation of the UN standards and norms on victims of crime. 
This meeting identified the need to be clear about the scope of 
action, rights and duties, and implementation and monitoring. It saw 
a need to find a way of assisting governments to be accountable for 
their commitments to prevention as well as support and justice for 
victims, including access to justice, protection, information, 
assistance, restitution, restorative justice and compensation. It also 
prepared a draft convention to achieve this. 
There is a special opportunity to mobilize public opinion 
throughout the world to encourage governments to act in 
conjunction with global lobbying campaigns, including petitions.  
 
 
National achievements 
 
Laudable progress has been made by affluent governments to 
implement the principles of the Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. Progress has 
been greatest in Western Europe, North America, Australia and 
New Zealand. Yet even for these countries, much work remains. In 
particular, the WSV has called attention to the exemplary progress 
achieved by some Member States in: 
• enacting legislation that puts the basic principles of justice into 
domestic laws so that a high level office will implement policies and 
programs to provide comprehensive measures for victims of crime 
– Canada has not done this 
• providing victims of crime with better information, support 
services, reparation from offenders, compensation from the state 
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and a role in criminal proceedings – Canada still only has a 
patchwork, 
• establishing programs to protect victims of crime who are 
vulnerable because of gender or age such as all-women police 
stations and measures to protect child victims – Canada has talked 
much but done little 
• appointing permanent boards and enacting legislation to 
promote the use of effective and proven crime prevention 
measures at all levels of government – Canada has reached first 
base but no Province has got close. 
 
Some rich governments have acted to assist some victims some 
of the time. They have some victim services; they provide for 
reparation to victims from offenders, which is paid occasionally; 
they have some compensation available from the State for the most 
injured victims; and they allow some input from victims to the 
criminal justice process. They undertake victimization surveys on 
large samples of adult members of the population that show how 
frequently adults are victims, how few report to the police and how 
many suffer loss, injury and trauma. 
In the USA, the Victims of Crime Act (1984; Waller, 2004) 
provides an inspiring example for the world. It raises over one 
billion US dollars from fines on federal offenders who are often rich 
corporations and individuals, to stimulate action by US States to 
multiply victim services, state compensation and bills of rights. 
Much of these funds are focused on women who are victims of 
sexual assault and domestic violence but other victims should also 
benefit. Even so, their federal Office for Victims of Crime continues 
to call for action to go from a patchwork system to universal 
services and programs to educate lawyers, judges and others on 
victim rights. 
In the European Union (‘EU’), a mandatory standard (Framework 
Decision) has been established so that every government in the EU 
will provide basic services for victims, reparation and mediation 
(See Waller, 2003, 25-27 and 60-64 for discussion and text). They 
have forced each government to report on progress. Other affluent 
countries have similar provisions but without the requirement for 
monitoring. The EU decision must be adapted to countries in the 
world. 
In the 1980s, Brazil launched police stations where victims of 
violence against women and children could go. These stations had 
only women officers. Today these stations have spread across the 
developing world. Just one example in the world is the State of 
Tamil Nadu with a population of 65 million, where the woman Chief 
Minister has established 200 all-women police stations. That same 
Chief Minister is hiring thousands of female police officers in part to 
staff these stations.  
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Since the 1960s in France, victims of crime have had a right to 
be represented by a lawyer funded by the State if necessary – just 
like offenders in other countries have a right to a defence lawyer. 
This makes justice in France inclusive of victims, offenders and the 
State. This obvious procedure is missing in other countries. It 
provides some guarantee that victims can get at the truth, protect 
their personal safety, seek and get restitution, avoid senseless and 
inconvenient judicial hearings, and so on. 
In 2000, Rwanda established a system of community justice – 
Gaçaça (pronounced gachacha). Today in every part of Rwanda, 
village communities get together in the shade of a tree to listen to 
surviving victims and suspected offenders. The rules of procedure 
are few. Those victims and offenders were neighbors who killed, 
raped and often infected victims with AIDS. When the community 
justice is finished, the offender will often apologise, express shame 
and make some reparation. The offender will also receive a prison 
sanction but likely less and sooner than if he had waited for the 
classic system of justice. 
In 2004, Japan put the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power into their national 
legislation. The Prime Minister established a powerful cabinet level 
committee to ensure that the principles would be imitated. The 
principles include services for victims, reparation from the offender, 
information about criminal justice, and a right to participate in the 
criminal justice process to protect their interests. 
Technical assistance, training and funds must be provided to 
multiply these successes across the world. Many examples of the 
best practices that could be adapted to countries across the world 
are set out in my text for the Soros Foundation (Waller, 2003). 
Governments must re-examine these international norms and 
invest in programs that will treat victims with dignity, whether 
children, women or whatever. 
 
 
Next steps 
 
Action must be taken to advance research, services and 
awareness for victims across the world. This requires persons 
committed to these ideals, better services, more research, 
innovative education and training, and continued advocacy and 
rights. It requires a process of assessing progress and acting to 
make the necessary improvements. It requires permanent 
victimology institutes. It requires a convention with teeth. 
The WSV has called on States to take concrete steps now to 
overcome the lack of recognition for the plight and justice for 
victims in the 21st century, including: 
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a) victims of transnational organized crime, corruption, terrorism, 
and economic crime, 
b) making standards work for victims, 
c) reforming criminal justice, including restorative justice, to assist 
victims and provide justice for all including victims, 
d) prevention of victimisation, 
e) women and children who are victimised, particularly within their 
families. 
 
The concrete steps for victims of crime should include: 
1. Legislation that puts the basic principles of justice for victims 
into national laws with an office to implement the programs 
comprehensively, 
2. Training and guidelines for police, lawyers, health 
professionals and others to ensure proper and prompt aid and 
respect for victims, 
3. Projects to provide services to assist and support victims, 
4. National policies to prevent and reduce victimisation, 
particularly based on the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime 
(2002), 
5. Actions to implement guidelines to overcome the particular lack 
of recognition for victims who are women and children, 
6. Research and surveys to monitor victimisation, services and 
justice for victims and implement effective countermeasures, 
7. Institutes to sustain the reforms that are needed to prevent 
victimisation, assist victims and provide justice for all, including the 
victim. 
 
The mission of the WSV is advancing research, services and 
awareness for victims. It achieves this through four purposes: 
 
1. To promote research in victimology and on victim needs 
WSV organizes research workshops on victimological issues and 
victim needs at its international symposia, including national and 
international surveys on victims, analysis of the consequences of 
victimisation and evaluations of the effectiveness of services and 
processes for victims. It fosters the publication of the proceedings 
from its international symposia. It makes available on its website an 
international bibliography of documents on victimology and victim 
issues. Its research committee was created to advance 
victimological research throughout the world and encourage 
interdisciplinary and comparative work in this field. It is a partner 
with the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands and the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime in the website www.victimology.nl, which provides 
extensive documentation on victim issues on the web. 
Aims: 
• foster more research on the implementation of the Declaration of 
the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
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Power, including the extent to which countries have implemented 
the Declaration and the barriers that must be overcome for greater 
implementation 
• create the capacity to evaluate practices for victims according to 
recognised international standards 
• foster research that compares the consequences and responses 
to victims of crime, abuse of power and other stark misfortunes 
• be recognized internationally as the leader for advancing 
research on victim issues and theory 
• foster research on the extent to which the International Criminal 
Court has implemented services that meet the legislated needs of 
victims. 
 
2. To provide services for victim service providers and 
victimologists 
WSV organizes workshops on services for victims at its 
international symposia. Its committee on victim services was 
established to provide a network of victim services around the 
globe and to develop a knowledge basis for training and technical 
assistance based on the Declaration of the Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. 
 
Aims:  
• support a database of victim service agencies across the world 
in order to facilitate the referral of victims for services in countries 
where needed 
• encourage list-serves for service providers in major languages in 
addition to English 
• bring together information on model practices so that reforms 
can benefit from best practices 
• assist the International Criminal Court with its mandate to assist, 
protect and respect rights for victims 
• determine the potential WSV role to facilitate financial and 
political leadership, and bring together crisis intervention and other 
services for victims in extraordinary crises such as catastrophic 
incidents  
• encourage relevant institutions and agencies – e.g. Human 
Rights Commissions – to monitor the availability and standards of 
services for victims. 
 
3. To provide education and training 
WSV organizes international courses on victimology and victim 
assistance. The two week course on victimology, victim assistance 
and criminal justice has been organized annually since 1984 in 
Dubrovnik. Similar courses on victimology and victim assistance 
have been organized for the world in Mito, Japan since 1998, for 
Central America in San Salvador since 2001, for South America in 
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Caracas since 2002, and a course was organised in South Africa in 
2003. It worked with the UN to develop the Guide for Policy Makers 
on the Implementation of the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and Handbook on 
Justice for Victims on the Use and Application of the Declaration of 
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power. It has fostered the translation of these books into other 
languages including French and Spanish. 
Aims: 
• convince law schools and others involved in the training of 
criminal justice professionals to include courses on victimology, 
victim rights and issues, and convince those who certify 
qualifications, such as bar associations, law enforcement and 
judicial bodies, to require this knowledge 
• encourage university courses and degree programs on 
victimology, including victim assistance, victim rights, crisis 
response, restorative justice and victimisation prevention 
• promote a system of credentials for victim service professionals 
(staff and volunteers) and establish international standards  
• establish a program to mentor and develop leaders able to 
influence action on behalf of victims 
• establish international courses in regions where they do not yet 
exist 
• encourage reciprocal training of victim service practitioners from 
different countries 
• host an annual training course for international victim service 
providers 
• develop standards for curricula and disseminate training 
materials 
• develop a mechanism for authorizing the use of the WSV logo 
and mission statements for courses and other activities 
 
4. To advance advocacy and rights 
WSV played a leadership role in promoting the adoption by the UN 
General Assembly of the Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power in 1985. It continues to 
lobby governments on the importance of legislative and program 
reforms to meet those basic principles, particularly through its UN 
Liaison Committee at the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice and at quinquiennial UN Congresses on crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice. It has encouraged the adoption of 
the UN norm based on the International Bureau of Children’s 
Rights’ Guidelines on Child Victims and Witnesses. It has 
advocated project grants for pilot projects to implement the 
Declaration as provided by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. 
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Aims: 
• advocate increased funding for research and services for victims 
to accelerate implementation of the Declaration 
• promote a convention on the implementation of the Declaration  
• raise political and public awareness of victim issues and rights 
• encourage organisations and others committed to reducing the 
number of victims of all types 
• organise events to interest government officials in making 
greater progress in the implementation of the Declaration 
• establish a WSV representative in each country to assist with 
information on victim issues and rights and advocate for 
improvements 
• foster national societies for victimology to pursue national 
missions and activities similar to the WSV 
• encourage mechanisms to provide an early warning system to 
prevent abuses of power and protect potential victims from stark 
misfortunes. 
 
At the WSV’s 12th International Symposium in Orlando, Florida, 
USA, in 2006, the draft Convention on Rights for Victims of Crime, 
Abuse of Power and Terrorism will be discussed. Much more needs 
to be done at international and regional levels. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The governments, academics and non-governmental organizations 
of the world must face the challenge of millions of children, women 
and men who suffer loss, injury and trauma when they are 
victimized by crime, abuse of power and terrorism every year.  
International standards and norms on victims call for investment 
in strategies that will tackle the risk factors that cause this 
victimization rather than only spend more on police, prisoners and 
judges. These focus on the importance of national and municipal 
offices that will spearhead the investment in programs to tackle the 
reasons why youth are at risk, the availability of handguns and 
more intelligent use of police. 
Those UN standards and norms call for support and justice for 
victims of crime, abuse of power and terrorism such as those set 
out in the draft convention. Already many examples exist of 
inspiring practices as to how victims could and should be treated 
better. Governments must not only legislate and revise their 
constitutions but allocate a percentage – I recommend 10% – of 
their expenditures to the reforms and implementation that is 
needed. 
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The time for action was more than ten years ago. Ten years 
from now we will realize that the time for action was now. So 
stronger than the tread of armies, prevention of victimization, 
support and justice for victims are practical actions whose time has 
come. 
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Imprisonment levels throughout the world are growing. Early in 
2005 there were over 9 million people held in penal institutions, 
either as pre-trial detainees or having been convicted, compared 
with 8 million some six years earlier. In that time increases were 
recorded in 73% of countries, and in a similar percentage of 
countries in each of the five continents1. 
The following paragraphs set out the situation in European 
countries over the last ten years, comparing figures for 2005 with 
those for 2000 and 19952. To some extent they update material in 
HEUNI Paper No.10 (1997), which described European prison 
population levels from 1985 to 19953. 
 
 
Changes in prison population levels 1995-2005 
 
The main feature of European imprisonment levels between 1995 
and 2005 has indeed been their growth. More than three quarters 
of prison administrations (32 out of 42) had more prisoners in 2005 
than in 1995, and in one half (16) of those that registered growth 
the increase was more than 30%. In another nine countries the 
increase was over 20%. (Table 1) 
                                                     
1 These are the estimated totals in the 1st and 6th editions of the World Prison 
Population List. Walmsley, R. (1999). World Prison Population List, Research 
Findings 88, Home Office, London. Walmsley, R. (2005). World Prison Population 
List (sixth edition), International Centre for Prison Studies, King’s College, London. 
2 A table showing the full figures used in this analysis is at the end of the article. 
3 Walmsley, R. (1997). Prison Populations in Europe and North America. HEUNI 
Paper No.10, Helsinki. 
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Table 1 Increases in European prison population levels 1995-2005 
 
 
 
It is to be noted that the countries that have registered large 
increases are not confined to a particular part of the European 
continent. Those with traditionally low levels, such as the 
Netherlands, Scandinavian/Nordic countries and countries from 
former Yugoslavia (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Serbia, Slovenia) have registered increases as much as countries 
from other parts of Europe. 
Ten countries registered a decrease in their prison population 
between 1995 and 2005, of which six were formerly members of 
the former Soviet Union. (Table 2)  
Cyprus   +241.2% 
Bosnia & H. – Federation   +167.8% 
Netherlands   +102.4% 
Macedonia (FYROM)     +99.3% 
Ireland     +66.4% 
Spain     +52.5% 
Malta     +52.0% 
Serbia & M. – Serbia     +50.0% 
U.K. – England & Wales     +49.5% 
Greece     +48.8% 
Austria      +43.7% 
Luxembourg     +39.2% 
Slovenia     +36.8% 
Norway     +32.1% 
Finland     +31.0% 
Hungary     +30.2% 
Poland     +28.1% 
Bulgaria     +27.5% 
Croatia     +26.5% 
Slovakia     +26.3% 
Belgium     +24.0% 
Sweden     +22.3% 
Denmark     +22.1% 
Germany     +21.6% 
U.K. – Scotland     +20.1% 
Italy     +13.9% 
Turkey       +8.8% 
Switzerland       +8.1% 
Georgia       +7.4% 
Portugal       +4.7% 
Estonia       +3.7% 
France       +2.5% 
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Table 2 Decreases in European prison population levels  
1995-2005 
 
Lithuania   - 36.4% 
U.K. –  
Northern Ireland 
   
  - 25.3% 
Belarus   - 24.3% 
Latvia   - 20.6% 
Russian Federation   - 17.1% 
Romania   - 11.3% 
Ukraine     - 7.7% 
Moldova     - 4.1% 
Iceland     - 3.4% 
Czech Republic     - 2.2% 
 
These ex-Soviet countries include those with the highest prison 
population rates (per head of the national population) in Europe in 
1995; the decreases thus represent moves towards the level 
elsewhere in Europe. However, the scale of the decreases has 
been insufficient to change the overall picture: in 2005 they remain 
six of the seven countries with the highest European levels. The 
seventh, Estonia, is of course another ex-Soviet country. (Table 3) 
 
Table 3 Countries with highest European prison population rates 
(per 100,000 of national population), 2005 
 
 Prison population rate, 
2005 per 100,000 of 
national population) 
Russian Federation 532 
Belarus 426 
Ukraine 398 
Estonia 339 
Latvia 331 
Moldova 260 
Lithuania 237 
 
Over the ten-year period 1995-2005 prison populations in a 
number of countries have fluctuated. While, as has been noted, the 
overall picture is one of growth in most countries, the growth has 
not always been steady throughout the period. In five of the 
countries that had the highest rises over the ten-year period 
(Bosnia & Herzegovina: Federation, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and 
UK: England & Wales) growth was much greater in 1995-2000 than 
in 2000-2005. In some other countries (for example Belarus, the 
Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey 
and Ukraine) the prison population rose in the period 1995-2000 
but has since fallen. In yet another group of countries (for example 
Croatia, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia and UK: 
Northern Ireland) the population fell between 1995 and 2000 but 
has risen in more recent years.  
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Changes in prison population levels 1995-2005 
 
Focusing on the most recent period - the last five years - the main 
feature of European imprisonment levels between 2000 and 2005 
has again been their growth. More than 70% of prison 
administrations (33 out of 47) had more prisoners in 2005 than in 
2000, and in over a half (17) of those that registered growth the 
increase was more than 25%.(Table 4) 
Table 4 Increases in European prison population levels 2000-2005 
 
Luxembourg +65.7% 
Macedonia (FYROM) +61.8% 
Cyprus +57.2% 
Netherlands +49.8% 
Croatia +49.1% 
Finland +46.3% 
Poland +41.6% 
Iceland +40.2% 
Bosnia & H. – Federation +37.8% 
Albania +37.2% 
Slovakia +36.5% 
Spain +36.0% 
U.K. – Northern Ireland +32.7% 
Austria +28.8% 
Denmark +28.0% 
Andorra +27.1% 
Serbia & M. – Serbia +25.4% 
Sweden +24.2% 
Norway +19.8% 
France +18.6% 
Ireland +18.4% 
U.K. – England & Wales +17.9% 
Malta +16.0% 
U.K. – Scotland +16.0% 
Slovenia +15.2% 
Bosnia & H. – Rep. Srpska +12.5% 
Hungary +9.5% 
Greece +9.0% 
Belgium +8.1% 
Bulgaria +7.2% 
Italy +5.7% 
Georgia +3.5% 
Germany +2.2% 
 
The countries that registered decreases over this five-year 
period are again dominated by former members of the Soviet Union 
(nine out of fourteen). 
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Table 5 Decreases in European prison population levels  
2000-2005 
 
Armenia - 61.2% 
Lithuania - 43.6% 
Russian Federation - 28.0% 
Belarus - 26.6% 
Turkey - 24.4% 
Azerbaijan - 22.3% 
Romania - 21.6% 
Czech Republic - 20.5% 
Ukraine - 15.1% 
Latvia - 13.3% 
Switzerland - 4.4% 
Estonia - 3.1% 
Portugal - 1.4% 
Moldova - 0.8% 
 
This then is the overall situation in respect of European 
imprisonment levels over the last ten years.  
 
 
The need for detailed analysis of prison population changes 
 
What is needed is detailed analysis of the changes in each country, 
examining their causes, whether these be linked to changes in 
crime patterns, police practice, sentencing policy or legislation, or 
to political pressures, initiatives by individual politicians or other 
factors. Such issues have been addressed by scholars in many 
countries and some comparative work has also been done. But 
there is scope for a broad comparative study focused on ways of 
avoiding the growth in prison populations and reducing the high 
levels in parts of the continent. As is well known, imprisonment is 
an expensive option that can be used more sparingly without 
compromising its value in protecting citizens from serious crime.  
The following are some examples of factors that have influenced 
recent trends in countries that are among those that have shown 
the largest increases or decreases since 2000. But in each of these 
countries more detail is needed as to the interplay of these and 
other causal factors. For instance, new or amended legislation that 
has led to increases in the prison population may have been the 
result of political pressures, which may have developed as a result 
of changes in crime patterns. By contrast, legislative change 
leading to reductions in the prison population may have occurred 
as a result of a wish to bring numbers down to levels in other 
European countries.  
Criminal justice experts in individual countries, some of whom 
may have already published on the subject, are likely to be able to 
shed light on the reasons for the changes in their countries and to 
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offer documentary and statistical evidence to support their 
conclusions. They may also be able to indicate some of the 
measures that would be necessary in order to avoid prison 
population growth in their country and to reduce high levels where 
these currently obtain. 
 
 
Countries that have seen increases in prison population levels since 
2000 
 
Austria: The main reason for the increase in the Austrian prison 
population is the rising number of foreign prisoners from Eastern 
Europe and South Eastern Europe, mainly Georgia, Russia, 
Ukraine and the Balkans. Having been involved in organized crime 
they receive long sentences. There is also a very large increase in 
the number of black African drug dealers in prison. These are fairly 
young people, often without any documents. 
Bosnia & Herzegovina – Federation: More than 80% of the 
increase between the end of 2000 and the end of 2005 occurred in 
the first of these five years. It represented a continuation of the 
period of normalisation of the prison population following the 
artificially low figure when the Bosnian war finished at the end of 
1995. (During the war the prison population was greatly reduced 
since combatants sometimes freed prisoners who agreed to fight 
for their particular national group.) 
Finland: The increase in the prison population in the last few years 
is associated with an increase in the number of foreign prisoners 
(mainly from Russia and the Baltic countries), an increase in drug 
trafficking (often linked with the former groups), an increase in the 
number of fine defaulters, in the number of prisoners on remand 
and in the number of persons imprisoned for offences of violence4.  
Luxembourg: The sharp increase in the prison population in the last 
few years (65.7% between 2000 and 2005) is associated with an 
increase in the number of foreign prisoners, especially foreign 
prisoners who are not resident in the country. There was an 
increase of 259 prisoners between 2000 and 2005; over the same 
period the number of foreign prisoners increased by 243 (94%). 
Macedonia: Most of the sharp rise between 2000 and 2005 
occurred in the last three years: the increase between September 
2002 and November 2005 was over 80%. Although there has been 
no noticeable shift in the pattern of the offences of newly admitted 
prisoners, the prison administration has noticed a rise in the 
number of prisoners who have been involved with drugs and who 
need medical treatment. 
                                                     
4 Lappi-Seppälä T. (forthcoming). ‘Penal Policy in Scandinavia’, in Crime and 
Justice, 37. 
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Netherlands: The 50% rise in the prison population between 2000 
and 2005 is seen as a result of more severe criminality and, as a 
consequence, more severe sentences. Prior to 2000 a life sentence 
(which in the Netherlands actually means lifetime imprisonment) 
was hardly applied; in 2004 six life sentences were imposed and in 
2005 nine such sentences. Overall prison sentences have become 
harsher. In recent years legislators have increased statutory prison 
sentences for a number of offences. 
Poland: In the year 2000, which had started with a prison 
population of less than 57,000, the Minister of Justice called for 
more restrictive use of bail and the deputy head of the lower house 
of Parliament called for heavier sentences for manslaughter, 
aggravated assault, armed robbery, rape and trafficking in women. 
These and other developments, notably a tightening up of the 
circumstances in which conditional release is granted, led to a 
sharp increase in the prison population. It passed 70,000 before the 
end of 2000 and reached 80,000 at the end of August 2001. 
Spain: Legislation was introduced in 2003 in order to ensure that 
prisoners serve the entire length of their sentence. A major revision 
of the penal code in that year is also believed to have contributed to 
the increase in the prison population, as is legislation of 2004 
concerning violence against women. 
UK - Northern Ireland: During the time of the political troubles, the 
political activists on both sides of the divide kept a very tight grip on 
‘ordinary’ criminal activity. Most low-level local crime resulted in firm 
action by the activists, who regarded part of their remit as keeping 
their own communities safe. This has changed considerably since 
the Belfast Agreement: there has been a loosening of this control 
and it is reported that many of those previously involved in low level 
political violence have now turned to crime. This has resulted in a 
steady rise in the prison population since 2001. 
 
 
Countries that have seen decreases in prison population levels since 
2000 
 
Armenia: A large amnesty in 2001 reduced the prison population by 
over 40%. A new criminal code introduced in 2003 is also believed 
to have contributed to the further reduction in the prison population. 
Latvia: The decrease in the prison population has not been 
associated with any reduction in crime levels. An amendment to the 
criminal law in 2001 limited the time that can be spent in pre-trial 
detention and a probation service was established in January 2004. 
These two factors, especially the former, have contributed to the 
recent fall in the prison population. 
Lithuania: A large amnesty in mid-2000 reduced the prison 
population by almost 40%. As a result of new legislation (Criminal 
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Code, Criminal Procedural Code and Penal Executive Code), which 
came into force in 2003, a first time offender sentenced for a minor 
crime is usually sentenced to a non-custodial penalty, a broader 
range of alternatives to imprisonment became available and the 
use of conditional release was increased. 
Romania: Legislative changes in 2002 and 2003 made it less likely 
that convicted offenders would receive sentences of imprisonment. 
Changes to the Criminal Procedural Code in 2004 removed from 
prosecutors the power to order pre-trial imprisonment and remand 
in custody was limited to 180 days. 
Russian Federation: The Ministry of Justice instituted substantial 
changes in legislation affecting the prison system. The Federal Law 
of March 2001 aimed to achieve a significant liberalisation and 
refocusing of criminal policy and to reduce the use of imprisonment, 
so that those who commit minor offences or those of medium 
gravity are only imprisoned in exceptional cases. At the same time 
more opportunities were provided for bail and sureties to be used 
instead of pre-trial detention. These measures made a large impact 
on the Russian prison population. 
Turkey: An amnesty law reduced the prison population by more 
than 40% (about 30,000 prisoners) between 2004 and 2005. An 
amnesty in 2000 reduced the numbers by about 10,000. 
Overcrowding has been causing significant problems in Turkish 
prisons and amnesties are seen as an appropriate way of tackling 
this situation. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Note: I am grateful, for their assistance in connection with these last two 
sections, to Ana Balan, Andrew Coyle, Irina Isajeva, Irene Koeck, Tapio Lappi-
Seppälä, Necati Nursal, Peter Tak and Vincent Theis. 
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Annex 
 
 
EUROPEAN IMPRISONMENT LEVELS 
 
Prison populations and prison population rates (per 100,000 of national population) 
1995-2005 
 
 
Total prison 
population 
(and prison 
population 
rate)1995 
Total prison 
population 
(and prison 
population rate) 
2000 
Total prison 
population 
(and prison 
population rate) 
2005 
Variation 
in prison 
population 
1995-2005 
Variation  
in prison 
population 
2000-2005  
 
Albania 2,544 (75) 3,491 (111)  +37.2%
Andorra 48 (72)* 61 (90)*  +27.1%
Armenia 7,428 (195) 2,879 (89)  -61.2%
Austria 6,180 (77) 6,896 (86) 8,883 (108) +43.7% +28.8%
Azerbaijan 23,504 (291) 18,259 (219)*  -22.3%
Belarus 54,869 (535) 56,590 (566) 41,538 (426) -24.3% -26.6%
Belgium 7,561 (75) 8,671 (85) 9,375 (90) +24.0% +8.1%
Bosnia&Herzegovina-
Federation 
536 (21) 1,041 (42) 1,435 (55) +167.8% +37.8%
Bosnia&Herzegovina 
- Republika Srpska 
849 (65)* 955 (68)  +12.5%
Bulgaria 8,529 (101) 10,147 (124) 10,871 (140) +27.5% +7.2%
Croatia 2,388 (51) 2,027 (44) 3,022 (65) +26.5% +49.1%
Cyprus 170 (26) 369 (56)* 580 (76)* +241.2% +57.2%
Czech Republic 18,753 (181) 23,060 (224) 18,343 (179) -2.2% -20.5%
Denmark 3,438 (66) 3,279 (61) 4,198 (77) +22.1% +28.0%
Estonia 4,401 (304) 4,712 (343) 4,565 (339) +3.7% -3.1%
Finland 3,018 (59) 2,703 (52) 3,954 (75)* +31.0% +46.3%
France 51,623 (89) 44,618 (77) 52,908 (88) +2.5% +18.6%
Georgia 8,048 (179) 8,349 (213) 8,644 (202) +7.4% +3.5%
Germany 66,146 (81) 78,707 (96) 80,413 (97) +21.6% +2.2%
Greece 5,887 (56) 8,038 (74) 8,760 (82)* +48.8% +9.0%
Hungary 12,703 (124) 15,110 (148) 16,543 (164) +30.2% +9.5%
Iceland 119 (44) 82 (29) 115 (39)* -3.4% +40.2%
Ireland 2,054 (57) 2,887 (75) 3,417 (85)* +66.4% +18.4%
Italy 49,642 (87) 53,481 (94) 56,530 (97) +13.9% +5.7%
Latvia 9,633 (381) 8,815 (364) 7,646 (331) -20.6% -13.3%
Lithuania 12,782 (351) 14,412 (411) 8,125 (237) -36.4% -43.6%
Luxembourg 469 (114) 394 (90) 653 (143) +39.2% +65.7%
Macedonia (the 
former Yugoslav 
republic of) 
1,132 (58) 1,394 (69) 2,256 (111) +99.3% +61.8%
Malta 196 (53) 257 (65)* 298 (74)* +52.0% +16.0%
Moldova 9,781 (263) 9,449 (259) 9,377 (260) -4.1% -0.8%
Netherlands 10,249 (66) 13,847 (87) 20,747 (127) +102.4% +49.8%
Norway 2,398 (55) 2,643 (59) 3,167 (68) +32.1% +19.8%
Poland 62,719 (163) 56,765 (147) 80,368 (211) +28.1% +41.6%
Portugal 12,343 (124) 13,106 (128)* 12,929 (122) +4.7% -1.4%
Romania 43,990 (194) 49,790 (222) 39,015 (180) -11.3% -21.6%
Russian Federation 920,685 (622) 1,060,401(729) 763,054 (532) -17.1% -28.0%
Serbia & Montenegro 
- Montenegro 
734 (108)*  
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Serbia & Montenegro 
- Serbia 
5,150 (52)* 6,160 (76) 7,724 (93) +50.0% +25.4%
Slovakia 7,412 (138) 6,858 (127) 9,363 (174) +26.3% +36.5%
Slovenia 825 (41) 980 (49) 1,129 (56) +36.8% +15.2% 
Spain 40,157 (102) 45,044 (112) 61,246 (142) +52.5% +36.0%
Sweden 5,767 (65) 5,678 (64) 7,054 (78) +22.3% +24.2%
Switzerland 5,655 (80) 6,390 (89) 6,111 (83) +8.1% -4.4%
Turkey 49,895 (82) 71,860 (106) 54,296 (76) +8.8% -24.4%
Ukraine 202,590 (395) 220,306 (448) 187,075 (398) -7.7% -15.1%
United Kingdom: 
England and Wales 
50,962 (99) 64,602 (124) 76,190 (143) +49.5% +17.9%
United Kingdom: 
Northern Ireland 
1,740 (105) 980 (58) 1,300 (76) -25.3% +32.7%
United Kingdom: 
Scotland 
5,657 (111) 5,855 (116) 6,794 (134) +20.1% +16.0%
 
* Andorra - the figures are for 1/9/01 and 1/9/03 
* Azerbaijan – the figure is for 1/9/04 
* Bosnia & Herzegovina (Republika Srpska) – the figure is for 
November 2001 
* Cyprus – the figures are for 1/9/01 and 1/4/06 
* Finland – the figure is for 1/4/06 
* Greece – the figure is for 16/12/04 
* Iceland – the figure is for 1/9/04 
* Ireland – the figure is for 30/9/04 
* Malta – the figures are for 1/9/01 and 30/9/04 
* Portugal – the figure is for 15/8/01 
* Serbia & Montenegro (Montenegro) – the figure is for 1/9/03 
 
 
Sources: 
 
National prison administrations, mainly as a result of direct 
communications or via the Council of Europe Annual Penal 
Statistics. 
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Judicial Cooperation in a Borderless Nordic Area 1 
 
 
Fredrik Wersäll  
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Sweden 
 
 
The importance of Nordic co-operation 
 
On an international scale, the Nordic countries have an almost 
unique potential for close co-operation in the legal area. In addition 
to our geographical proximity, we have open borders with very 
heavy travel flows. We have a common labour market and an 
increasingly intertwined business sector. We also have very 
pronounced cultural similarities. There is a fundamental sense of 
trust between the Nordic countries. In the legal area, this trust has 
expressed itself in both extensive legislative co-operation as well as 
close co-operation between the authorities at all levels.  
For many years, we have also had an extremely efficient and 
well-functioning co-operation between public prosecutors and the 
police in our Nordic countries. One important feature of this co-
operation is that our prosecutors and police have for many years 
been able to collaborate with and contact each other directly across 
borders without the involvement of central authorities.  
The Nordic co-operation is described in various international 
contexts as a model of well-functioning regional co-operation. 
Nordic extradition legislation, for example, was a source of 
inspiration when the framework decision on the European arrest 
warrant was drawn up within the EU.  
 
 
The EU has taken the lead 
 
Over the past ten years, European co-operation in criminal matters 
has undergone extensive development, above all within the EU. 
For example, the EU has adopted methods involving direct 
communication that allow the crime investigation authorities to 
make direct cross-border contact. In addition, a large number of 
legal instruments have been adopted in order to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of co-operation within the EU. This 
applies not only to the new provisions for surrender based on a 
European arrest warrant, which within the EU has replaced the 
traditional extradition procedure, but also the preconditions and 
procedure applied for providing different forms of legal assistance 
                                                     
1 This contribution is based on an article that was published in Nordisk Tidsskrift for 
Kriminalvidenskab in June 2006  
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across borders and the forms for setting up joint investigation 
groups. The European public prosecution office, Eurojust, has also 
created entirely new preconditions for co-ordinating cross-border 
criminal investigations within the EU. 
There has been no corresponding development of the Nordic co-
operation. The result is that co-operation within the EU has just 
about managed to catch up with the Nordic co-operation, and that 
the preconditions for co-operation across the Nordic borders are 
nowadays more or less on a par with what apply for co-operation 
with other EU countries. I presume that the European development 
has required all available energy during recent years. This has in 
part been at the expense of Nordic co-operation.  
 
 
What has been done? 
 
However, a certain amount of development is taking place. In 
December 2005, the Ministers of Justice of the Nordic countries 
signed a convention on surrender between the Nordic states 
(Nordic arrest warrant). The background to the Convention is one 
of the conclusions at the meeting between the Nordic Ministers of 
Justice in Svalbard in 2002 – that the extradition procedure within 
the Nordic area shall be made more simple and more effective. The 
Convention is based on the EU framework decision on the 
European arrest warrant. However, in several respects it goes 
further, for example in that no double criminality requirement and 
no penalty thresholds shall apply and in that the Nordic convention 
contains fewer grounds for refusals and shorter deadlines than the 
EU framework decision.  
This is all well and good, of course, and I think that the final 
result is sound and offers tangible improvements compared with 
the situation we have today, with two parallel systems for 
extradition/surrender of persons within the Nordic countries. At the 
same time, I regret that the EU framework decision was adopted as 
the starting point for the negotiations. In my opinion, the starting 
point should have been to simplify and streamline the joint Nordic 
extradition legislation, not to work out a Nordic variant of the EU 
regulations for the surrender of persons, which is based on entirely 
different preconditions for co-operation.  
The Nordic solidarity, the confidence in the legal systems of the 
neighbouring Nordic countries and, above all, the legal similarities 
in the Nordic countries and the many years of close co-operation 
between our law enforcement authorities pave the way for a 
considerably more ambitious and advanced co-operation than is 
possible to achieve within the EU. This is something we must take 
advantage of. I know that I am in good company with the Swedish 
Minister of Justice, who ever since the Meeting of Nordic Ministers 
of Justice in Visby in 1998 has been promoting the further 
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development of criminal law co-operation under the motto of “a 
borderless Nordic area”.  
The results to date are unfortunately fairly meagre.  
 
Where is that sense of daring that was demonstrated by the 
Nordic Ministers of Justice in the middle of the last century, when 
they were prepared to allow public prosecutors and the police to 
co-operate directly across borders? The Nordic countries decided 
as early as in the 1950s to adopt a trusting attitude to extradition 
co-operation, with low penalty thresholds, the extradition of own 
citizens and a waiving of double criminality and – in the mid-1970s 
– a diluted rule of speciality. All this has now been transferred to 
the European instruments.  
Another example is the 1948 Convention between Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway, which contained provisions on the 
recognition and enforcement of, inter alia, fines and forfeiture. The 
Convention also contained provisions to the effect that orders 
relating to sequestration and seizure that have been issued in order 
to safeguard claims on forfeiture should be recognised and 
enforced in the other countries. The Swedish provisions stating that 
such decisions should be enforced were introduced in 1948 and 
were in 1963 transferred to the Nordic Enforcement Act 2 at the 
same time as the other Nordic countries passed similar laws.  
Admittedly, I do not believe that these provisions have been 
used to any major extent. The police and public prosecutors have 
chosen to apply for legal assistance in another Nordic country in 
order to bring about coercive measures in that other country rather 
than to request the immediate enforcement of domestic coercive 
measures. But the fact remains: as early as in 1948 we were 
prepared in the Nordic countries to apply the principle of mutual 
recognition that was launched within the EU at the summit meeting 
held in Tampere in 1999. 
The reasons which during the last century justified effective and 
far-reaching Nordic criminal law co-operation have today grown 
even stronger. International criminality continues to increase. 
Criminals pay no attention to national borders. The authorities 
responsible for investigating crimes must also be able to disregard 
national borders when crimes are to be investigated and put to trial 
within the Nordic area.  
                                                     
2 Section 1, second paragraph of the Act (1963:193) on co-operation with 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway on the enforcement of punishment.  
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Vision – a borderless Nordic area 
 
In the vision of a borderless Nordic area is included full 
implementation of the principle of mutual recognition and 
enforcement of orders that are issued in the course of criminal 
investigations and legal proceedings. An order that has been 
issued in a Nordic country during a criminal investigation or trial 
shall be recognised, and shall be possible to enforce in other 
Nordic countries without any form of review whatsoever.  
Included in such a vision is that it shall be possible to transfer 
individuals by force across the national borders in the Nordic area 
as easily as it is today possible to move them by force in one and 
the same country in the course of a criminal investigation or trial.  
This means that it shall be possible for a detention order that has 
been passed by a court of law in a Nordic country to be quite easily 
executed by the police in another Nordic country if the person is 
found there, without further review. In my opinion, an order of this 
type does not create any misapprehensions whatsoever from the 
point of view of legal security. The guarantees relating to legal 
security that the wanted person shall enjoy can and should be 
provided by the authorities in the country in which the investigation 
or trial takes place and not by the authorities in the country in which 
the person in question is found. For example, an objection 
regarding ne bis in idem could equally well, or perhaps even better, 
be examined where the investigation or trial is taking place. I very 
much doubt that anyone will contradict me if I say that legal security 
is served just as well in all of our five Nordic countries. Why should 
there need to be any form of extradition or surrender procedure 
within the Nordic area? Why should it be more complicated for a 
Swedish public prosecutor in Malmö to get a wanted person who is 
found in Copenhagen than if he or she had been found in the 
northern parts of Sweden? 
Furthermore, I see no reason why a system along these lines 
should not also be applied vis-à-vis a country’s own citizens who 
are the subject of a criminal investigation or legal proceedings in 
another Nordic country. Our confidence in the legal systems of 
other Nordic countries is so firmly founded that there is no reason 
in this context to demand that our own citizens be treated any 
differently. Finnish authorities can represent the interests of 
Swedish citizens just as well as Swedish authorities can.  
I also feel that Swedish police should be able to put into 
immediate effect an order by a Norwegian court regarding the 
handing over of a Swedish witness who failed to appear at a court 
hearing in Oslo. Similarly, it should be possible to transfer a witness 
who is deprived of his or her freedom in Sweden to another Nordic 
country for questioning during a criminal investigation or trial 
without the review that today has to be conducted in accordance 
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with the provisions governing legal assistance in criminal matters. 
In my opinion, it should be possible for this kind of appearance to 
be made as simply and formlessly as when a witness who is 
deprived of his/her freedom is to be heard in the course of a 
Swedish criminal investigation or trial in another part of Sweden.  
Also decisions on sequestration and seizure that are issued in 
one Nordic country should be recognised and enforced immediately 
in other Nordic countries without further review in the country of 
enforcement. The provisions on the recognition and enforcement of 
coercive measures for the purpose of securing the enforcement of 
forfeiture that already apply within the Nordic area3 should be 
revived and re-applied in practice. In the same way, it should be 
possible for decisions to search premises and decisions to carry 
out secret wire-tapping that have been issued in another Nordic 
country, and which is enforceable in that country, to be recognised 
and enforced in other Nordic countries without any need for further 
review in the country in which they are to be enforced. It is enough 
for the question to be considered and for a decision to be issued 
once – in the country in which the investigation is in progress or the 
trial is being held.  
Fully implemented, the vision of a borderless Nordic area would 
mean that the Nordic countries would accept the exercise of public 
authority by other countries’ authorities on their own territory. I am 
not averse to the thought, even though the question, of course, 
contains numerous complications and also requires changes in the 
Constitution. But it is high time for the question to be taken up for 
discussion. For example, to my way of thinking there is every 
reason to allow police and public prosecutors from one Nordic 
country to question suspects and witnesses who are in another 
Nordic country without the need for domestic police or public 
prosecutors to be involved and formally be responsible for the 
questioning. It should be enough for the authorities in the country in 
question to be informed of the fact that the officials from the other 
country intend to come to the country and conduct a questioning. 
Another example where there could be some justification in 
allowing foreign exercise of public authority on one’s own territory is 
if Finnish police have strong indications to the effect that a person 
wanted in Finland is in a certain place on the Swedish side of the 
border. In such a situation, it should in my opinion be perfectly 
possible for the Finnish police to inform the Swedish police of what 
is taking place and then make the arrest themselves without 
needing to ask Swedish authorities for assistance.  
To my way of thinking, a reform like this would not need to 
create too much of a sensation. I regard it rather as being a 
perfectly natural development of, among other things, the 
provisions concerning cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit 
                                                     
3 See above 
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that have been brought into force as a consequence of the 
Schengen co-operation and the regulations for co-operation 
between the police in the Baltic Sea region that were introduced 
when the Öresund Bridge was completed. In point of fact, it is more 
remarkable that the Nordic countries did not dare – long before the 
Schengen co-operation and the Öresund Bridge made it necessary 
– to introduce provisions that are better adapted to suit the reality 
with which our police and public prosecutors have for many years 
been confronted, not least in connection with daily border co-
operation.  
It is therefore in my opinion high time that the visionary 
development work in the area of criminal law be revived within the 
Nordic countries. With this kind of initiative, I also believe that the 
Nordic area could serve to an even greater extent as a model and 
take on even more of a leading role in the corresponding work 
within the European Union.  
 
 
